

# Does our DNA keep us awake?

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\*\*\*abstract\*\*\*

## 1 SNPs and insomnia

### 1.1 Introduction and goals

✂ [Some intro about insomnia and its symptoms here](#)

Every single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP), together with the huge variety of external factors, can in principle affect the appearance of insomnia symptoms. It is extremely complicated to identify and untangle these causal mechanisms and interactions and to ascertain their degrees, although their causal graph (Pearl 2009) is easy to draw (fig.\*\*). The interacting mechanisms represented by the arrows are difficult to study, and the external factors  $X$  are innumerable and largely unknown.

An indication of the causal strength of one or more SNPs on one or more symptoms can be obtained by replacing the causal graph with a corresponding simplified Bayesian network (Pearl 2009) of *conditional probabilities* (fig.\*\*). The external factors  $X$  disappear from the graph but their presence is implicit in the probabilistic relation between the nodes; the latter also accounts for the complexity of the causal mechanisms and our uncertainty about them. This is the approach of genetic association studies ✂ \*\*\*ref.

The present work has two distinct goals:

First, we present evidence of a strong association between some SNPs located in \*\*\* and the three main insomnia symptoms ✂ [name the relevant SNPs here?](#), within population sampled in\*\*\*. Our results involve associations between each symptom and several SNPs individually, and also associations between each symptom and *pairs* of SNPs; the latter result shows different kinds of interaction between the alleles of a SNP pair.

Second, we give a detailed but intuitive discussion of the Bayesian method used to infer the associations described above. Similar methods have been used for other kinds of association studies, for example contextual text prediction (MacKay et al. 1995) and population-specific allele count (Lockwood et al. 2001). This method gives simple, clear, and intuitively understandable inferences about symptom-SNP associations; it is computationally fast; and it is easy to generalize to association studies of symptom *combinations* vs *multiple* SNPs, as we'll show in later sections.

The Method section of this work focus on explaining our Bayesian approach, but use the real data from which our results are derived. In the subsequent Result section we discuss the different relevant associations found.

## 1.2 The data

✂ [description of our data here](#)

# 2 Methods

## 2.1 Outline

Let's first focus on the simplest kind of association: between one particular SNP with two alleles  $a$ ,  $b$ , and one symptom  $S$ . In an arbitrarily large population, consider the fraction  $f_{S|a}$  of individuals that show symptom  $S$  among those having allele  $a$ , and the fraction  $f_{S|b}$  among those having allele  $b$ . These are *conditional relative frequencies*. If these conditional frequencies are markedly different, then we can conclude that the SNP must have some causal relevance, however indirect, for the symptom.

We want to quantify our degree of belief about the values of such conditional frequencies in an arbitrarily large population, given (1) the conditional frequencies in a population sample, (2) a representation of our initial information about such frequencies. In formulae,

$$p(\text{conditional frequencies} \mid \text{sample data, initial information}).$$

Degrees of belief follow the probability calculus (Jeffreys 1983; Cox 1946; Jaynes 2003; Hailperin 1996), hence to quantify our belief we use

Bayes's theorem:

$$p(\text{frequencies} | \text{data}, \text{initial info}) \propto$$

$$p(\text{data} | \text{frequencies}, \text{initial info}) \times p(\text{frequencies} | \text{initial info}). \quad (1)$$

The first degree of belief in the product above is given by a simple sampling formula; the second can be modelled in several ways, but if the sample data are enough it will lead to basically the same final degrees of belief about the conditional frequencies.

Once we have a quantified distribution of belief about the conditional frequencies in an arbitrarily large population, it is easy to see whether we expect the latter to be significantly different for different alleles. See for example the distributions in fig. 1: from the sample data we expect conditional frequencies 0.259 and 0.284 for the symptom conditional on the two alleles, with standard deviations 0.008 and 0.006. From the two belief distributions we can even calculate our belief that the two conditional frequencies are equal to within some range; in the case of the figure our belief that the two frequencies are the same within 0.01 is 3.2%. Many other quantifications are possible; for example our belief that a conditional frequency lies between two particular values, and so on.




Figure 1 Example of distributions of belief

✂ add something about dependence of broadness on sample size, and ‘smoothing’ as discussed by MacKay & Bauman Peto (1995 § 2.6).

This approach is not dichotomous, unlike a ‘significance’ test. Rather, we will find a graduation of cases: from frequencies predicted to be clearly distinct, to frequencies with uncertainties too large for drawing definite conclusions. These cases can be sorted, obtaining a sequence of SNPs with a decreasing belief of causal association with the symptom. How many of these SNPs are to be selected for further study depends on one’s experimental and computational resources.

In the next sections we use formula (1) to estimate the limit frequencies given a sample of 6029 individuals from ✂\*\*\* details here. We shall first focus on the conditional frequencies of each insomnia symptom given one SNP at a time. The inferences in this case are very simple, intuitive, and easily visualizable. In the subsequent sections we shall consider the study of each symptom given *pairs* of SNPs, and the study of all possible eight *symptom combinations* given one SNP at a time.

### 3 Inference

✂ Add some remarks about the role of these ‘limit frequencies’. Relation to partial exchangeability and belief about next individual in an endless sequence.

Consider for definiteness symptom  $A$  and a particular SNP with alleles  $a, b$ . The limit conditional frequencies are denoted  $f_{A|a}$  and  $f_{A|b}$ . Denote the sample data by  $D$  and our initial beliefs by  $I$ . We want to quantify our belief about these frequencies jointly, expressed by the density function

$$p(f_{A|a}, f_{A|b} | D, I). \quad (2)$$

According to Bayes’s theorem (1), the belief above is proportional to the product of  $p(D | f_{A|a}, f_{A|b}, I)$  and our initial belief  $p(f_{A|a}, f_{A|b} | I)$ . Let’s consider these in turn.

In our hypothetical large population a fraction  $f_{A|a}$  of individuals having allele  $a$  shows symptom  $A$ , and a fraction  $1 - f_{A|a}$  doesn’t show that symptom. Then, upon sampling  $N_a$  individuals with allele  $a$ , our

belief that a fraction  $F_{A|a}$  of these will show symptom  $A$  and a fraction  $1 - F_{A|a}$  won't show this symptom is

$$p(n_{A|a} | N_a, f_{A|a}, I) = f_{A|a}^{N_a F_{A|a}} (1 - f_{A|a})^{N_a (1 - F_{A|a})}, \quad (3)$$

and analogously for allele  $b$ . Our belief about obtaining data  $D = (F_{A|a}, F_{A|b})$  is therefore

$$p(D | N_a, N_b, f_{A|a}, f_{A|b}, I) = \prod_{x=a,b} f_{A|x}^{N_x F_{A|x}} (1 - f_{A|x})^{N_x (1 - F_{A|x})}. \quad (4)$$

Our initial degree of belief about the limit conditional frequencies is based on this main assumption: we expect the frequencies conditional on the two alleles,  $f_{A|a}$  and  $f_{A|b}$ , not to be wildly different. This is a conservative assumption. Therefore, if our updated belief conditional on the data will show clearly distinct conditional frequencies, it will be because the data have given enough evidence to overwhelm our initial conservative belief.

The kind of density representing this initial belief is qualitatively shown in fig. 2. Mathematically we write it as an integral:

$$p(f_{A|a}, f_{A|b} | I) = \int_0^\infty d\alpha \int_0^1 d\nu \beta(f_{A|a} | \alpha, \nu) \beta(f_{A|b} | \alpha, \nu) \pi(\alpha, \nu), \quad (5)$$

where  $\beta(\cdot | \alpha, \nu)$  is a beta density with shape parameters  $\alpha\nu$  and  $\alpha(1 - \nu)$ :

$$\beta(f | \alpha, \nu) := \frac{\Gamma(\alpha)}{\Gamma(\alpha\nu) \Gamma[\alpha(1 - \nu)]} f^{\alpha\nu} (1 - f)^{\alpha(1 - \nu)}, \quad (6)$$

and  $\pi$  is a density that we leave unspecified for the moment: several different expressions for  $\pi$  will be used, to test how much our inferences depend on our initial belief.

We write  $p(f_{A|a}, f_{A|b} | I)$  in the above fashion, with integrals, only to emphasize that our beliefs about  $f_{A|a}$  and  $f_{A|b}$  are not disjoint, and to show how their mutual dependence comes about: by first considering two independent densities having the same parameters, and then mixing over these parameters.




Figure 2 Qualitative plot of our initial belief

This construction has the interesting consequence that the our updated belief  $p(f_{A|a}, f_{A|b} | D, I)$  can be formally written in the following way:

$$p(f_{A|a}, f_{A|b} | D, I) = \int d\alpha \int d\nu \, p(f_{A|a}, f_{A|b} | \alpha, \nu, D, I) p(\alpha, \nu | D, I), \quad (7)$$

with

$$p(\alpha, \nu | D, I) \propto \int df_{A|a} \int df_{A|b} \, p(D | f_{A|a}, f_{A|b}, I) p(f_{A|a}, f_{A|b} | \alpha, \nu, I). \quad (8)$$

This representation is discussed in appendix\*\*\*. It is as if  $\alpha, \nu$  were unknown parameters, and our update for the frequencies proceeded by first updating our belief about the parameters and then marginalizing them out. This is a so-called *hierarchic* model (Good 1980). A point rarely emphasized in the literature is that there is no mathematical difference between a hierarchic and a non-hierarchic model: we could forget about the integrals in formula (5) and about the update formula (7), and simply treat  $p(f_{A|a}, f_{A|b} | I)$  as the density depicted in fig. 2, with update (1). The results would be the same. The hierarchic way of thinking, though, often helps in constructing densities that better represent our initial beliefs,

and also leads to formulae that can be better approximated when exact computation is unfeasible.

## 4 Summary of the main formulae

We have a sample of size  $n$ . We check the subsample of individuals that have a particular allele, say Bx, for a particular gene, say rs697680\_A. Suppose that in this subsample  $n_0$  individuals *don't* show symptom A and  $n_1$  *do* show symptom A. This also means that the size of our subsample (individuals with allele Bx) is  $n := n_0 + n_1$ .

Our degree of belief about the frequency  $f_1$  of symptom A among the individuals with allele Bx in an *infinite* population is a Beta distribution with parameters  $n_0 + \theta_0$ ,  $n_1 + \theta_1$ , with  $\theta := \theta_0 + \theta_1$ :

$$p(f_1 | n_0, n_1, \theta_0, \theta_1) df_1 = \frac{\Gamma(n + \theta)}{\Gamma(n_0 + \theta_0) \Gamma(n_1 + \theta_1)} (1 - f_1)^{n_0 + \theta_0 - 1} f_1^{n_1 + \theta_1 - 1} df_1 \quad (9)$$

This distribution has expected value and variance

$$\begin{aligned} E(f_1 | n_0, n_1, \theta_0, \theta_1) &= \frac{n_1 + \theta_1}{n + \theta}, \\ \text{var}(f_1 | n_0, n_1, \theta_0, \theta_1) &= \frac{(n_0 + \theta_0)(n_1 + \theta_1)}{(n + \theta)^2 (n + \theta + 1)}. \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

✂ Possible further developments: use of hyper-Dirichlet priors, use of graphical models to infer causal relationships (Pearl 2009)

## Thanks

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## Bibliography

(‘de X’ is listed under D, ‘van X’ under V, and so on, regardless of national conventions.)

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