Release 2.0.0 · polius/VAULT

A redesign of the app and a new file format. Files from VAULT 1.x still decrypt.

The container listens on port 8080, not 80, and runs as a non-root user. Change -p 80:80 to -p 80:8080 (or "80:80" to "80:8080" in Compose).
New file format (version 3). Files encrypted by 2.0 can't be opened by VAULT 1.x.
Empty files encrypted by VAULT 1.x are refused, because that format couldn't authenticate them: any password would have "opened" them.

Encrypt several files or a whole folder at once: they're packed into a single ZIP (ZIP64 for large archives) inside one .vault file.
One drop zone for everything, and dropping anywhere on the page works. .vault files switch to decrypt automatically, with a manual override.
Password confirmation field, a strength estimate with an estimated guess-time, and a second click to confirm a weak password.
6-word passphrase generator (EFF wordlist, about 77 bits) with a Copy button.
Option to give the encrypted file a neutral name.
Light and dark themes with an Auto/Light/Dark switch.
Specific error messages for a wrong password, a damaged file, a file from a newer version, and so on.
Over plain HTTP the page explains that it needs HTTPS instead of failing.
FORMAT.md specifies the file format, with test vectors in test/vectors/.
A one-minute video in the README shows VAULT at work. It is generated from code in scripts/explainer.

Keys are derived with Argon2id (64 MiB, 3 passes) and HKDF-SHA-256 instead of PBKDF2-SHA-512.
The original file name and size are encrypted, and the metadata is padded to hide the name's exact length.
A key commitment rejects a wrong password before any save dialog opens.
Downloads in Firefox and Safari stream through the Service Worker with backpressure, and never write data to browser storage.
Cancel works in every download mode.
New interface without Bootstrap; accessibility checked with axe in both themes.
Strict Content-Security-Policy with Trusted Types, also set in a <meta> tag for static hosts.
The nginx base image is pinned by digest and works with a read-only root filesystem. All responses are sent with Cache-Control: no-cache so upgrades are never mixed with cached files.
The HTTPS compose file pins Caddy and adds container hardening.
Docker images are tagged by semver (2.0.0, 2.0, 2, latest) and published only after the full test suite passes.

Truncated files, extra bytes after the end, and edited headers are all rejected.
The browser no longer opens a file dropped outside the drop zone instead of encrypting it.

Leftover files staged by VAULT 1.x in the origin-private file system, which could contain plaintext, are deleted when the page loads.

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