Update README by sgaud-quic · Pull Request #4 · qualcomm-linux-stg/kernel

sgaud-quic · 2025-11-11T01:54:03Z

No description provided.

Staging Signed-off-by: VISHAL KUMAR <viskuma@qti.qualcomm.com>

Tets: Update README

test Signed-off-by: VISHAL KUMAR <viskuma@qti.qualcomm.com>

Update README

Signed-off-by: Salendarsingh Gaud <sgaud@qti.qualcomm.com>

Michael Chan says: ==================== bnxt_en: Bug fixes Patches 1, 3, and 4 are bug fixes related to the FW log tracing driver coredump feature recently added in 6.13. Patch #1 adds the necessary call to shutdown the FW logging DMA during PCI shutdown. Patch #3 fixes a possible null pointer derefernce when using early versions of the FW with this feature. Patch #4 adds the coredump header information unconditionally to make it more robust. Patch #2 fixes a possible memory leak during PTP shutdown. Patch #5 eliminates a dmesg warning when doing devlink reload. ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251104005700.542174-1-michael.chan@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

On completion of i915_vma_pin_ww(), a synchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() is called. When pinning a VMA to GGTT address space on a Cherry View family processor, or on a Broxton generation SoC with VTD enabled, i.e., when stop_machine() is then called from intel_ggtt_bind_vma(), that can potentially lead to lock inversion among reservation_ww and cpu_hotplug locks. [86.861179] ====================================================== [86.861193] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [86.861209] 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 Tainted: G U [86.861226] ------------------------------------------------------ [86.861238] i915_module_loa/1432 is trying to acquire lock: [86.861252] ffffffff83489090 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.861290] but task is already holding lock: [86.861303] ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.862233] which lock already depends on the new lock. [86.862251] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [86.862265] -> #5 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862292] dma_resv_lockdep+0x19a/0x390 [86.862315] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862334] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862353] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862369] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862383] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862399] -> #4 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: [86.862425] dma_resv_lockdep+0x178/0x390 [86.862440] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862454] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862470] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862482] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862495] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862509] -> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862531] down_read_killable+0x46/0x1e0 [86.862546] lock_mm_and_find_vma+0xa2/0x280 [86.862561] do_user_addr_fault+0x266/0x8e0 [86.862578] exc_page_fault+0x8a/0x2f0 [86.862593] asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 [86.862607] filldir64+0xeb/0x180 [86.862620] kernfs_fop_readdir+0x118/0x480 [86.862635] iterate_dir+0xcf/0x2b0 [86.862648] __x64_sys_getdents64+0x84/0x140 [86.862661] x64_sys_call+0x1058/0x2660 [86.862675] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.862689] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.862703] -> #2 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862725] down_write+0x3e/0xf0 [86.862738] kernfs_add_one+0x30/0x3c0 [86.862751] kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x53/0xb0 [86.862765] internal_create_group+0x134/0x4c0 [86.862779] sysfs_create_group+0x13/0x20 [86.862792] topology_add_dev+0x1d/0x30 [86.862806] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4b5/0x850 [86.862822] cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0 [86.862836] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320 [86.862852] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.862866] topology_sysfs_init+0x30/0x50 [86.862879] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862893] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862908] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862921] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862934] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862947] -> #1 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862969] __mutex_lock+0xaa/0xed0 [86.862982] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [86.862995] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320 [86.863012] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.863026] page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60 [86.863041] mm_core_init+0x22/0x2d0 [86.863054] start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0 [86.863068] x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 [86.863084] x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 [86.863098] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 [86.863114] -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: [86.863135] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.863152] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.863166] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.863180] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.863194] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.863987] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.864735] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.865510] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.866248] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.866983] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.867719] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.868453] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.869228] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.870001] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.870774] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.871546] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.872330] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.873057] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.873782] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.873802] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.873817] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.873833] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.873848] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.873862] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.873876] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.873892] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.873904] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.873917] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.873931] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.873945] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.874678] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.875347] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.875369] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.875385] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.875398] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.875413] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.875426] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.875440] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.875454] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.875470] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.875486] other info that might help us debug this: [86.875502] Chain exists of: cpu_hotplug_lock --> reservation_ww_class_acquire --> reservation_ww_class_mutex [86.875539] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [86.875552] CPU0 CPU1 [86.875563] ---- ---- [86.875573] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875588] lock(reservation_ww_class_acquire); [86.875606] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875624] rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock); [86.875637] *** DEADLOCK *** [86.875650] 3 locks held by i915_module_loa/1432: [86.875663] #0: ffff888101f5c1b0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __driver_attach+0x104/0x220 [86.875699] #1: ffffc90002e0b4a0 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.876512] #2: ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.877305] stack backtrace: [86.877326] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1432 Comm: i915_module_loa Tainted: G U 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) [86.877334] Tainted: [U]=USER [86.877336] Hardware name: /NUC5CPYB, BIOS PYBSWCEL.86A.0079.2020.0420.1316 04/20/2020 [86.877339] Call Trace: [86.877344] <TASK> [86.877353] dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 [86.877364] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [86.877369] print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 [86.877379] check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 [86.877390] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.877403] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.877408] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.877422] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878173] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.878182] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878191] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878916] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878927] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.879652] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.880375] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.881133] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.881851] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.882566] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.883286] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.884003] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.884756] ? i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x6c/0x1d0 [i915] [86.885513] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.886281] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.887049] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.887819] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.888587] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.889293] ? mutex_unlock+0x12/0x20 [86.889301] ? drm_privacy_screen_get+0x171/0x190 [86.889308] ? acpi_dev_found+0x66/0x80 [86.889321] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.890038] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.890049] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.890058] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.890067] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.890072] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.890078] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.890083] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 [86.890088] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.890097] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.890101] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.890107] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.890113] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.890119] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.890833] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.891482] ? __pfx_i915_init+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.892135] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.892145] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x33f/0x470 [86.892157] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.892164] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.892168] ? __kernel_read+0x15c/0x300 [86.892185] ? kernel_read_file+0x2b1/0x320 [86.892195] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892199] ? init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892211] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.892224] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.892230] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.892236] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.892243] ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0 [86.892249] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0 [86.892256] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.892261] RIP: 0033:0x7303e1b2725d [86.892271] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 8b bb 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [86.892276] RSP: 002b:00007ffddd1fdb38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [86.892281] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005d771d88fd90 RCX: 00007303e1b2725d [86.892285] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00005d771d893aa0 RDI: 000000000000000c [86.892287] RBP: 00007ffddd1fdbf0 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 00007ffddd1fdb80 [86.892289] R10: 00007303e1c03b20 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005d771d893aa0 [86.892292] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00005d771d88f0d0 R15: 00005d771d895710 [86.892304] </TASK> Call asynchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() in that case. v3: Provide more verbose in-line comment (Andi), - mention target environments in commit message. Fixes: 7d1c261 ("drm/i915: Take reservation lock around i915_vma_pin.") Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/14985 Cc: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Janusz Krzysztofik <janusz.krzysztofik@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Sebastian Brzezinka <sebastian.brzezinka@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Karas <krzysztof.karas@intel.com> Acked-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251023082925.351307-6-janusz.krzysztofik@linux.intel.com (cherry picked from commit 648ef13) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>

…ked_inode() In btrfs_read_locked_inode() we are calling btrfs_init_file_extent_tree() while holding a path with a read locked leaf from a subvolume tree, and btrfs_init_file_extent_tree() may do a GFP_KERNEL allocation, which can trigger reclaim. This can create a circular lock dependency which lockdep warns about with the following splat: [6.1433] ====================================================== [6.1574] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [6.1583] 6.18.0+ #4 Tainted: G U [6.1591] ------------------------------------------------------ [6.1599] kswapd0/117 is trying to acquire lock: [6.1606] ffff8d9b6333c5b8 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x39/0x2f0 [6.1625] but task is already holding lock: [6.1633] ffffffffa4ab8ce0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat+0x195/0xc60 [6.1646] which lock already depends on the new lock. [6.1657] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [6.1667] -> #2 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: [6.1677] fs_reclaim_acquire+0x9d/0xd0 [6.1685] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x59/0x750 [6.1694] btrfs_init_file_extent_tree+0x90/0x100 [6.1702] btrfs_read_locked_inode+0xc3/0x6b0 [6.1710] btrfs_iget+0xbb/0xf0 [6.1716] btrfs_lookup_dentry+0x3c5/0x8e0 [6.1724] btrfs_lookup+0x12/0x30 [6.1731] lookup_open.isra.0+0x1aa/0x6a0 [6.1739] path_openat+0x5f7/0xc60 [6.1746] do_filp_open+0xd6/0x180 [6.1753] do_sys_openat2+0x8b/0xe0 [6.1760] __x64_sys_openat+0x54/0xa0 [6.1768] do_syscall_64+0x97/0x3e0 [6.1776] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [6.1784] -> #1 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}: [6.1794] lock_release+0x127/0x2a0 [6.1801] up_read+0x1b/0x30 [6.1808] btrfs_search_slot+0x8e0/0xff0 [6.1817] btrfs_lookup_inode+0x52/0xd0 [6.1825] __btrfs_update_delayed_inode+0x73/0x520 [6.1833] btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode+0x11a/0x120 [6.1842] btrfs_log_inode+0x608/0x1aa0 [6.1849] btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x249/0xf80 [6.1857] btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x3e/0x60 [6.1865] btrfs_sync_file+0x431/0x690 [6.1872] do_fsync+0x39/0x80 [6.1879] __x64_sys_fsync+0x13/0x20 [6.1887] do_syscall_64+0x97/0x3e0 [6.1894] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [6.1903] -> #0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [6.1913] __lock_acquire+0x15e9/0x2820 [6.1920] lock_acquire+0xc9/0x2d0 [6.1927] __mutex_lock+0xcc/0x10a0 [6.1934] __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x39/0x2f0 [6.1944] btrfs_evict_inode+0x20b/0x4b0 [6.1952] evict+0x15a/0x2f0 [6.1958] prune_icache_sb+0x91/0xd0 [6.1966] super_cache_scan+0x150/0x1d0 [6.1974] do_shrink_slab+0x155/0x6f0 [6.1981] shrink_slab+0x48e/0x890 [6.1988] shrink_one+0x11a/0x1f0 [6.1995] shrink_node+0xbfd/0x1320 [6.1002] balance_pgdat+0x67f/0xc60 [6.1321] kswapd+0x1dc/0x3e0 [6.1643] kthread+0xff/0x240 [6.1965] ret_from_fork+0x223/0x280 [6.1287] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [6.1616] other info that might help us debug this: [6.1561] Chain exists of: &delayed_node->mutex --> btrfs-tree-00 --> fs_reclaim [6.1503] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [6.1110] CPU0 CPU1 [6.1411] ---- ---- [6.1707] lock(fs_reclaim); [6.1998] lock(btrfs-tree-00); [6.1291] lock(fs_reclaim); [6.1581] lock(&delayed_node->mutex); [6.1874] *** DEADLOCK *** [6.1716] 2 locks held by kswapd0/117: [6.1999] #0: ffffffffa4ab8ce0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat+0x195/0xc60 [6.1294] #1: ffff8d998344b0e0 (&type->s_umount_key#40){++++}- {3:3}, at: super_cache_scan+0x37/0x1d0 [6.1596] stack backtrace: [6.1183] CPU: 11 UID: 0 PID: 117 Comm: kswapd0 Tainted: G U 6.18.0+ #4 PREEMPT(lazy) [6.1185] Tainted: [U]=USER [6.1186] Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME B560M-A AC, BIOS 2001 02/01/2023 [6.1187] Call Trace: [6.1187] <TASK> [6.1189] dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0 [6.1192] print_circular_bug.cold+0x17a/0x1c0 [6.1194] check_noncircular+0x175/0x190 [6.1197] __lock_acquire+0x15e9/0x2820 [6.1200] lock_acquire+0xc9/0x2d0 [6.1201] ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x39/0x2f0 [6.1204] __mutex_lock+0xcc/0x10a0 [6.1206] ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x39/0x2f0 [6.1208] ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x39/0x2f0 [6.1211] ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x39/0x2f0 [6.1213] __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x39/0x2f0 [6.1215] btrfs_evict_inode+0x20b/0x4b0 [6.1217] ? lock_acquire+0xc9/0x2d0 [6.1220] evict+0x15a/0x2f0 [6.1222] prune_icache_sb+0x91/0xd0 [6.1224] super_cache_scan+0x150/0x1d0 [6.1226] do_shrink_slab+0x155/0x6f0 [6.1228] shrink_slab+0x48e/0x890 [6.1229] ? shrink_slab+0x2d2/0x890 [6.1231] shrink_one+0x11a/0x1f0 [6.1234] shrink_node+0xbfd/0x1320 [6.1236] ? shrink_node+0xa2d/0x1320 [6.1236] ? shrink_node+0xbd3/0x1320 [6.1239] ? balance_pgdat+0x67f/0xc60 [6.1239] balance_pgdat+0x67f/0xc60 [6.1241] ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0xc4/0x2a0 [6.1246] kswapd+0x1dc/0x3e0 [6.1247] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10 [6.1249] ? __pfx_kswapd+0x10/0x10 [6.1250] kthread+0xff/0x240 [6.1251] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [6.1253] ret_from_fork+0x223/0x280 [6.1255] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [6.1257] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [6.1260] </TASK> This is because: 1) The fsync task is holding an inode's delayed node mutex (for a directory) while calling __btrfs_update_delayed_inode() and that needs to do a search on the subvolume's btree (therefore read lock some extent buffers); 2) The lookup task, at btrfs_lookup(), triggered reclaim with the GFP_KERNEL allocation done by btrfs_init_file_extent_tree() while holding a read lock on a subvolume leaf; 3) The reclaim triggered kswapd which is doing inode eviction for the directory inode the fsync task is using as an argument to btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode() - but in that call chain we are trying to read lock the same leaf that the lookup task is holding while calling btrfs_init_file_extent_tree() and doing the GFP_KERNEL allocation. Fix this by calling btrfs_init_file_extent_tree() after we don't need the path anymore and release it in btrfs_read_locked_inode(). Reported-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/6e55113a22347c3925458a5d840a18401a38b276.camel@linux.intel.com/ Fixes: 8679d26 ("btrfs: initialize inode::file_extent_tree after i_mode has been set") Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

The GPIO controller is configured as non-sleeping but it uses generic pinctrl helpers which use a mutex for synchronization. This can cause the following lockdep splat with shared GPIOs enabled on boards which have multiple devices using the same GPIO: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:591 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 12, name: kworker/u16:0 preempt_count: 1, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 6 locks held by kworker/u16:0/12: #0: ffff0001f0018d48 ((wq_completion)events_unbound#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x18c/0x604 #1: ffff8000842dbdf0 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1b4/0x604 #2: ffff0001f18498f8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach+0x38/0x1b0 #3: ffff0001f75f1e90 (&gdev->srcu){.+.?}-{0:0}, at: gpiod_direction_output_raw_commit+0x0/0x360 #4: ffff0001f46e3db8 (&shared_desc->spinlock){....}-{3:3}, at: gpio_shared_proxy_direction_output+0xd0/0x144 [gpio_shared_proxy] #5: ffff0001f180ee90 (&gdev->srcu){.+.?}-{0:0}, at: gpiod_direction_output_raw_commit+0x0/0x360 irq event stamp: 81450 hardirqs last enabled at (81449): [<ffff8000813acba4>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x74/0x78 hardirqs last disabled at (81450): [<ffff8000813abfb8>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x84/0x88 softirqs last enabled at (79616): [<ffff8000811455fc>] __alloc_skb+0x17c/0x1e8 softirqs last disabled at (79614): [<ffff8000811455fc>] __alloc_skb+0x17c/0x1e8 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u16:0 Not tainted 6.19.0-rc4-next-20260105+ #11975 PREEMPT Hardware name: Hardkernel ODROID-M1 (DT) Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C) dump_stack_lvl+0x90/0xd0 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 __might_resched+0x144/0x248 __might_sleep+0x48/0x98 __mutex_lock+0x5c/0x894 mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x30 pinctrl_get_device_gpio_range+0x44/0x128 pinctrl_gpio_direction+0x3c/0xe0 pinctrl_gpio_direction_output+0x14/0x20 rockchip_gpio_direction_output+0xb8/0x19c gpiochip_direction_output+0x38/0x94 gpiod_direction_output_raw_commit+0x1d8/0x360 gpiod_direction_output_nonotify+0x7c/0x230 gpiod_direction_output+0x34/0xf8 gpio_shared_proxy_direction_output+0xec/0x144 [gpio_shared_proxy] gpiochip_direction_output+0x38/0x94 gpiod_direction_output_raw_commit+0x1d8/0x360 gpiod_direction_output_nonotify+0x7c/0x230 gpiod_configure_flags+0xbc/0x480 gpiod_find_and_request+0x1a0/0x574 gpiod_get_index+0x58/0x84 devm_gpiod_get_index+0x20/0xb4 devm_gpiod_get_optional+0x18/0x30 rockchip_pcie_probe+0x98/0x380 platform_probe+0x5c/0xac really_probe+0xbc/0x298 Fixes: 936ee26 ("gpio/rockchip: add driver for rockchip gpio") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/d035fc29-3b03-4cd6-b8ec-001f93540bc6@samsung.com/ Acked-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260106090011.21603-1-bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>

commit 317e493 upstream. The devm_free_irq() and devm_request_irq() functions should not be executed in an atomic context. During device suspend, all userspace processes and most kernel threads are frozen. Additionally, we flush all tx/rx status, disable all macb interrupts, and halt rx operations. Therefore, it is safe to split the region protected by bp->lock into two independent sections, allowing devm_free_irq() and devm_request_irq() to run in a non-atomic context. This modification resolves the following lockdep warning: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:591 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 501, name: rtcwake preempt_count: 1, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 0 7 locks held by rtcwake/501: #0: ffff0008038c3408 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: vfs_write+0xf8/0x368 #1: ffff0008049a5e88 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xbc/0x1c8 #2: ffff00080098d588 (kn->active#70){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xcc/0x1c8 #3: ffff800081c84888 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: pm_suspend+0x1ec/0x290 #4: ffff0008009ba0f8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_suspend+0x118/0x4f0 #5: ffff800081d00458 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire+0x4/0x48 #6: ffff0008031fb9e0 (&bp->lock){-.-.}-{3:3}, at: macb_suspend+0x144/0x558 irq event stamp: 8682 hardirqs last enabled at (8681): [<ffff8000813c7d7c>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x88 hardirqs last disabled at (8682): [<ffff8000813c7b58>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x38/0x98 softirqs last enabled at (7322): [<ffff8000800f1b4c>] handle_softirqs+0x52c/0x588 softirqs last disabled at (7317): [<ffff800080010310>] __do_softirq+0x20/0x2c CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 501 Comm: rtcwake Not tainted 7.0.0-rc3-next-20260310-yocto-standard+ qualcomm-linux#125 PREEMPT Hardware name: ZynqMP ZCU102 Rev1.1 (DT) Call trace: show_stack+0x24/0x38 (C) __dump_stack+0x28/0x38 dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x88 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 __might_resched+0x200/0x218 __might_sleep+0x38/0x98 __mutex_lock_common+0x7c/0x1378 mutex_lock_nested+0x38/0x50 free_irq+0x68/0x2b0 devm_irq_release+0x24/0x38 devres_release+0x40/0x80 devm_free_irq+0x48/0x88 macb_suspend+0x298/0x558 device_suspend+0x218/0x4f0 dpm_suspend+0x244/0x3a0 dpm_suspend_start+0x50/0x78 suspend_devices_and_enter+0xec/0x560 pm_suspend+0x194/0x290 state_store+0x110/0x158 kobj_attr_store+0x1c/0x30 sysfs_kf_write+0xa8/0xd0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11c/0x1c8 vfs_write+0x248/0x368 ksys_write+0x7c/0xf8 __arm64_sys_write+0x28/0x40 invoke_syscall+0x4c/0xe8 el0_svc_common+0x98/0xf0 do_el0_svc+0x28/0x40 el0_svc+0x54/0x1e0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x1a0 Fixes: 558e35c ("net: macb: WoL support for GEM type of Ethernet controller") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Théo Lebrun <theo.lebrun@bootlin.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260318-macb-irq-v2-1-f1179768ab24@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit baa35a6 upstream. Access to net_device::ip_ptr and its associated members must be protected by an RCU lock. Since we are modifying this piece of code, let's also move it to execute only when WAKE_ARP is enabled. To minimize the duration of the RCU lock, a local variable is used to temporarily store the IP address. This change resolves the following RCU check warning: WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 7.0.0-rc3-next-20260310-yocto-standard+ qualcomm-linux#122 Not tainted ----------------------------- drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c:5944 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 5 locks held by rtcwake/518: #0: ffff000803ab1408 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: vfs_write+0xf8/0x368 #1: ffff0008090bf088 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xbc/0x1c8 #2: ffff00080098d588 (kn->active#70){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xcc/0x1c8 #3: ffff800081c84888 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: pm_suspend+0x1ec/0x290 #4: ffff0008009ba0f8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_suspend+0x118/0x4f0 stack backtrace: CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 518 Comm: rtcwake Not tainted 7.0.0-rc3-next-20260310-yocto-standard+ qualcomm-linux#122 PREEMPT Hardware name: ZynqMP ZCU102 Rev1.1 (DT) Call trace: show_stack+0x24/0x38 (C) __dump_stack+0x28/0x38 dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x88 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x134/0x1d8 macb_suspend+0xd8/0x4c0 device_suspend+0x218/0x4f0 dpm_suspend+0x244/0x3a0 dpm_suspend_start+0x50/0x78 suspend_devices_and_enter+0xec/0x560 pm_suspend+0x194/0x290 state_store+0x110/0x158 kobj_attr_store+0x1c/0x30 sysfs_kf_write+0xa8/0xd0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11c/0x1c8 vfs_write+0x248/0x368 ksys_write+0x7c/0xf8 __arm64_sys_write+0x28/0x40 invoke_syscall+0x4c/0xe8 el0_svc_common+0x98/0xf0 do_el0_svc+0x28/0x40 el0_svc+0x54/0x1e0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x1a0 Fixes: 0cb8de3 ("net: macb: Add ARP support to WOL") Signed-off-by: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Théo Lebrun <theo.lebrun@bootlin.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260318-macb-irq-v2-2-f1179768ab24@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

bond_xmit_broadcast() reuses the original skb for the last slave (determined by bond_is_last_slave()) and clones it for others. Concurrent slave enslave/release can mutate the slave list during RCU-protected iteration, changing which slave is "last" mid-loop. This causes the original skb to be double-consumed (double-freed). Replace the racy bond_is_last_slave() check with a simple index comparison (i + 1 == slaves_count) against the pre-snapshot slave count taken via READ_ONCE() before the loop. This preserves the zero-copy optimization for the last slave while making the "last" determination stable against concurrent list mutations. The UAF can trigger the following crash: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in skb_clone Read of size 8 at addr ffff888100ef8d40 by task exploit/147 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 147 Comm: exploit Not tainted 7.0.0-rc3+ #4 PREEMPTLAZY Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:379 mm/kasan/report.c:482) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:597) skb_clone (include/linux/skbuff.h:1724 include/linux/skbuff.h:1792 include/linux/skbuff.h:3396 net/core/skbuff.c:2108) bond_xmit_broadcast (drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5334) bond_start_xmit (drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5567 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5593) dev_hard_start_xmit (include/linux/netdevice.h:5325 include/linux/netdevice.h:5334 net/core/dev.c:3871 net/core/dev.c:3887) __dev_queue_xmit (include/linux/netdevice.h:3601 net/core/dev.c:4838) ip6_finish_output2 (include/net/neighbour.h:540 include/net/neighbour.h:554 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:136) ip6_finish_output (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:208 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:219) ip6_output (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:250) ip6_send_skb (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1985) udp_v6_send_skb (net/ipv6/udp.c:1442) udpv6_sendmsg (net/ipv6/udp.c:1733) __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:730 net/socket.c:742 net/socket.c:2206) __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2209) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) </TASK> Allocated by task 147: Freed by task 147: The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888100ef8c80 which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224 The buggy address is located 192 bytes inside of freed 224-byte region [ffff888100ef8c80, ffff888100ef8d60) Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888100ef8c00: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff888100ef8c80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff888100ef8d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ^ ffff888100ef8d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888100ef8e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Fixes: 4e5bd03 ("net: bonding: fix bond_xmit_broadcast return value error bug") Reported-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260326075553.3960562-1-xmei5@asu.edu Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

…l flushing Over the years we often get reports of some -ENOSPC failure while updating metadata that leads to a transaction abort. I have seen this happen for filesystems of all sizes and with workloads that are very user/customer specific and unable to reproduce, but Aleksandar recently reported a simple way to reproduce this with a 1G filesystem and using the bonnie++ benchmark tool. The following test script reproduces the failure: $ cat test.sh #!/bin/bash # Create and use a 1G null block device, memory backed, otherwise # the test takes a very long time. modprobe null_blk nr_devices="0" null_dev="/sys/kernel/config/nullb/nullb0" mkdir "$null_dev" size=$((1 * 1024)) # in MB echo 2 > "$null_dev/submit_queues" echo "$size" > "$null_dev/size" echo 1 > "$null_dev/memory_backed" echo 1 > "$null_dev/discard" echo 1 > "$null_dev/power" DEV=/dev/nullb0 MNT=/mnt/nullb0 mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV mount $DEV $MNT mkdir $MNT/test/ bonnie++ -d $MNT/test/ -m BTRFS -u 0 -s 256M -r 128M -b umount $MNT echo 0 > "$null_dev/power" rmdir "$null_dev" When running this bonnie++ fails in the phase where it deletes test directories and files: $ ./test.sh (...) Using uid:0, gid:0. Writing a byte at a time...done Writing intelligently...done Rewriting...done Reading a byte at a time...done Reading intelligently...done start 'em...done...done...done...done...done... Create files in sequential order...done. Stat files in sequential order...done. Delete files in sequential order...done. Create files in random order...done. Stat files in random order...done. Delete files in random order...Can't sync directory, turning off dir-sync. Can't delete file 9Bq7sr0000000338 Cleaning up test directory after error. Bonnie: drastic I/O error (rmdir): Read-only file system And in the syslog/dmesg we can see the following transaction abort trace: [161915.501506] BTRFS warning (device nullb0): Skipping commit of aborted transaction. [161915.502983] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [161915.503832] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -28) [161915.504748] WARNING: fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2045 at btrfs_commit_transaction+0xa21/0xd30 [btrfs], CPU#11: bonnie++/3377975 [161915.506786] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_zero dm_snapshot (...) [161915.518759] CPU: 11 UID: 0 PID: 3377975 Comm: bonnie++ Tainted: G W 6.19.0-rc7-btrfs-next-224+ #4 PREEMPT(full) [161915.520857] Tainted: [W]=WARN [161915.521405] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [161915.523414] RIP: 0010:btrfs_commit_transaction+0xa24/0xd30 [btrfs] [161915.524630] Code: 48 8b 7c 24 (...) [161915.526982] RSP: 0018:ffffd3fe8206fda8 EFLAGS: 00010292 [161915.527707] RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff8f4886d3c000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [161915.528723] RDX: 0000000002040001 RSI: 00000000ffffffe4 RDI: ffffffffc088f780 [161915.529691] RBP: ffff8f4f5adae7e0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffd3fe8206fb90 [161915.530842] R10: ffff8f4f9c1fffa8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 00000000ffffffe4 [161915.532027] R13: ffff8f4ef2cf2400 R14: ffff8f4f5adae708 R15: ffff8f4f62d18000 [161915.533229] FS: 00007ff93112a780(0000) GS:ffff8f4ff63ee000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [161915.534611] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [161915.535575] CR2: 00005571b3072000 CR3: 0000000176080005 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 [161915.536758] Call Trace: [161915.537185] <TASK> [161915.537575] btrfs_sync_file+0x431/0x530 [btrfs] [161915.538473] do_fsync+0x39/0x80 [161915.539042] __x64_sys_fsync+0xf/0x20 [161915.539750] do_syscall_64+0x50/0xf20 [161915.540396] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [161915.541301] RIP: 0033:0x7ff930ca49ee [161915.541904] Code: 08 0f 85 f5 (...) [161915.544830] RSP: 002b:00007ffd94291f38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004a [161915.546152] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ff93112a780 RCX: 00007ff930ca49ee [161915.547263] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 [161915.548383] RBP: 0000000000000dab R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [161915.549853] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd94291fb0 [161915.551196] R13: 00007ffd94292350 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00007ffd94292340 [161915.552161] </TASK> [161915.552457] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [161915.553232] BTRFS info (device nullb0 state A): dumping space info: [161915.553236] BTRFS info (device nullb0 state A): space_info DATA (sub-group id 0) has 12582912 free, is not full [161915.553239] BTRFS info (device nullb0 state A): space_info total=12582912, used=0, pinned=0, reserved=0, may_use=0, readonly=0 zone_unusable=0 [161915.553243] BTRFS info (device nullb0 state A): space_info METADATA (sub-group id 0) has -5767168 free, is full [161915.553245] BTRFS info (device nullb0 state A): space_info total=53673984, used=6635520, pinned=46956544, reserved=16384, may_use=5767168, readonly=65536 zone_unusable=0 [161915.553251] BTRFS info (device nullb0 state A): space_info SYSTEM (sub-group id 0) has 8355840 free, is not full [161915.553254] BTRFS info (device nullb0 state A): space_info total=8388608, used=16384, pinned=16384, reserved=0, may_use=0, readonly=0 zone_unusable=0 [161915.553257] BTRFS info (device nullb0 state A): global_block_rsv: size 5767168 reserved 5767168 [161915.553261] BTRFS info (device nullb0 state A): trans_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0 [161915.553263] BTRFS info (device nullb0 state A): chunk_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0 [161915.553265] BTRFS info (device nullb0 state A): remap_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0 [161915.553268] BTRFS info (device nullb0 state A): delayed_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0 [161915.553270] BTRFS info (device nullb0 state A): delayed_refs_rsv: size 0 reserved 0 [161915.553272] BTRFS: error (device nullb0 state A) in cleanup_transaction:2045: errno=-28 No space left [161915.554463] BTRFS info (device nullb0 state EA): forced readonly The problem is that we allow for a very aggressive metadata overcommit, about 1/8th of the currently available space, even when the task attempting the reservation allows for full flushing. Over time this allows more and more tasks to overcommit without getting a transaction commit to release pinned extents, joining the same transaction and eventually lead to the transaction abort when attempting some tree update, as the extent allocator is not able to find any available metadata extent and it's not able to allocate a new metadata block group either (not enough unallocated space for that). Fix this by allowing the overcommit to be up to 1/64th of the available (unallocated) space instead and for that limit to apply to both types of full flushing, BTRFS_RESERVE_FLUSH_ALL and BTRFS_RESERVE_FLUSH_ALL_STEAL. This way we get more frequent transaction commits to release pinned extents in case our caller is in a context where full flushing is allowed. Note that the space infos dump in the dmesg/syslog right after the transaction abort give the wrong idea that we have plenty of unallocated space when the abort happened. During the bonnie++ workload we had a metadata chunk allocation attempt and it failed with -ENOSPC because at that time we had a bunch of data block groups allocated, which then became empty and got deleted by the cleaner kthread after the metadata chunk allocation failed with -ENOSPC and before the transaction abort happened and dumped the space infos. The custom tracing (some trace_printk() calls spread in strategic places) used to check that: mount-1793735 [011] ...1. 28877.261096: btrfs_add_bg_to_space_info: added bg offset 13631488 length 8388608 flags 1 to space_info->flags 1 total_bytes 8388608 bytes_used 0 bytes_may_use 0 mount-1793735 [011] ...1. 28877.261098: btrfs_add_bg_to_space_info: added bg offset 22020096 length 8388608 flags 34 to space_info->flags 2 total_bytes 8388608 bytes_used 16384 bytes_may_use 0 mount-1793735 [011] ...1. 28877.261100: btrfs_add_bg_to_space_info: added bg offset 30408704 length 53673984 flags 36 to space_info->flags 4 total_bytes 53673984 bytes_used 131072 bytes_may_use 0 These are from loading the block groups created by mkfs during mount. Then when bonnie++ starts doing its thing: kworker/u48:5-1792004 [011] ..... 28886.122050: btrfs_create_chunk: gather_device_info 1 ctl->dev_extent_min = 65536 dev_extent_want 1073741824 kworker/u48:5-1792004 [011] ..... 28886.122053: btrfs_create_chunk: gather_device_info 2 ctl->dev_extent_min = 65536 dev_extent_want 1073741824 max_avail 927596544 kworker/u48:5-1792004 [011] ..... 28886.122055: btrfs_make_block_group: make bg offset 84082688 size 117440512 type 1 kworker/u48:5-1792004 [011] ...1. 28886.122064: btrfs_add_bg_to_space_info: added bg offset 84082688 length 117440512 flags 1 to space_info->flags 1 total_bytes 125829120 bytes_used 0 bytes_may_use 5251072 First allocation of a data block group of 112M. kworker/u48:5-1792004 [011] ..... 28886.192408: btrfs_create_chunk: gather_device_info 1 ctl->dev_extent_min = 65536 dev_extent_want 1073741824 kworker/u48:5-1792004 [011] ..... 28886.192413: btrfs_create_chunk: gather_device_info 2 ctl->dev_extent_min = 65536 dev_extent_want 1073741824 max_avail 810156032 kworker/u48:5-1792004 [011] ..... 28886.192415: btrfs_make_block_group: make bg offset 201523200 size 117440512 type 1 kworker/u48:5-1792004 [011] ...1. 28886.192425: btrfs_add_bg_to_space_info: added bg offset 201523200 length 117440512 flags 1 to space_info->flags 1 total_bytes 243269632 bytes_used 0 bytes_may_use 122691584 Another 112M data block group allocated. kworker/u48:5-1792004 [011] ..... 28886.260935: btrfs_create_chunk: gather_device_info 1 ctl->dev_extent_min = 65536 dev_extent_want 1073741824 kworker/u48:5-1792004 [011] ..... 28886.260941: btrfs_create_chunk: gather_device_info 2 ctl->dev_extent_min = 65536 dev_extent_want 1073741824 max_avail 692715520 kworker/u48:5-1792004 [011] ..... 28886.260943: btrfs_make_block_group: make bg offset 318963712 size 117440512 type 1 kworker/u48:5-1792004 [011] ...1. 28886.260954: btrfs_add_bg_to_space_info: added bg offset 318963712 length 117440512 flags 1 to space_info->flags 1 total_bytes 360710144 bytes_used 0 bytes_may_use 240132096 Yet another one. bonnie++-1793755 [010] ..... 28886.280407: btrfs_create_chunk: gather_device_info 1 ctl->dev_extent_min = 65536 dev_extent_want 1073741824 bonnie++-1793755 [010] ..... 28886.280412: btrfs_create_chunk: gather_device_info 2 ctl->dev_extent_min = 65536 dev_extent_want 1073741824 max_avail 575275008 bonnie++-1793755 [010] ..... 28886.280414: btrfs_make_block_group: make bg offset 436404224 size 117440512 type 1 bonnie++-1793755 [010] ...1. 28886.280419: btrfs_add_bg_to_space_info: added bg offset 436404224 length 117440512 flags 1 to space_info->flags 1 total_bytes 478150656 bytes_used 0 bytes_may_use 268435456 One more. kworker/u48:5-1792004 [011] ..... 28886.566233: btrfs_create_chunk: gather_device_info 1 ctl->dev_extent_min = 65536 dev_extent_want 1073741824 kworker/u48:5-1792004 [011] ..... 28886.566238: btrfs_create_chunk: gather_device_info 2 ctl->dev_extent_min = 65536 dev_extent_want 1073741824 max_avail 457834496 kworker/u48:5-1792004 [011] ..... 28886.566241: btrfs_make_block_group: make bg offset 553844736 size 117440512 type 1 kworker/u48:5-1792004 [011] ...1. 28886.566250: btrfs_add_bg_to_space_info: added bg offset 553844736 length 117440512 flags 1 to space_info->flags 1 total_bytes 595591168 bytes_used 268435456 bytes_may_use 209723392 Another one. bonnie++-1793755 [009] ..... 28886.613446: btrfs_create_chunk: gather_device_info 1 ctl->dev_extent_min = 65536 dev_extent_want 1073741824 bonnie++-1793755 [009] ..... 28886.613451: btrfs_create_chunk: gather_device_info 2 ctl->dev_extent_min = 65536 dev_extent_want 1073741824 max_avail 340393984 bonnie++-1793755 [009] ..... 28886.613453: btrfs_make_block_group: make bg offset 671285248 size 117440512 type 1 bonnie++-1793755 [009] ...1. 28886.613458: btrfs_add_bg_to_space_info: added bg offset 671285248 length 117440512 flags 1 to space_info->flags 1 total_bytes 713031680 bytes_used 268435456 bytes_may_use 2 68435456 Another one. bonnie++-1793755 [009] ..... 28886.674953: btrfs_create_chunk: gather_device_info 1 ctl->dev_extent_min = 65536 dev_extent_want 1073741824 bonnie++-1793755 [009] ..... 28886.674957: btrfs_create_chunk: gather_device_info 2 ctl->dev_extent_min = 65536 dev_extent_want 1073741824 max_avail 222953472 bonnie++-1793755 [009] ..... 28886.674959: btrfs_make_block_group: make bg offset 788725760 size 117440512 type 1 bonnie++-1793755 [009] ...1. 28886.674963: btrfs_add_bg_to_space_info: added bg offset 788725760 length 117440512 flags 1 to space_info->flags 1 total_bytes 830472192 bytes_used 268435456 bytes_may_use 1 34217728 Another one. bonnie++-1793755 [009] ..... 28886.674981: btrfs_create_chunk: gather_device_info 1 ctl->dev_extent_min = 65536 dev_extent_want 1073741824 bonnie++-1793755 [009] ..... 28886.674982: btrfs_create_chunk: gather_device_info 2 ctl->dev_extent_min = 65536 dev_extent_want 1073741824 max_avail 105512960 bonnie++-1793755 [009] ..... 28886.674983: btrfs_make_block_group: make bg offset 906166272 size 105512960 type 1 bonnie++-1793755 [009] ...1. 28886.674984: btrfs_add_bg_to_space_info: added bg offset 906166272 length 105512960 flags 1 to space_info->flags 1 total_bytes 935985152 bytes_used 268435456 bytes_may_use 67108864 Another one, but a bit smaller (~100.6M) since we now have less space. bonnie++-1793758 [009] ..... 28891.962096: btrfs_create_chunk: gather_device_info 1 ctl->dev_extent_min = 65536 dev_extent_want 1073741824 bonnie++-1793758 [009] ..... 28891.962103: btrfs_create_chunk: gather_device_info 2 ctl->dev_extent_min = 65536 dev_extent_want 1073741824 max_avail 12582912 bonnie++-1793758 [009] ..... 28891.962105: btrfs_make_block_group: make bg offset 1011679232 size 12582912 type 1 bonnie++-1793758 [009] ...1. 28891.962114: btrfs_add_bg_to_space_info: added bg offset 1011679232 length 12582912 flags 1 to space_info->flags 1 total_bytes 948568064 bytes_used 268435456 bytes_may_use 8192 Another one, this one even smaller (12M). kworker/u48:5-1792004 [011] ..... 28892.112802: btrfs_chunk_alloc: enter first metadata chunk alloc attempt kworker/u48:5-1792004 [011] ..... 28892.112805: btrfs_create_chunk: gather_device_info 1 ctl->dev_extent_min = 131072 dev_extent_want 536870912 kworker/u48:5-1792004 [011] ..... 28892.112806: btrfs_create_chunk: gather_device_info 2 ctl->dev_extent_min = 131072 dev_extent_want 536870912 max_avail 0 536870912 is 512M, the standard 256M metadata chunk size times 2 because of the DUP profile for metadata. 'max_avail' is what find_free_dev_extent() returns to us in gather_device_info(). As a result, gather_device_info() sets ctl->ndevs to 0, making decide_stripe_size() fail with -ENOSPC, and therefore metadata chunk allocation fails while we are attempting to run delayed items during the transaction commit. kworker/u48:5-1792004 [011] ..... 28892.112807: btrfs_create_chunk: decide_stripe_size fail -ENOSPC In the syslog/dmesg pasted above, which happened after the transaction was aborted, the space info dumps did not account for all these data block groups that were allocated during bonnie++'s workload. And that is because after the metadata chunk allocation failed with -ENOSPC and before the transaction abort happened, most of the data block groups had become empty and got deleted by by the cleaner kthread - when the abort happened, we had bonnie++ in the middle of deleting the files it created. But dumping the space infos right after the metadata chunk allocation fails by adding a call to btrfs_dump_space_info_for_trans_abort() in decide_stripe_size() when it returns -ENOSPC, we get: [29972.409295] BTRFS info (device nullb0): dumping space info: [29972.409300] BTRFS info (device nullb0): space_info DATA (sub-group id 0) has 673341440 free, is not full [29972.409303] BTRFS info (device nullb0): space_info total=948568064, used=0, pinned=275226624, reserved=0, may_use=0, readonly=0 zone_unusable=0 [29972.409305] BTRFS info (device nullb0): space_info METADATA (sub-group id 0) has 3915776 free, is not full [29972.409306] BTRFS info (device nullb0): space_info total=53673984, used=163840, pinned=42827776, reserved=147456, may_use=6553600, readonly=65536 zone_unusable=0 [29972.409308] BTRFS info (device nullb0): space_info SYSTEM (sub-group id 0) has 7979008 free, is not full [29972.409310] BTRFS info (device nullb0): space_info total=8388608, used=16384, pinned=0, reserved=0, may_use=393216, readonly=0 zone_unusable=0 [29972.409311] BTRFS info (device nullb0): global_block_rsv: size 5767168 reserved 5767168 [29972.409313] BTRFS info (device nullb0): trans_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0 [29972.409314] BTRFS info (device nullb0): chunk_block_rsv: size 393216 reserved 393216 [29972.409315] BTRFS info (device nullb0): remap_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0 [29972.409316] BTRFS info (device nullb0): delayed_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0 So here we see there's ~904.6M of data space, ~51.2M of metadata space and 8M of system space, making a total of 963.8M. Reported-by: Aleksandar Gerasimovski <Aleksandar.Gerasimovski@belden.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/SA1PR18MB56922F690C5EC2D85371408B998FA@SA1PR18MB5692.namprd18.prod.outlook.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CAL3q7H61vZ3_+eqJ1A9po2WcgNJJjUu9MJQoYB2oDSAAecHaug@mail.gmail.com/ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

Limit the number of zones reclaimed in flush_space()'s RECLAIM_ZONES state. This prevents possibly long running reclaim sweeps to block other tasks in the system, while the system is under pressure anyways, causing the tasks to hang. An example of this can be seen here, triggered by fstests generic/551: generic/551 [ 27.042349] run fstests generic/551 at 2026-02-27 11:05:30 BTRFS: device fsid 78c16e29-20d9-4c8e-bc04-7ba431be38ff devid 1 transid 8 /dev/vdb (254:16) scanned by mount (806) BTRFS info (device vdb): first mount of filesystem 78c16e29-20d9-4c8e-bc04-7ba431be38ff BTRFS info (device vdb): using crc32c checksum algorithm BTRFS info (device vdb): host-managed zoned block device /dev/vdb, 64 zones of 268435456 bytes BTRFS info (device vdb): zoned mode enabled with zone size 268435456 BTRFS info (device vdb): checking UUID tree BTRFS info (device vdb): enabling free space tree INFO: task kworker/u38:1:90 blocked for more than 120 seconds. Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1+ qualcomm-linux#345 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:kworker/u38:1 state:D stack:0 pid:90 tgid:90 ppid:2 task_flags:0x4208060 flags:0x00080000 Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space Call Trace: <TASK> __schedule+0x34f/0xe70 schedule+0x41/0x140 schedule_timeout+0xa3/0x110 ? mark_held_locks+0x40/0x70 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xd8/0x1c0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x100 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x84/0x130 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x33/0x50 wait_for_completion+0xa4/0x150 ? __flush_work+0x24c/0x550 __flush_work+0x339/0x550 ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 ? wait_for_completion+0x39/0x150 flush_space+0x243/0x660 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x11/0x20 ? local_clock_noinstr+0x17/0x110 ? local_clock+0x15/0x30 ? lock_release+0x1b7/0x4b0 do_async_reclaim_data_space+0xe8/0x160 btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x19/0x30 process_one_work+0x20a/0x5f0 ? lock_is_held_type+0xcd/0x130 worker_thread+0x1e2/0x3c0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x103/0x150 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x20d/0x320 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Showing all locks held in the system: 1 lock held by khungtaskd/67: #0: ffffffff824d58e0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x3d/0x194 2 locks held by kworker/u38:1/90: #0: ffff8881000aa158 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x3c4/0x5f0 #1: ffffc90000c17e58 ((work_completion)(&fs_info->async_data_reclaim_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1c0/0x5f0 5 locks held by kworker/u39:1/191: #0: ffff8881000aa158 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x3c4/0x5f0 #1: ffffc90000dfbe58 ((work_completion)(&fs_info->reclaim_bgs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1c0/0x5f0 #2: ffff888101da0420 (sb_writers#9){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x20a/0x5f0 #3: ffff88811040a648 (&fs_info->reclaim_bgs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_reclaim_bgs_work+0x1de/0x770 #4: ffff888110408a18 (&fs_info->cleaner_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x95a/0x20f0 1 lock held by aio-dio-write-v/980: #0: ffff888110093008 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#15){++++}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_inode_lock+0x51/0xb0 ============================================= To prevent these long running reclaims from blocking the system, only reclaim 5 block_groups in the RECLAIM_ZONES state of flush_space(). Also as these reclaims are now constrained, it opens up the use for a synchronous call to brtfs_reclaim_block_groups(), eliminating the need to place the reclaim task on a workqueue and then flushing the workqueue again. Reviewed-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

hfsplus_fill_super() calls hfs_find_init() to initialize a search structure, which acquires tree->tree_lock. If the subsequent call to hfsplus_cat_build_key() fails, the function jumps to the out_put_root error label without releasing the lock. The later cleanup path then frees the tree data structure with the lock still held, triggering a held lock freed warning. Fix this by adding the missing hfs_find_exit(&fd) call before jumping to the out_put_root error label. This ensures that tree->tree_lock is properly released on the error path. The bug was originally detected on v6.13-rc1 using an experimental static analysis tool we are developing, and we have verified that the issue persists in the latest mainline kernel. The tool is specifically designed to detect memory management issues. It is currently under active development and not yet publicly available. We confirmed the bug by runtime testing under QEMU with x86_64 defconfig, lockdep enabled, and CONFIG_HFSPLUS_FS=y. To trigger the error path, we used GDB to dynamically shrink the max_unistr_len parameter to 1 before hfsplus_asc2uni() is called. This forces hfsplus_asc2uni() to naturally return -ENAMETOOLONG, which propagates to hfsplus_cat_build_key() and exercises the faulty error path. The following warning was observed during mount: ========================= WARNING: held lock freed! 7.0.0-rc3-00016-gb4f0dd314b39 #4 Not tainted ------------------------- mount/174 is freeing memory ffff888103f92000-ffff888103f92fff, with a lock still held there! ffff888103f920b0 (&tree->tree_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: hfsplus_find_init+0x154/0x1e0 2 locks held by mount/174: #0: ffff888103f960e0 (&type->s_umount_key#42/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: alloc_super.constprop.0+0x167/0xa40 #1: ffff888103f920b0 (&tree->tree_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: hfsplus_find_init+0x154/0x1e0 stack backtrace: CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 174 Comm: mount Not tainted 7.0.0-rc3-00016-gb4f0dd314b39 #4 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x82/0xd0 debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x13a/0x180 kfree+0x16b/0x510 ? hfsplus_fill_super+0xcb4/0x18a0 hfsplus_fill_super+0xcb4/0x18a0 ? __pfx_hfsplus_fill_super+0x10/0x10 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? bdev_open+0x65f/0xc30 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? pointer+0x4ce/0xbf0 ? trace_contention_end+0x11c/0x150 ? __pfx_pointer+0x10/0x10 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? bdev_open+0x79b/0xc30 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? vsnprintf+0x6da/0x1270 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x157/0x740 ? __pfx_vsnprintf+0x10/0x10 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x80 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? irqentry_exit+0x17b/0x5e0 ? trace_irq_disable.constprop.0+0x116/0x150 ? __pfx_hfsplus_fill_super+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_hfsplus_fill_super+0x10/0x10 get_tree_bdev_flags+0x302/0x580 ? __pfx_get_tree_bdev_flags+0x10/0x10 ? vfs_parse_fs_qstr+0x129/0x1a0 ? __pfx_vfs_parse_fs_qstr+0x3/0x10 vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x320 fc_mount+0x10/0x1d0 path_mount+0x5c5/0x21c0 ? __pfx_path_mount+0x10/0x10 ? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0x116/0x150 ? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0x116/0x150 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? kmem_cache_free+0x307/0x540 ? user_path_at+0x51/0x60 ? __x64_sys_mount+0x212/0x280 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f __x64_sys_mount+0x212/0x280 ? __pfx___x64_sys_mount+0x10/0x10 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0x116/0x150 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f do_syscall_64+0x111/0x680 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7ffacad55eae Code: 48 8b 0d 85 1f 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 8 RSP: 002b:00007fff1ab55718 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007ffacad55eae RDX: 000055740c64e5b0 RSI: 000055740c64e630 RDI: 000055740c651ab0 RBP: 000055740c64e380 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000055740c64e5b0 R14: 000055740c651ab0 R15: 000055740c64e380 </TASK> After applying this patch, the warning no longer appears. Fixes: 89ac9b4 ("hfsplus: fix longname handling") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan <zilin@seu.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com> Tested-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com> Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>

The decision whether to keep timers on the local CPU or on the CPU they are associated to is suboptimal and causes the expensive switch_hrtimer_base() mechanism to be invoked more than necessary. This is especially true for pinned timers. Rewrite the decision logic so that the current base is kept if: 1) The callback is running on the base 2) The timer is associated to the local CPU and the first expiring timer as that allows to optimize for reprogramming avoidance 3) The timer is associated to the local CPU and pinned 4) The timer is associated to the local CPU and timer migration is disabled. Only #2 was covered by the original code, but especially #3 makes a difference for high frequency rearming timers like the scheduler hrtick timer. If timer migration is disabled, then #4 avoids most of the base switches. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260224163430.607935269@kernel.org

It has been possible for a long time to mark ptes in the linear map as invalid. This is done for secretmem, kfence, realm dma memory un/share, and others, by simply clearing the PTE_VALID bit. But until commit a166563 ("arm64: mm: support large block mapping when rodata=full") large leaf mappings were never made invalid in this way. It turns out various parts of the code base are not equipped to handle invalid large leaf mappings (in the way they are currently encoded) and I've observed a kernel panic while booting a realm guest on a BBML2_NOABORT system as a result: [ 15.432706] software IO TLB: Memory encryption is active and system is using DMA bounce buffers [ 15.476896] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff000019600000 [ 15.513762] Mem abort info: [ 15.527245] ESR = 0x0000000096000046 [ 15.548553] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 15.572146] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 15.592141] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 15.612694] FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault [ 15.640644] Data abort info: [ 15.661983] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000046, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 15.694875] CM = 0, WnR = 1, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 15.723740] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 15.755776] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000081f3f000 [ 15.800410] [ffff000019600000] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=180000009ffff403, pud=180000009fffe403, pmd=00e8000199600704 [ 15.855046] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000046 [#1] SMP [ 15.886394] Modules linked in: [ 15.900029] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc4-dirty #4 PREEMPT [ 15.935258] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 15.955612] pstate: 21400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 15.986009] pc : __pi_memcpy_generic+0x128/0x22c [ 16.006163] lr : swiotlb_bounce+0xf4/0x158 [ 16.024145] sp : ffff80008000b8f0 [ 16.038896] x29: ffff80008000b8f0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 16.069953] x26: ffffb3976d261ba8 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff000019600000 [ 16.100876] x23: 0000000000000001 x22: ffff0000043430d0 x21: 0000000000007ff0 [ 16.131946] x20: 0000000084570010 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffff00001ffe3fcc [ 16.163073] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 00000000003fffff x15: 646e612065766974 [ 16.194131] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 16.225059] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000010 x9 : 0000000000000018 [ 16.256113] x8 : 0000000000000018 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 16.287203] x5 : ffff000019607ff0 x4 : ffff000004578000 x3 : ffff000019600000 [ 16.318145] x2 : 0000000000007ff0 x1 : ffff000004570010 x0 : ffff000019600000 [ 16.349071] Call trace: [ 16.360143] __pi_memcpy_generic+0x128/0x22c (P) [ 16.380310] swiotlb_tbl_map_single+0x154/0x2b4 [ 16.400282] swiotlb_map+0x5c/0x228 [ 16.415984] dma_map_phys+0x244/0x2b8 [ 16.432199] dma_map_page_attrs+0x44/0x58 [ 16.449782] virtqueue_map_page_attrs+0x38/0x44 [ 16.469596] virtqueue_map_single_attrs+0xc0/0x130 [ 16.490509] virtnet_rq_alloc.isra.0+0xa4/0x1fc [ 16.510355] try_fill_recv+0x2a4/0x584 [ 16.526989] virtnet_open+0xd4/0x238 [ 16.542775] __dev_open+0x110/0x24c [ 16.558280] __dev_change_flags+0x194/0x20c [ 16.576879] netif_change_flags+0x24/0x6c [ 16.594489] dev_change_flags+0x48/0x7c [ 16.611462] ip_auto_config+0x258/0x1114 [ 16.628727] do_one_initcall+0x80/0x1c8 [ 16.645590] kernel_init_freeable+0x208/0x2f0 [ 16.664917] kernel_init+0x24/0x1e0 [ 16.680295] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 16.696369] Code: 927cec03 cb0e0021 8b0e0042 a9411c26 (a900340c) [ 16.723106] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 16.752866] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b [ 16.792556] Kernel Offset: 0x3396ea200000 from 0xffff800080000000 [ 16.818966] PHYS_OFFSET: 0xfff1000080000000 [ 16.837237] CPU features: 0x0000000,00060005,13e38581,957e772f [ 16.862904] Memory Limit: none [ 16.876526] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b ]--- This panic occurs because the swiotlb memory was previously shared to the host (__set_memory_enc_dec()), which involves transitioning the (large) leaf mappings to invalid, sharing to the host, then marking the mappings valid again. But pageattr_p[mu]d_entry() would only update the entry if it is a section mapping, since otherwise it concluded it must be a table entry so shouldn't be modified. But p[mu]d_sect() only returns true if the entry is valid. So the result was that the large leaf entry was made invalid in the first pass then ignored in the second pass. It remains invalid until the above code tries to access it and blows up. The simple fix would be to update pageattr_pmd_entry() to use !pmd_table() instead of pmd_sect(). That would solve this problem. But the ptdump code also suffers from a similar issue. It checks pmd_leaf() and doesn't call into the arch-specific note_page() machinery if it returns false. As a result of this, ptdump wasn't even able to show the invalid large leaf mappings; it looked like they were valid which made this super fun to debug. the ptdump code is core-mm and pmd_table() is arm64-specific so we can't use the same trick to solve that. But we already support the concept of "present-invalid" for user space entries. And even better, pmd_leaf() will return true for a leaf mapping that is marked present-invalid. So let's just use that encoding for present-invalid kernel mappings too. Then we can use pmd_leaf() where we previously used pmd_sect() and everything is magically fixed. Additionally, from inspection kernel_page_present() was broken in a similar way, so I'm also updating that to use pmd_leaf(). The transitional page tables component was also similarly broken; it creates a copy of the kernel page tables, making RO leaf mappings RW in the process. It also makes invalid (but-not-none) pte mappings valid. But it was not doing this for large leaf mappings. This could have resulted in crashes at kexec- or hibernate-time. This code is fixed to flip "present-invalid" mappings back to "present-valid" at all levels. Finally, I have hardened split_pmd()/split_pud() so that if it is passed a "present-invalid" leaf, it will maintain that property in the split leaves, since I wasn't able to convince myself that it would only ever be called for "present-valid" leaves. Fixes: a166563 ("arm64: mm: support large block mapping when rodata=full") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

Eduard Zingerman says: ==================== selftests/bpf: impose global ordering for test decl_tags Impose global ordering for all decl tags used by test_loader.c based tests: __success, __failure, __msg, etc. The tags are now sorted by testing framework to be processed in the same order they appear in the C source code of the test. The ordering is necessary for gcc-bpf. Neither GCC nor the C standard defines the order in which function attributes are consumed. While Clang tends to preserve tags definition order in the output BTF, GCC does not. This inconsistency causes BPF tests with multiple __msg entries to fail when compiled with GCC. This is based on a patch [1] from Cupertino Miranda (see patch #3) and includes some additional cleanups for test_loader.c decl tags declaration and processing (see patches #1, #2, #4). [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260305130035.192080-1-cupertino.miranda@oracle.com/ Changelog: v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260330-selftests-global-tags-ordering-v2-0-c0ac61e81098@gmail.com/ v2 -> v3: - fixed free(tmp) call in collect_decl_tags() (Puranjay, bot) - naming nit in compile_regex() (Mykyta) v1 -> v2: - refactoring str_has_pfx() usages missing from v1 (Puranjay) - removed realloc_or_free() (Andrii) - fixed qsort(NULL, ...) usage (Puranjay) - skip_decl_tag_pfx() returns NULL if tag does not start from "comment:" (Puranjay) v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260326-selftests-global-tags-ordering-v1-0-5dd2ced5d9ad@gmail.com/ ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260410-selftests-global-tags-ordering-v2-0-c566ec9781bf@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

Tariq Toukan says: ==================== devlink: add per-port resource support This series by Or adds devlink per-port resource support: Currently, devlink resources are only available at the device level. However, some resources are inherently per-port, such as the maximum number of subfunctions (SFs) that can be created on a specific PF port. This limitation prevents user space from obtaining accurate per-port capacity information. This series adds infrastructure for per-port resources in devlink core and implements it in the mlx5 driver to expose the max_SFs resource on PF devlink ports. Patch #1 refactors resource functions to be generic Patch #2 adds port-level resource registration infrastructure Patch #3 registers SF resource on PF port representor in mlx5 Patch #4 adds devlink port resource registration to netdevsim for testing Patch #5 adds dump support for device-level resources Patch #6 includes port resources in the resource dump dumpit path Patch #7 adds port-specific option to resource dump doit path Patch #8 adds selftest for devlink port resource doit Patch #9 documents port-level resources and full dump Patch #10 adds resource scope filtering to resource dump Patch #11 adds selftest for resource dump and scope filter Patch #12 documents resource scope filtering ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260407194107.148063-1-tariqt@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

…ernel/git/ath/ath Jeff Johnson says: ================== ath.git patches for v7.1 (PR #4) Add support for an ath10k device-tree quirk to skip host cap QMI requests. ================== Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

Merge series from Richard Fitzgerald <rf@opensource.cirrus.com>: The first 3 patches in this series add some more KUnit testing for fetching speaker ID and combining it with the system name to create part of the qualifier for a firmware filename. Patch #4 enables GPIOLIB in KUnit 'alltests' builds. This can be taken separately from the first 3 patches. The GPIO tests will skip if GPIOLIB is not enabled, but obviously it would be ideal for 'kunit.py --alltests' runs to include these new test cases.

Currently, the initialization of loongarch_jump_ops does not contain an assignment to its .free field. This causes disasm_line__free() to fall through to ins_ops__delete() for LoongArch jump instructions. ins_ops__delete() will free ins_operands.source.raw and ins_operands.source.name, and these fields overlaps with ins_operands.jump.raw_comment and ins_operands.jump.raw_func_start. Since in loongarch_jump__parse(), these two fields are populated by strchr()-ing the same buffer, trying to free them will lead to undefined behavior. This invalid free usually leads to crashes: Process 1712902 (perf) of user 1000 dumped core. Stack trace of thread 1712902: #0 0x00007fffef155c58 n/a (libc.so.6 + 0x95c58) #1 0x00007fffef0f7a94 raise (libc.so.6 + 0x37a94) #2 0x00007fffef0dd6a8 abort (libc.so.6 + 0x1d6a8) #3 0x00007fffef145490 n/a (libc.so.6 + 0x85490) #4 0x00007fffef1646f4 n/a (libc.so.6 + 0xa46f4) #5 0x00007fffef164718 n/a (libc.so.6 + 0xa4718) #6 0x00005555583a6764 __zfree (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x106764) #7 0x000055555854fb70 disasm_line__free (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x2afb70) #8 0x000055555853d618 annotated_source__purge (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x29d618) #9 0x000055555852300c __hist_entry__tui_annotate (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x28300c) #10 0x0000555558526718 do_annotate (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x286718) #11 0x000055555852ed94 evsel__hists_browse (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x28ed94) #12 0x000055555831fdd0 cmd_report (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x7fdd0) #13 0x000055555839b644 handle_internal_command (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0xfb644) #14 0x00005555582fe6ac main (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x5e6ac) #15 0x00007fffef0ddd90 n/a (libc.so.6 + 0x1dd90) #16 0x00007fffef0ddf0c __libc_start_main (libc.so.6 + 0x1df0c) #17 0x00005555582fed10 _start (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x5ed10) ELF object binary architecture: LoongArch ... and it can be confirmed with Valgrind: ==1721834== Invalid free() / delete / delete[] / realloc() ==1721834== at 0x4EA9014: free (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-loongarch64-linux.so) ==1721834== by 0x4106287: __zfree (zalloc.c:13) ==1721834== by 0x42ADC8F: disasm_line__free (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf) ==1721834== by 0x429B737: annotated_source__purge (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf) ==1721834== by 0x42811EB: __hist_entry__tui_annotate (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf) ==1721834== by 0x42848D7: do_annotate (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf) ==1721834== by 0x428CF33: evsel__hists_browse (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf) ==1721834== Address 0x7d34303 is 35 bytes inside a block of size 62 alloc'd ==1721834== at 0x4EA59B8: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-loongarch64-linux.so) ==1721834== by 0x6B80B6F: strdup (strdup.c:42) ==1721834== by 0x42AD917: disasm_line__new (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf) ==1721834== by 0x42AE5A3: symbol__disassemble_objdump (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf) ==1721834== by 0x42AF0A7: symbol__disassemble (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf) ==1721834== by 0x429B3CF: symbol__annotate (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf) ==1721834== by 0x429C233: symbol__annotate2 (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf) ==1721834== by 0x42804D3: __hist_entry__tui_annotate (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf) ==1721834== by 0x42848D7: do_annotate (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf) ==1721834== by 0x428CF33: evsel__hists_browse (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf) This patch adds the missing free() specialization in loongarch_jump_ops, which prevents disasm_line__free() from invoking the default cleanup function. Fixes: fb7fd2a ("perf annotate: Move raw_comment and raw_func_start fields out of 'struct ins_operands'") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: WANG Rui <wangrui@loongson.cn> Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org> Cc: WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name> Cc: loongarch@lists.linux.dev Signed-off-by: Rong Bao <rong.bao@csmantle.top> Tested-by: WANG Rui <wangrui@loongson.cn> Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>

ice_reset_all_vfs() ignores the return value of ice_vf_rebuild_vsi(). When the VSI rebuild fails (e.g. during NVM firmware update via nvmupdate64e), ice_vsi_rebuild() tears down the VSI on its error path, leaving txq_map and rxq_map as NULL. The subsequent unconditional call to ice_vf_post_vsi_rebuild() leads to a NULL pointer dereference in ice_ena_vf_q_mappings() when it accesses vsi->txq_map[0]. The single-VF reset path in ice_reset_vf() already handles this correctly by checking the return value of ice_vf_reconfig_vsi() and skipping ice_vf_post_vsi_rebuild() on failure. Apply the same pattern to ice_reset_all_vfs(): check the return value of ice_vf_rebuild_vsi() and skip ice_vf_post_vsi_rebuild() and ice_eswitch_attach_vf() on failure. The VF is left safely disabled (ICE_VF_STATE_INIT not set, VFGEN_RSTAT not set to VFACTIVE) and can be recovered via a VFLR triggered by a PCI reset of the VF (sysfs reset or driver rebind). Note that this patch does not prevent the VF VSI rebuild from failing during NVM update — the underlying cause is firmware being in a transitional state while the EMP reset is processed, which can cause Admin Queue commands (ice_add_vsi, ice_cfg_vsi_lan) to fail. This patch only prevents the subsequent NULL pointer dereference that crashes the kernel when the rebuild does fail. crash> bt PID: 50795 TASK: ff34c9ee708dc680 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "kworker/u512:5" #0 [ff72159bcfe5bb50] machine_kexec at ffffffffaa8850ee #1 [ff72159bcfe5bba8] __crash_kexec at ffffffffaaa15fba #2 [ff72159bcfe5bc68] crash_kexec at ffffffffaaa16540 #3 [ff72159bcfe5bc70] oops_end at ffffffffaa837eda #4 [ff72159bcfe5bc90] page_fault_oops at ffffffffaa893997 #5 [ff72159bcfe5bce8] exc_page_fault at ffffffffab528595 #6 [ff72159bcfe5bd10] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffffab600bb2 [exception RIP: ice_ena_vf_q_mappings+0x79] RIP: ffffffffc0a85b29 RSP: ff72159bcfe5bdc8 RFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 00000000000f0000 RBX: ff34c9efc9c00000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000010 RDI: ff34c9efc9c00000 RBP: ff34c9efc27d4828 R8: 0000000000000093 R9: 0000000000000040 R10: ff34c9efc27d4828 R11: 0000000000000040 R12: 0000000000100000 R13: 0000000000000010 R14: R15: ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ff72159bcfe5bdf8] ice_sriov_post_vsi_rebuild at ffffffffc0a85e2e [ice] #8 [ff72159bcfe5be08] ice_reset_all_vfs at ffffffffc0a920b4 [ice] #9 [ff72159bcfe5be48] ice_service_task at ffffffffc0a31519 [ice] #10 [ff72159bcfe5be88] process_one_work at ffffffffaa93dca4 #11 [ff72159bcfe5bec8] worker_thread at ffffffffaa93e9de #12 [ff72159bcfe5bf18] kthread at ffffffffaa946663 #13 [ff72159bcfe5bf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffaa8086b9 The panic occurs attempting to dereference the NULL pointer in RDX at ice_sriov.c:294, which loads vsi->txq_map (offset 0x4b8 in ice_vsi). The faulting VSI is an allocated slab object but not fully initialized after a failed ice_vsi_rebuild(): crash> struct ice_vsi 0xff34c9efc27d4828 netdev = 0x0, rx_rings = 0x0, tx_rings = 0x0, q_vectors = 0x0, txq_map = 0x0, rxq_map = 0x0, alloc_txq = 0x10, num_txq = 0x10, alloc_rxq = 0x10, num_rxq = 0x10, The nvmupdate64e process was performing NVM firmware update: crash> bt 0xff34c9edd1a30000 PID: 49858 TASK: ff34c9edd1a30000 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "nvmupdate64e" #0 [ff72159bcd617618] __schedule at ffffffffab5333f8 #4 [ff72159bcd617750] ice_sq_send_cmd at ffffffffc0a35347 [ice] #5 [ff72159bcd6177a8] ice_sq_send_cmd_retry at ffffffffc0a35b47 [ice] #6 [ff72159bcd617810] ice_aq_send_cmd at ffffffffc0a38018 [ice] #7 [ff72159bcd617848] ice_aq_read_nvm at ffffffffc0a40254 [ice] #8 [ff72159bcd6178b8] ice_read_flat_nvm at ffffffffc0a4034c [ice] #9 [ff72159bcd617918] ice_devlink_nvm_snapshot at ffffffffc0a6ffa5 [ice] dmesg: ice 0000:13:00.0: firmware recommends not updating fw.mgmt, as it may result in a downgrade. continuing anyways ice 0000:13:00.1: ice_init_nvm failed -5 ice 0000:13:00.1: Rebuild failed, unload and reload driver Fixes: 12bb018 ("ice: Refactor VF reset") Signed-off-by: Petr Oros <poros@redhat.com> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <rafal.romanowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260427-jk-iwl-net-petr-oros-fixes-v1-5-cdcb48303fd8@intel.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

When a controller reset is triggered via sysfs (by writing to /sys/class/nvme/<nvmedev>/reset_controller), the reset work tears down and re-establishes all queues. The socket release using fput() defers the actual cleanup to task_work delayed_fput workqueue. This deferred cleanup can race with the subsequent queue re-allocation during reset, potentially leading to use-after-free or resource conflicts. Replace fput() with __fput_sync() to ensure synchronous socket release, guaranteeing that all socket resources are fully cleaned up before the function returns. This prevents races during controller reset where new queue setup may begin before the old socket is fully released. * Call chain during reset: nvme_reset_ctrl_work() -> nvme_tcp_teardown_ctrl() -> nvme_tcp_teardown_io_queues() -> nvme_tcp_free_io_queues() -> nvme_tcp_free_queue() <-- fput() -> __fput_sync() -> nvme_tcp_teardown_admin_queue() -> nvme_tcp_free_admin_queue() -> nvme_tcp_free_queue() <-- fput() -> __fput_sync() -> nvme_tcp_setup_ctrl() <-- race with deferred fput memalloc_noreclaim_save() sets PF_MEMALLOC which is intended for tasks performing memory reclaim work that need reserve access. While PF_MEMALLOC prevents the task from entering direct reclaim (causing __need_reclaim() to return false), it does not strip __GFP_IO from gfp flags. The allocator can therefore still trigger writeback I/O when __GFP_IO remains set, which is unsafe when the caller holds block layer locks. Switch to memalloc_noio_save() which sets PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO. This causes current_gfp_context() to strip __GFP_IO|__GFP_FS from every allocation in the scope, making it safe to allocate memory while holding elevator_lock and set->srcu. * The issue can be reproduced using blktests: nvme_trtype=tcp ./check nvme/005 blktests (master) # nvme_trtype=tcp ./check nvme/005 nvme/005 (tr=tcp) (reset local loopback target) [failed] runtime 0.725s ... 0.798s something found in dmesg: [ 108.473940] run blktests nvme/005 at 2025-11-22 16:12:20 [...] ... (See '/root/blktests/results/nodev_tr_tcp/nvme/005.dmesg' for the entire message) blktests (master) # cat /root/blktests/results/nodev_tr_tcp/nvme/005.dmesg [ 108.473940] run blktests nvme/005 at 2025-11-22 16:12:20 [ 108.526983] loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 2097152 [ 108.555606] nvmet: adding nsid 1 to subsystem blktests-subsystem-1 [ 108.572531] nvmet_tcp: enabling port 0 (127.0.0.1:4420) [ 108.613061] nvmet: Created nvm controller 1 for subsystem blktests-subsystem-1 for NQN nqn.2014-08.org.nvmexpress:uuid:0f01fb42-9f7f-4856-b0b3-51e60b8de349. [ 108.616832] nvme nvme0: creating 48 I/O queues. [ 108.630791] nvme nvme0: mapped 48/0/0 default/read/poll queues. [ 108.661892] nvme nvme0: new ctrl: NQN "blktests-subsystem-1", addr 127.0.0.1:4420, hostnqn: nqn.2014-08.org.nvmexpress:uuid:0f01fb42-9f7f-4856-b0b3-51e60b8de349 [ 108.746639] nvmet: Created nvm controller 2 for subsystem blktests-subsystem-1 for NQN nqn.2014-08.org.nvmexpress:uuid:0f01fb42-9f7f-4856-b0b3-51e60b8de349. [ 108.748466] nvme nvme0: creating 48 I/O queues. [ 108.802984] nvme nvme0: mapped 48/0/0 default/read/poll queues. [ 108.829983] nvme nvme0: Removing ctrl: NQN "blktests-subsystem-1" [ 108.854288] block nvme0n1: no available path - failing I/O [ 108.854344] block nvme0n1: no available path - failing I/O [ 108.854373] Buffer I/O error on dev nvme0n1, logical block 1, async page read [ 108.891693] ====================================================== [ 108.895912] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 108.900184] 6.17.0nvme+ #3 Tainted: G N [ 108.903913] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 108.908171] nvme/2734 is trying to acquire lock: [ 108.911957] ffff88810210e610 (set->srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: __synchronize_srcu+0x17/0x170 [ 108.917587] but task is already holding lock: [ 108.921570] ffff88813abea198 (&q->elevator_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: elevator_change+0xa8/0x1c0 [ 108.927361] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 108.933018] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 108.938223] -> #4 (&q->elevator_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: [ 108.942988] __mutex_lock+0xa2/0x1150 [ 108.945873] elevator_change+0xa8/0x1c0 [ 108.948925] elv_iosched_store+0xdf/0x140 [ 108.952043] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x16a/0x220 [ 108.955367] vfs_write+0x378/0x520 [ 108.957598] ksys_write+0x67/0xe0 [ 108.959721] do_syscall_64+0x76/0xbb0 [ 108.962052] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 108.965145] -> #3 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)){++++}-{0:0}: [ 108.968923] blk_alloc_queue+0x30e/0x350 [ 108.972117] blk_mq_alloc_queue+0x61/0xd0 [ 108.974677] scsi_alloc_sdev+0x2a0/0x3e0 [ 108.977092] scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x1bd/0x430 [ 108.979921] __scsi_add_device+0x109/0x120 [ 108.982504] ata_scsi_scan_host+0x97/0x1c0 [ 108.984365] async_run_entry_fn+0x2d/0x130 [ 108.986109] process_one_work+0x20e/0x630 [ 108.987830] worker_thread+0x184/0x330 [ 108.989473] kthread+0x10a/0x250 [ 108.990852] ret_from_fork+0x297/0x300 [ 108.992491] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 108.994159] -> #2 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 108.996320] fs_reclaim_acquire+0x99/0xd0 [ 108.998058] kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x4e/0x3c0 [ 109.000123] __alloc_skb+0x15f/0x190 [ 109.002195] tcp_send_active_reset+0x3f/0x1e0 [ 109.004038] tcp_disconnect+0x50b/0x720 [ 109.005695] __tcp_close+0x2b8/0x4b0 [ 109.007227] tcp_close+0x20/0x80 [ 109.008663] inet_release+0x31/0x60 [ 109.010175] __sock_release+0x3a/0xc0 [ 109.011778] sock_close+0x14/0x20 [ 109.013263] __fput+0xee/0x2c0 [ 109.014673] delayed_fput+0x31/0x50 [ 109.016183] process_one_work+0x20e/0x630 [ 109.017897] worker_thread+0x184/0x330 [ 109.019543] kthread+0x10a/0x250 [ 109.020929] ret_from_fork+0x297/0x300 [ 109.022565] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 109.024194] -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_INET-NVME){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 109.026634] lock_sock_nested+0x2e/0x70 [ 109.028251] tcp_sendmsg+0x1a/0x40 [ 109.029783] sock_sendmsg+0xed/0x110 [ 109.031321] nvme_tcp_try_send_cmd_pdu+0x13e/0x260 [nvme_tcp] [ 109.034263] nvme_tcp_try_send+0xb3/0x330 [nvme_tcp] [ 109.036375] nvme_tcp_queue_rq+0x342/0x3d0 [nvme_tcp] [ 109.038528] blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x297/0x800 [ 109.040448] __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x3db/0x5f0 [ 109.042677] blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x29/0x70 [ 109.044787] blk_mq_run_work_fn+0x76/0x1b0 [ 109.046535] process_one_work+0x20e/0x630 [ 109.048245] worker_thread+0x184/0x330 [ 109.049890] kthread+0x10a/0x250 [ 109.051331] ret_from_fork+0x297/0x300 [ 109.053024] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 109.054740] -> #0 (set->srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}: [ 109.056850] __lock_acquire+0x1468/0x2210 [ 109.058614] lock_sync+0xa5/0x110 [ 109.060048] __synchronize_srcu+0x49/0x170 [ 109.061802] elevator_switch+0xc9/0x330 [ 109.063950] elevator_change+0x128/0x1c0 [ 109.065675] elevator_set_none+0x4c/0x90 [ 109.067316] blk_unregister_queue+0xa8/0x110 [ 109.069165] __del_gendisk+0x14e/0x3c0 [ 109.070824] del_gendisk+0x75/0xa0 [ 109.072328] nvme_ns_remove+0xf2/0x230 [nvme_core] [ 109.074365] nvme_remove_namespaces+0xf2/0x150 [nvme_core] [ 109.076652] nvme_do_delete_ctrl+0x71/0x90 [nvme_core] [ 109.078775] nvme_delete_ctrl_sync+0x3b/0x50 [nvme_core] [ 109.081009] nvme_sysfs_delete+0x34/0x40 [nvme_core] [ 109.083082] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x16a/0x220 [ 109.085009] vfs_write+0x378/0x520 [ 109.086539] ksys_write+0x67/0xe0 [ 109.087982] do_syscall_64+0x76/0xbb0 [ 109.089577] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 109.091665] other info that might help us debug this: [ 109.095478] Chain exists of: set->srcu --> &q->q_usage_counter(io) --> &q->elevator_lock [ 109.099544] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 109.101708] CPU0 CPU1 [ 109.103402] ---- ---- [ 109.105103] lock(&q->elevator_lock); [ 109.106530] lock(&q->q_usage_counter(io)); [ 109.109022] lock(&q->elevator_lock); [ 109.111391] sync(set->srcu); [ 109.112586] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 109.114772] 5 locks held by nvme/2734: [ 109.116189] #0: ffff888101925410 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x67/0xe0 [ 109.119143] #1: ffff88817a914e88 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x10f/0x220 [ 109.123141] #2: ffff8881046313f8 (kn->active#185){++++}-{0:0}, at: sysfs_remove_file_self+0x26/0x50 [ 109.126543] #3: ffff88810470e1d0 (&set->update_nr_hwq_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: del_gendisk+0x6d/0xa0 [ 109.129891] #4: ffff88813abea198 (&q->elevator_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: elevator_change+0xa8/0x1c0 [ 109.133149] stack backtrace: [ 109.134817] CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 2734 Comm: nvme Tainted: G N 6.17.0nvme+ #3 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 109.134819] Tainted: [N]=TEST [ 109.134820] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 109.134821] Call Trace: [ 109.134823] <TASK> [ 109.134824] dump_stack_lvl+0x75/0xb0 [ 109.134828] print_circular_bug+0x26a/0x330 [ 109.134831] check_noncircular+0x12f/0x150 [ 109.134834] __lock_acquire+0x1468/0x2210 [ 109.134837] ? __synchronize_srcu+0x17/0x170 [ 109.134838] lock_sync+0xa5/0x110 [ 109.134840] ? __synchronize_srcu+0x17/0x170 [ 109.134842] __synchronize_srcu+0x49/0x170 [ 109.134843] ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x80 [ 109.134845] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2d/0x60 [ 109.134847] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x14/0x30 [ 109.134853] ? ktime_get_mono_fast_ns+0x36/0xb0 [ 109.134858] elevator_switch+0xc9/0x330 [ 109.134860] elevator_change+0x128/0x1c0 [ 109.134862] ? kernfs_put.part.0+0x86/0x290 [ 109.134864] elevator_set_none+0x4c/0x90 [ 109.134866] blk_unregister_queue+0xa8/0x110 [ 109.134868] __del_gendisk+0x14e/0x3c0 [ 109.134870] del_gendisk+0x75/0xa0 [ 109.134872] nvme_ns_remove+0xf2/0x230 [nvme_core] [ 109.134879] nvme_remove_namespaces+0xf2/0x150 [nvme_core] [ 109.134887] nvme_do_delete_ctrl+0x71/0x90 [nvme_core] [ 109.134893] nvme_delete_ctrl_sync+0x3b/0x50 [nvme_core] [ 109.134899] nvme_sysfs_delete+0x34/0x40 [nvme_core] [ 109.134905] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x16a/0x220 [ 109.134908] vfs_write+0x378/0x520 [ 109.134911] ksys_write+0x67/0xe0 [ 109.134913] do_syscall_64+0x76/0xbb0 [ 109.134915] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 109.134916] RIP: 0033:0x7fd68a737317 [ 109.134917] Code: 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 [ 109.134919] RSP: 002b:00007ffded1546d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 109.134920] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000054f7e0 RCX: 00007fd68a737317 [ 109.134921] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007fd68a855719 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 109.134921] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000030407850 R09: 00007fd68a7cd4e0 [ 109.134922] R10: 00007fd68a65b130 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fd68a855719 [ 109.134923] R13: 00000000304074c0 R14: 00000000304074c0 R15: 0000000030408660 [ 109.134926] </TASK> [ 109.962756] Key type psk unregistered Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>

The switch case in loongson_gpu_fixup_dma_hang() may not DC2 or DC3, and readl(crtc_reg) will access with random address, because the "device" is from "base+PCI_DEVICE_ID", "base" is from "pdev->devfn+1". This is wrong when my platform inserts a discrete GPU: lspci -tv -[0000:00]-+-00.0 Loongson Technology LLC Hyper Transport Bridge Controller ... +-06.0 Loongson Technology LLC LG100 GPU +-06.2 Loongson Technology LLC Device 7a37 ... Add a default switch case to fix the panic as below: Kernel ade access[#1]: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.6.136-loong64-desktop-hwe+ #4 pc 90000000017e5534 ra 90000000017e54c0 tp 90000001002f8000 sp 90000001002fb6c0 a0 80000efe00003100 a1 0000000000003100 a2 0000000000000000 a3 0000000000000002 a4 90000001002fb6b4 a5 900000087cdb58fd a6 90000000027af000 a7 0000000000000001 t0 00000000000085b9 t1 000000000000ffff t2 0000000000000000 t3 0000000000000000 t4 fffffffffffffffd t5 00000000fffb6d9c t6 0000000000083b00 t7 00000000000070c0 t8 900000087cdb4d94 u0 900000087cdb58fd s9 90000001002fb826 s0 90000000031c12c8 s1 7fffffffffffff00 s2 90000000031c12d0 s3 0000000000002710 s4 0000000000000000 s5 0000000000000000 s6 9000000100053000 s7 7fffffffffffff00 s8 90000000030d4000 ra: 90000000017e54c0 loongson_gpu_fixup_dma_hang+0x40/0x210 ERA: 90000000017e5534 loongson_gpu_fixup_dma_hang+0xb4/0x210 CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE) PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE) EUEN: 00000000 (-FPE -SXE -ASXE -BTE) ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7) ESTAT: 00480000 [ADEM] (IS= ECode=8 EsubCode=1) BADV: 7fffffffffffff00 PRID: 0014d000 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3A6000-HV) Modules linked in: Process swapper/0 (pid: 1, threadinfo=(____ptrval____), task=(____ptrval____)) Stack : 0000000000000006 90000001002fb778 90000001002fb704 0000000000000007 0000000016a65700 90000000017e5690 000000000000ffff ffffffffffffffff 900000000209f7c0 9000000100053000 900000000209f7a8 9000000000eebc08 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000006 90000001002fb778 90000001000530b8 90000000027af000 0000000000000000 9000000100054000 9000000100053000 9000000000ebb70c 9000000100004c00 9000000004000001 90000001002fb7e4 bae765461f31cb12 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000006 90000000027af000 0000000000000030 90000000027af000 900000087cd6f800 9000000100053000 0000000000000000 9000000000ebc560 7a2500147cdaf720 bae765461f31cb12 0000000000000001 0000000000000030 ... Call Trace: [<90000000017e5534>] loongson_gpu_fixup_dma_hang+0xb4/0x210 [<9000000000eebc08>] pci_fixup_device+0x108/0x280 [<9000000000ebb70c>] pci_setup_device+0x24c/0x690 [<9000000000ebc560>] pci_scan_single_device+0xe0/0x140 [<9000000000ebc684>] pci_scan_slot+0xc4/0x280 [<9000000000ebdd00>] pci_scan_child_bus_extend+0x60/0x3f0 [<9000000000f5bc94>] acpi_pci_root_create+0x2b4/0x420 [<90000000017e5e74>] pci_acpi_scan_root+0x2d4/0x440 [<9000000000f5b02c>] acpi_pci_root_add+0x21c/0x3a0 [<9000000000f4ee54>] acpi_bus_attach+0x1a4/0x3c0 [<90000000010e200c>] device_for_each_child+0x6c/0xe0 [<9000000000f4bbf4>] acpi_dev_for_each_child+0x44/0x70 [<9000000000f4ef40>] acpi_bus_attach+0x290/0x3c0 [<90000000010e200c>] device_for_each_child+0x6c/0xe0 [<9000000000f4bbf4>] acpi_dev_for_each_child+0x44/0x70 [<9000000000f4ef40>] acpi_bus_attach+0x290/0x3c0 [<9000000000f5211c>] acpi_bus_scan+0x6c/0x280 [<900000000189c028>] acpi_scan_init+0x194/0x310 [<900000000189bc6c>] acpi_init+0xcc/0x140 [<9000000000220cdc>] do_one_initcall+0x4c/0x310 [<90000000018618fc>] kernel_init_freeable+0x258/0x2d4 [<900000000184326c>] kernel_init+0x28/0x13c [<9000000000222008>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0xc/0xa4 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 95db0c9 ("LoongArch: Workaround LS2K/LS7A GPU DMA hang bug") Link: https://gist.github.com/opsiff/ebf2dac51b4013d22462f2124c55f807 Link: https://gist.github.com/opsiff/a62f2a73db0492b3c49bf223a339b133 Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com> Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>

Pavan Chebbi says: ==================== bnxt_en: Bug fixes This patchset adds the following fixes for bnxt: Patch #1 fixes DPC AER handling to make it more reliable Patch #2 fixes incorrect capping bp->max_tpa based on what the FW supports Patch #3 fixes ignoring of VNIC configuration result when RDMA driver is loading Patch #4 fixes logic to make phase adjustment on the PPS OUT signal ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260504083611.1383776-1-pavan.chebbi@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

syzbot reports for sleeping function called from invalid context [1]. The recently added code for resizable hash tables uses hlist_bl bit locks in combination with spin_lock for the connection fields (cp->lock). Fix the following problems: * avoid using spin_lock(&cp->lock) under locked bit lock because it sleeps on PREEMPT_RT * as the recent changes call ip_vs_conn_hash() only for newly allocated connection, the spin_lock can be removed there because the connection is still not linked to table and does not need cp->lock protection. * the lock can be removed also from ip_vs_conn_unlink() where we are the last connection user. * the last place that is fixed is ip_vs_conn_fill_cport() where now the cp->lock is locked before the other locks to ensure other packets do not modify the cp->flags in non-atomic way. Here we make sure cport and flags are changed only once if two or more packets race to fill the cport. Also, we fill cport early, so that if we race with resizing there will be valid cport key for the hashing. Add a warning if too many hash table changes occur for our RCU read-side critical section which is error condition but minor because the connection still can expire gracefully. Still, restore the cport to 0 to allow retransmitted packet to properly fill the cport. Problems reported by Sashiko. [1]: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 16, name: ktimers/0 preempt_count: 2, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 3, expected: 3 8 locks held by ktimers/0/16: #0: ffffffff8de5f260 (local_bh){.+.+}-{1:3}, at: __local_bh_disable_ip+0x3c/0x420 kernel/softirq.c:163 #1: ffffffff8dfc80c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: __local_bh_disable_ip+0x3c/0x420 kernel/softirq.c:163 #2: ffff8880b8826360 (&base->expiry_lock){+...}-{3:3}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_rt.h:45 [inline] #2: ffff8880b8826360 (&base->expiry_lock){+...}-{3:3}, at: timer_base_lock_expiry kernel/time/timer.c:1502 [inline] #2: ffff8880b8826360 (&base->expiry_lock){+...}-{3:3}, at: __run_timer_base+0x120/0x9f0 kernel/time/timer.c:2384 #3: ffffffff8dfc80c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:300 [inline] #3: ffffffff8dfc80c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline] #3: ffffffff8dfc80c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: __rt_spin_lock kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:50 [inline] #3: ffffffff8dfc80c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rt_spin_lock+0x1e0/0x400 kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:57 #4: ffffc90000157a80 ((&cp->timer)){+...}-{0:0}, at: call_timer_fn+0xd4/0x5e0 kernel/time/timer.c:1745 #5: ffffffff8dfc80c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:300 [inline] #5: ffffffff8dfc80c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline] #5: ffffffff8dfc80c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: ip_vs_conn_unlink net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_conn.c:315 [inline] #5: ffffffff8dfc80c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: ip_vs_conn_expire+0x257/0x2390 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_conn.c:1260 #6: ffffffff8de5f260 (local_bh){.+.+}-{1:3}, at: __local_bh_disable_ip+0x3c/0x420 kernel/softirq.c:163 #7: ffff888068d4c3f0 (&cp->lock#2){+...}-{3:3}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_rt.h:45 [inline] #7: ffff888068d4c3f0 (&cp->lock#2){+...}-{3:3}, at: ip_vs_conn_unlink net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_conn.c:324 [inline] #7: ffff888068d4c3f0 (&cp->lock#2){+...}-{3:3}, at: ip_vs_conn_expire+0xd4a/0x2390 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_conn.c:1260 Preemption disabled at: [<ffffffff898a6358>] bit_spin_lock include/linux/bit_spinlock.h:38 [inline] [<ffffffff898a6358>] hlist_bl_lock+0x18/0x110 include/linux/list_bl.h:149 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 16 Comm: ktimers/0 Tainted: G W L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT_{RT,(full)} Tainted: [W]=WARN, [L]=SOFTLOCKUP Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/18/2026 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120 __might_resched+0x329/0x480 kernel/sched/core.c:9162 __rt_spin_lock kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48 [inline] rt_spin_lock+0xc2/0x400 kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:57 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_rt.h:45 [inline] ip_vs_conn_unlink net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_conn.c:324 [inline] ip_vs_conn_expire+0xd4a/0x2390 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_conn.c:1260 call_timer_fn+0x192/0x5e0 kernel/time/timer.c:1748 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1799 [inline] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:2374 [inline] __run_timer_base+0x6a3/0x9f0 kernel/time/timer.c:2386 run_timer_base kernel/time/timer.c:2395 [inline] run_timer_softirq+0xb7/0x170 kernel/time/timer.c:2405 handle_softirqs+0x1de/0x6d0 kernel/softirq.c:622 __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:656 [inline] run_ktimerd+0x69/0x100 kernel/softirq.c:1151 smpboot_thread_fn+0x541/0xa50 kernel/smpboot.c:160 kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436 ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> Reported-by: syzbot+504e778ddaecd36fdd17@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260415200216.79699-1-ja%40ssi.bg Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260420165539.85174-4-ja%40ssi.bg Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260422135823.50489-4-ja%40ssi.bg Fixes: 2fa7cc9 ("ipvs: switch to per-net connection table") Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

rmnet_dellink() removes the endpoint from the hash table with hlist_del_init_rcu() and then immediately frees it with kfree(). However, RCU readers on the receive path (rmnet_rx_handler -> __rmnet_map_ingress_handler) may still hold a reference to the endpoint and dereference ep->egress_dev after the memory has been freed. The endpoint is a kmalloc-32 object, and the stale read at offset 8 corresponds to the egress_dev pointer. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffde942eef Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 137 Comm: poc_write Not tainted 7.0.0+ #4 PREEMPTLAZY RIP: 0010:rmnet_vnd_rx_fixup (rmnet_vnd.c:27) Call Trace: <TASK> __rmnet_map_ingress_handler (rmnet_handlers.c:48 rmnet_handlers.c:101) rmnet_rx_handler (rmnet_handlers.c:129 rmnet_handlers.c:235) __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 (net/core/dev.c:6096) __netif_receive_skb_one_core (net/core/dev.c:6208) netif_receive_skb (net/core/dev.c:6467) tun_get_user (drivers/net/tun.c:1955) tun_chr_write_iter (drivers/net/tun.c:2003) vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:688) ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740) </TASK> Add an rcu_head field to struct rmnet_endpoint and replace kfree() with kfree_rcu() so the endpoint memory remains valid through the RCU grace period. Also remove the rmnet_vnd_dellink() call and inline only the nr_rmnet_devs decrement, since rmnet_vnd_dellink() would set ep->egress_dev to NULL during the grace period, creating a data race with lockless readers. Fixes: ceed73a ("drivers: net: ethernet: qualcomm: rmnet: Initial implementation") Reported-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu> Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260514122511.3083479-2-bestswngs@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Since the start of the git history, brport_store() always acquired the bridge lock. Back then this decision made sense: The bridge lock protects the STP state of the bridge and its ports and at that time the function was only used by two STP related attributes (cost and priority). Nowadays, brport_store() processes a lot more attributes and most of them do not need the bridge lock: * Bridge flags: Only require RTNL. Read locklessly by the data path. Annotations can be added in net-next. * FDB port flushing: Only requires the FDB lock. * Multicast attributes: Only require the multicast lock. * Group forward mask: Only requires RTNL. Read locklessly by the data path. Annotations can be added in net-next. * Backup port: Only requires RTNL. Read locklessly by the data path. This is a problem as the bridge calls dev_set_promiscuity() when certain bridge port flags change and this function can sleep since the commit cited below, resulting in a splat such as [1]. Fix this by reducing the scope of the bridge lock and only take it when processing the two STP related attributes that require it. Remove the now stale comment from br_switchdev_set_port_flag(). The SWITCHDEV_F_DEFER flag can be removed in net-next. [1] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:1262 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 372, name: bash preempt_count: 201, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 5 locks held by bash/372: #0: ffff88810c51c3f0 (sb_writers#7){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740) #1: ffff888115ce9480 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:343) #2: ffff88810b9fd330 (kn->active#37){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:80 fs/kernfs/file.c:344) #3: ffffffffa59473a0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: brport_store (net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c:326) #4: ffff8881099d2d58 (&br->lock){+...}-{3:3}, at: brport_store (./include/linux/spinlock.h:348 net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c:345) Preemption disabled at: 0x0 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120) __might_resched.cold (kernel/sched/core.c:9163) netif_rx_mode_run (net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:1262) netif_rx_mode_sync (net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:1428) dev_set_promiscuity (net/core/dev_api.c:289) br_manage_promisc (net/bridge/br_if.c:135 net/bridge/br_if.c:172) br_port_flags_change (net/bridge/br_if.c:242 net/bridge/br_if.c:747) store_learning (net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c:79 net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c:235) brport_store (net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c:346) kernfs_fop_write_iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:352) new_sync_write (fs/read_write.c:595) vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:688) ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) Fixes: 78cd408 ("net: add missing instance lock to dev_set_promiscuity") Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260526064818.272516-3-idosch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

…kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 7.1, take #4 - Restore CONFIG_PKVM_DISABLE_STAGE2_ON_PANIC to its former glory by making sure the config symbol is correctly spelled out in the code - Don't reset the AArch32 view of the PMU counters to zero when the guest is writing to them - Fix an assorted collection of memory leaks in the newly added tracing code - Fix the capping of ZCR_EL2 which could be used in an unsanitised way by an L2 guest

…e_text_cmd() Two latent bugs in the Text-phase handler, both present since the original LIO integration in commit e48354c ("iscsi-target: Add iSCSI fabric support for target v4.1"): 1) DataDigest CRC buffer overread (4 bytes past text_in). text_in is kzalloc()'d at ALIGN(payload_length, 4). rx_size is then incremented by ISCSI_CRC_LEN to make room for the received DataDigest in the iovec, but the same (now-bumped) rx_size is passed as the buffer length to iscsit_crc_buf(): if (conn->conn_ops->DataDigest) { ... rx_size += ISCSI_CRC_LEN; } ... if (conn->conn_ops->DataDigest) { data_crc = iscsit_crc_buf(text_in, rx_size, 0, NULL); iscsit_crc_buf() walks rx_size bytes of text_in with crc32c(), so when DataDigest is negotiated it reads 4 bytes past the end of the text_in allocation. KASAN reproduces this directly on the unpatched mainline tree as slab-out-of-bounds in crc32c() called from the Text PDU path. The OOB bytes feed crc32c() and are then compared against the initiator-supplied checksum, so the value does not flow back to the attacker, but the kernel does read past the buffer on every Text PDU with DataDigest=CRC32C. Fix by passing the actual padded payload length (ALIGN(payload_length, 4)) that was used for the kzalloc(). 2) Stale cmd->text_in_ptr re-free (double-free) on ERL>0 bad DataDigest drop. On DataDigest mismatch with ErrorRecoveryLevel > 0 the handler silently drops the PDU and lets the initiator plug the CmdSN gap: kfree(text_in); return 0; cmd->text_in_ptr still points at the freed buffer. The next Text Request on the same ITT re-enters iscsit_setup_text_cmd(), which unconditionally does kfree(cmd->text_in_ptr); cmd->text_in_ptr = NULL; freeing the same pointer a second time. Session teardown via iscsit_release_cmd() has the same shape and hits the same double-free if the connection is dropped before a second Text Request arrives. On an unmodified mainline tree the bug-1 CRC overread fires first on the initial valid Text Request and perturbs the subsequent state, so #4 was isolated by building a kernel with only the bug-1 hunk of this patch applied plus temporary printk() observability around the three relevant kfree() sites. The observability prints are not part of this patch. On that build, a three-PDU Text Request sequence after login produces two back-to-back splats: BUG: KASAN: double-free in iscsit_setup_text_cmd+0x?? BUG: KASAN: double-free in iscsit_release_cmd+0x?? showing the same pointer freed in the ERL>0 drop path and again in iscsit_setup_text_cmd() (next Text Request on the same ITT) and once more in iscsit_release_cmd() (session teardown). On distro kernels with CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y (default) the double-free becomes a remote kernel BUG(); on non-hardened kernels it corrupts the slab freelist. Fix by clearing cmd->text_in_ptr after the kfree() in the ERL>0 drop path. With both hunks applied #4 is directly observable on the stock tree without observability printks; fixing bug-1 alone would mask #4 less, not more, so the hunks are submitted together. Both fixes are one-liners. The Text PDU state machine is unchanged and the wire protocol is unaffected. Fixes: e48354c ("iscsi-target: Add iSCSI fabric support for target v4.1") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com> Tested-by: John Garry <john.g.garry@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: John Garry <john.g.garry@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>

…unlock race When the FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK mechanism is used for unlocking (PI-)futexes, then the unlock sequence in user space looks like this: 1) robust_list_set_op_pending(mutex); 2) robust_list_remove(mutex); lval = gettid(); 3) if (atomic_try_cmpxchg(&mutex->lock, lval, 0)) 4) robust_list_clear_op_pending(); else 5) sys_futex(OP | FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK, ....); That still leaves a minimal race window between #3 and #4 where the mutex could be acquired by some other task, which observes that it is the last user and: 1) unmaps the mutex memory 2) maps a different file, which ends up covering the same address When then the original task exits before reaching #5 then the kernel robust list handling observes the pending op entry and tries to fix up user space. In case that the newly mapped data contains the TID of the exiting thread at the address of the mutex/futex the kernel will set the owner died bit in that memory and therefore corrupt unrelated data. On X86 this boils down to this simplified assembly sequence: mov %esi,%eax // Load TID into EAX xor %ecx,%ecx // Set ECX to 0 #3 lock cmpxchg %ecx,(%rdi) // Try the TID -> 0 transition .Lstart: jnz .Lend #4 movq %rcx,(%rdx) // Clear list_op_pending .Lend: If the cmpxchg() succeeds and the task is interrupted before it can clear list_op_pending in the robust list head (#4) and the task crashes in a signal handler or gets killed then it ends up in do_exit() and subsequently in the robust list handling, which then might run into the unmap/map issue described above. This is only relevant when user space was interrupted and a signal is pending. The fix-up has to be done before signal delivery is attempted because: 1) The signal might be fatal so get_signal() ends up in do_exit() 2) The signal handler might crash or the task is killed before returning from the handler. At that point the instruction pointer in pt_regs is not longer the instruction pointer of the initially interrupted unlock sequence. The right place to handle this is in __exit_to_user_mode_loop() before invoking arch_do_signal_or_restart() as this covers obviously both scenarios. As this is only relevant when the task was interrupted in user space, this is tied to RSEQ and the generic entry code as RSEQ keeps track of user space interrupts unconditionally even if the task does not have a RSEQ region installed. That makes the decision very lightweight: if (current->rseq.user_irq && within(regs, csr->unlock_ip_range)) futex_fixup_robust_unlock(regs, csr); futex_fixup_robust_unlock() then invokes a architecture specific function to return the pending op pointer or NULL. The function evaluates the register content to decide whether the pending ops pointer in the robust list head needs to be cleared. Assuming the above unlock sequence, then on x86 this decision is the trivial evaluation of the zero flag: return regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_ZF ? regs->dx : NULL; Other architectures might need to do more complex evaluations due to LLSC, but the approach is valid in general. The size of the pointer is determined from the matching range struct, which covers both 32-bit and 64-bit builds including COMPAT. The unlock sequence is going to be placed in the VDSO so that the kernel can keep everything synchronized, especially the register usage. The resulting code sequence for user space is: if (__vdso_futex_robust_list$SZ_try_unlock(lock, tid, &pending_op) != tid) err = sys_futex($OP | FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK,....); Both the VDSO unlock and the kernel side unlock ensure that the pending_op pointer is always cleared when the lock becomes unlocked. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: André Almeida <andrealmeid@igalia.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260602090535.773669210@kernel.org

When the FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK mechanism is used for unlocking (PI-)futexes, then the unlock sequence in userspace looks like this: 1) robust_list_set_op_pending(mutex); 2) robust_list_remove(mutex); lval = gettid(); 3) if (atomic_try_cmpxchg(&mutex->lock, lval, 0)) 4) robust_list_clear_op_pending(); else 5) sys_futex(OP,...FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK); That still leaves a minimal race window between #3 and #4 where the mutex could be acquired by some other task which observes that it is the last user and: 1) unmaps the mutex memory 2) maps a different file, which ends up covering the same address When then the original task exits before reaching #5 then the kernel robust list handling observes the pending op entry and tries to fix up user space. In case that the newly mapped data contains the TID of the exiting thread at the address of the mutex/futex the kernel will set the owner died bit in that memory and therefore corrupt unrelated data. Provide a VDSO function which exposes the critical section window in the VDSO symbol table. The resulting addresses are updated in the task's mm when the VDSO is (re)map()'ed. The core code detects when a task was interrupted within the critical section and is about to deliver a signal. It then invokes an architecture specific function which determines whether the pending op pointer has to be cleared or not. The unlock assembly sequence on 64-bit is: mov %esi,%eax // Load TID into EAX xor %ecx,%ecx // Set ECX to 0 lock cmpxchg %ecx,(%rdi) // Try the TID -> 0 transition .Lstart: jnz .Lend movq %rcx,(%rdx) // Clear list_op_pending .Lend: ret So the decision can be simply based on the ZF state in regs->flags. The pending op pointer is always in DX independent of the build mode (32/64-bit) to make the pending op pointer retrieval uniform. The size of the pointer is stored in the matching criticial section range struct and the core code retrieves it from there. So the pointer retrieval function does not have to care. It is bit-size independent: return regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_ZF ? regs->dx : NULL; There are two entry points to handle the different robust list pending op pointer size: __vdso_futex_robust_list64_try_unlock() __vdso_futex_robust_list32_try_unlock() The 32-bit VDSO provides only __vdso_futex_robust_list32_try_unlock(). The 64-bit VDSO provides always __vdso_futex_robust_list64_try_unlock() and when COMPAT is enabled also the list32 variant, which is required to support multi-size robust list pointers used by gaming emulators. The unlock function is inspired by an idea from Mathieu Desnoyers. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: André Almeida <andrealmeid@igalia.com> Acked-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260311185409.1988269-1-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260602090535.883796247@kernel.org

tl;dr: Use stop_machine() and a state machine based on the "MULTI_STOP" pattern to implement core TDX module update logic. Long version: TDX module updates require careful synchronization with other TDX operations. The requirements are (#1/#2 reflect current behavior that must be preserved): 1. SEAMCALLs need to be callable from both process and IRQ contexts. 2. SEAMCALLs need to be able to run concurrently across CPUs 3. During updates, only update-related SEAMCALLs are permitted; all other SEAMCALLs shouldn't be called. 4. During updates, all online CPUs must participate in the update work. No single lock primitive satisfies all requirements. For instance, rwlock_t handles #1/#2 but fails #4: CPUs spinning with IRQs disabled cannot be directed to perform update work. Use stop_machine() as it is the only well-understood mechanism that can meet all requirements. And TDX module updates consist of several steps (See Intel Trust Domain Extensions (Intel TDX) Module Base Architecture Specification, Chapter "TD-Preserving TDX module Update"). Ordering requirements between steps mandate lockstep synchronization across all CPUs. multi_cpu_stop() provides a good example of executing a multi-step task in lockstep across CPUs, but it does not synchronize the individual steps inside the callback itself. Implement a similar state machine as the skeleton for TDX module updates. Each state represents one step in the update flow, and the state advances only after all CPUs acknowledge completion of the current step. This acknowledgment mechanism provides the required lockstep execution. The update flow is intentionally simpler than multi_cpu_stop() in two ways: a) use a spinlock to protect the control data instead of atomic_t and explicit memory barriers. b) omit touch_nmi_watchdog() and rcu_momentary_eqs(), which exist there for debugging and are not strictly needed for this update flow Potential alternative to stop_machine() ======================================= An alternative approach is to lock all KVM entry points and kick all vCPUs. Here, KVM entry points refer to KVM VM/vCPU ioctl entry points, implemented in KVM common code (virt/kvm). Adding a locking mechanism there would affect all architectures KVM supports. And to lock only TDX vCPUs, new logic would be needed to identify TDX vCPUs, which the KVM common code currently lacks. This would add significant complexity and maintenance overhead to KVM for this TDX-specific use case, so don't take this approach. [ dhansen: normal changelog/style munging ] Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony.lindgren@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kiryl Shutsemau (Meta) <kas@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260520133909.409394-15-chao.gao@intel.com

Ido Schimmel says: ==================== net: Fix protodown with macvlan When protodown is enabled on a macvlan, two bugs cause the macvlan to incorrectly gain carrier: 1. Toggling the lower device's carrier while protodown is enabled on the macvlan causes the macvlan to gain carrier, effectively bypassing the protodown mechanism. 2. Toggling protodown on and then off on the macvlan while the lower device has no carrier causes the macvlan to gain carrier, since netif_change_proto_down() unconditionally turns the carrier on. Patch #1 is a preparation. Patch #2 solves the first problem by making netif_carrier_on() return early when protodown is on. Patch #3 solves the second problem by only calling netif_carrier_on() when protodown is turned off if there is no linked net device or if the linked net device has a carrier. Patch #4 adds a selftest covering both bugs and the basic protodown functionality. Targeting at net-next since these are not regressions (i.e., never worked). Note that while these changes are in the core, they should only affect macvlan as protodown is only supported by macvlan and vxlan and only the former has a linked net device. ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260507105906.891817-1-idosch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

…announcements' Danielle Ratson says: ==================== bridge: Add selective forwarding of gratuitous neighbor announcements The existing neighbor suppression unconditionally suppresses gratuitous ARPs and unsolicited Neighbor Advertisements, which prevents fast mobility of hosts between VTEPs. This series adds a new neigh_forward_grat option that provides independent control of gratuitous ARP and unsolicited NA forwarding. When neigh_suppress is enabled but neigh_forward_grat is enabled, regular neighbor discovery is suppressed while gratuitous announcements are forwarded. The implementation marks gratuitous ARPs and unsolicited NAs in BR_INPUT_SKB_CB during input processing, then checks the per-output-port neigh_forward_grat setting during flooding. This allows gratuitous announcements from any input port to be selectively forwarded based on each output port's individual configuration. Both port-level control (via IFLA_BRPORT_NEIGH_FORWARD_GRAT) and per-VLAN control (via BRIDGE_VLANDB_ENTRY_NEIGH_FORWARD_GRAT) are provided. The default value of OFF preserves existing behavior. This behavior is in accordance with RFC 9161 (Section 3.6), which recommends that VTEPs forward gratuitous ARP and unsolicited NA messages to avoid traffic disruption during host mobility events. The new attributes use NLA_U8, although the kernel netlink guideline recommends NLA_U32 as the minimum integer type on the grounds that alignment makes smaller types equivalent on the wire. For a simple on/off attribute there is no technical advantage to u32 over u8, and keeping u8 preserves consistency with all surrounding bridge port attributes and avoids introducing new helpers alongside the existing infrastructure. Patchset overview: Patch #1: adds uapi headers. Patches #2-#3: support selective forwarding of gratuitous ARP. Patches #4-#5: add netlink handling. Patch #6: adds tests. Please see iproute related patches in the last 3 commits of: https://github.com/daniellerts/iproute2 ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260511065936.4173106-1-danieller@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

Writing to the netdevsim debugfs file "netdevsim/netdevsimN/fib/nexthop_bucket_activity" enters nsim_nexthop_bucket_activity_write(), which looks up a nexthop in data->nexthop_ht under rtnl_lock(). If a network namespace teardown, devlink reload or device deletion runs concurrently, nsim_fib_destroy() frees that rhashtable (and the surrounding nsim_fib_data) while the write is still in flight, leading to a slab-use-after-free: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nsim_nexthop_bucket_activity_write+0xb9e/0xdf0 Read of size 4 at addr ff1100001a379808 by task syz.0.11967/27894 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 27894 Comm: syz.0.11967 Not tainted 7.1.0-rc4-gf6f1bfc1980a #4 Call Trace: nsim_nexthop_bucket_activity_write+0xb9e/0xdf0 full_proxy_write+0x135/0x1a0 vfs_write+0x2e2/0x1040 ksys_write+0x146/0x270 __x64_sys_write+0x76/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0xb9/0x5b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x74/0x7c Allocated by task 15957: rhashtable_init_noprof+0x3ec/0x860 nsim_fib_create+0x371/0xca0 nsim_drv_probe+0xd60/0x15c0 ... new_device_store+0x425/0x7f0 Freed by task 24: rhashtable_free_and_destroy+0x10d/0x620 nsim_fib_destroy+0xc9/0x1c0 nsim_dev_reload_destroy+0x1e7/0x530 nsim_dev_reload_down+0x6b/0xd0 devlink_reload+0x1b5/0x770 devlink_pernet_pre_exit+0x25d/0x3a0 ops_undo_list+0x1b7/0xb90 cleanup_net+0x47f/0x8a0 The buggy address belongs to the object at ff1100001a379800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The freed 1k object is the bucket table of data->nexthop_ht. Shortly after, the dangling table is dereferenced again and the machine also takes a GPF in __rht_bucket_nested() from the same call site. The root cause is a lifetime mismatch: the debugfs files reference nsim_fib_data (the writer dereferences data->nexthop_ht), but the interface is not bracketed around the lifetime of that data. nsim_fib_destroy() freed both rhashtables and only removed the debugfs directory afterwards, and nsim_fib_create() created the debugfs files before the rhashtables were initialized and, on the error path, freed them before removing the files. debugfs keeps the file itself alive across a ->write() via debugfs_file_get()/debugfs_file_put() (fs/debugfs/file.c), but it does not keep data->nexthop_ht alive, so the in-flight writer dereferenced freed memory. rtnl_lock() in the writer does not help, because the teardown path does not take rtnl around rhashtable_free_and_destroy(). Fix it by bracketing the debugfs interface around the data it exposes, keeping nsim_fib_create() and nsim_fib_destroy() symmetric: - In nsim_fib_destroy(), tear down the debugfs files before the data structures they reference. debugfs_remove_recursive() drops the initial active-user reference and then waits for every in-flight ->write() to drop its reference before returning, and rejects new opens (__debugfs_file_removed(), fs/debugfs/inode.c). Once it returns, no debugfs accessor can reach the FIB data, so the rhashtables and nsim_fib_data can be destroyed safely. This also covers the bool knobs in the same directory, which store pointers into the same nsim_fib_data, and the final kfree(data). - In nsim_fib_create(), create the debugfs files after the rhashtables and notifiers are set up. This closes the same race on the error-unwind path, where a concurrent writer could otherwise observe a half-constructed instance or a table that the unwind has already freed. (With only the destroy-side change, a writer racing the create window instead dereferences an uninitialized data->nexthop_ht.) This is reproducible by racing, in a loop, writes to /sys/kernel/debug/netdevsim/netdevsimN/fib/nexthop_bucket_activity against a teardown of the same netdevsim instance -- a devlink reload ("devlink dev reload netdevsim/netdevsimN"), destroying the network namespace it lives in, or "echo N > /sys/bus/netdevsim/del_device". It was found with syzkaller; a syzkaller reproducer is available. A standalone C reproducer does not trigger it reliably because the race needs the netns-teardown/reload path. Cc: <stable+noautosel@kernel.org> # netdevsim is a test harness, it's never loaded on production systems Signed-off-by: Zijing Yin <yzjaurora@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260529135718.1804031-1-yzjaurora@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

…ernel/git/ath/ath Jeff Johnson says: ================== ath.git patches for v7.2 (PR #4) An assortment of cleanups and minor bug fixes across wcn36xx, ath9k, ath10k, ath11k, and ath12k. ================== Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

Eduard Zingerman says: ==================== bpf: replace min/max fields with struct cnum{32,64} This RFC replaces s64, u64, s32, u32 scalar range domains tracked by verifier by a pair of circular numbers (cnums): one for 64-bit domain and another for 32-bit domain. Each cnum represents a range as a single arc on the circular number line, from which signed and unsigned bounds are derived on demand. See also wrapped intervals representation as in [1]. The use of such representation simplifies arithmetic and conditions handling in verifier.c and allows to express 32 <-> 64 bit deductions in a more mathematically rigorous way. [1] https://jorgenavas.github.io/papers/ACM-TOPLAS-wrapped.pdf Changelog ========= v2 -> v1: - Fixes in source code comments highlighted by bot+bpf-ci. RFCv1 -> v2: - Dropped RFC tag. - Dropped cnum{32,64}_mul(), too much complexity and no veristat or selftests gains. - cnum32_from_cnum64() normalizes to CNUM32_EMPTY when input cnum64.size >= U32_MAX, previously only checked for > U32_MAX (bot+bpf-ci). - cnum32_from_cnum64() and cnum64_cnum32_intersect() now check for empty inputs (sashiko). - In regs_refine_cond_op() case BPF_JSLT use cnum{32,64}_from_srange constructors instead of unsigned variants (sashiko). - cnum{32,64}_intersect_with{,_urange,_srange}() helpers added (Alexei) [RFCv1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/0c47b0b7ea476647746806c46fded4353be885f7.camel@gmail.com/T/ [v2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/c4fb60bafd526ae2d92b86e2250255aef0ba5ee1.camel@gmail.com/T/ Patch set layout ================ Patch #1 introduces the cnum (circular number) data type and basic operations: intersection, addition, multiplication, negation, 32-to-64 and 64-to-32 projections. CBMC based proofs for these operations are available at [2]. (The proofs lag behind the current patch set and need an update if this RFC moves further. Although, I don't expect any significant changes). [2] https://github.com/eddyz87/cnum-verif Patch #2 mechanically converts all direct accesses to bpf_reg_state's min/max fields to use accessor functions, preparing for the field replacement. Patch #3 replaces the eight independent min/max fields in bpf_reg_state with two cnum fields. The signed and unsigned bounds are derived on demand from the cnum via the accessor functions. This eliminates the separate signed<->unsigned cross-deduction logic, simplifies reg_bounds_sync(), regs_refine_cond_op() and some arithmetic operations. Patch #4 adds selftest cases for improved 32->64 range refinements enabled by cnum64_cnum32_intersect(). Precision trade-offs ==================== A cnum represents a contiguous arc on the circular number line. Current master tracks four independent ranges (s64, u64, s32, u32) whose intersection could implicitly represent value sets that are two disjoint arcs on the circle - something a single cnum cannot. Cnums lose precision when a cross-domain conditional comparison (e.g., unsigned comparison on a register with a signed-derived range) produces an intersection that would be two disjoint arcs. The cnum must over-approximate by returning one of the input arcs. E.g. a pair of ranges u64:[1,U64_MAX] s:[-1,1] represents a set of two values: {-1,1}, this can only be approximated as a set of three values by cnum: {-1,0,1}. Cnums gain precision in arithmetic: when addition, subtraction or multiplication causes register value to cross both signed and unsigned min/max boundaries. Current master resets the register as unbound in such cases, while cnums preserve the exact wrapping arc. In practice precision loss turned out to matter only for a set of specifically crafted selftests from reg_bounds.c (see patch #3 for more details). On the other hand, precision gains are observable for a set real-life programs. Verification performance measurements ===================================== Tested on 6683 programs across four corpora: Cilium (134 programs), selftests (4635), sched_ext (376), and Meta internal BPF corpus (1540). Program verification verdicts are identical across all four program sets - no program changes between success and failure. Instruction count comparison (cnum vs signed/unsigned pair): - 83 programs improve, 44 regress, 6596 unchanged - Total saved: ~290K insns, total added: 10K insns - Largest improvements: -26% insns in a internal network firewall program; -47% insns in rusty/wd40 sched_ext schedulers. - Largest regression: +24% insns in one Cilium program (5062 insns added). Raw performance data is at the bottom of the email. Raw verification performance metrics ==================================== Filtered out by -f insns_pct>5 -f !insns<10000 ========= selftests: master vs cnums-everywhere-v2 ========= File Program Insns (A) Insns (B) Insns (DIFF) ---- ------- --------- --------- ------------ Total progs: 4665 total_insns diff min: -15.71% total_insns diff max: 45.45% -20 .. -10 %: 3 -5 .. 0 %: 6 0 .. 5 %: 4654 45 .. 50 %: 2 ========= scx: master vs cnums-everywhere-v2 ========= File Program Insns (A) Insns (B) Insns (DIFF) --------------- -------------- --------- --------- ---------------- scx_rusty.bpf.o rusty_enqueue 39842 22053 -17789 (-44.65%) scx_rusty.bpf.o rusty_stopping 37738 19949 -17789 (-47.14%) scx_wd40.bpf.o wd40_stopping 37729 19880 -17849 (-47.31%) Total progs: 376 total_insns diff min: -47.31% total_insns diff max: 19.61% -50 .. -40 %: 3 -5 .. 0 %: 5 0 .. 5 %: 366 5 .. 15 %: 1 15 .. 20 %: 1 ========= meta: master vs cnums-everywhere-v2 ========= File Program Insns (A) Insns (B) Insns (DIFF) --------------------------------- ---------- --------- --------- ---------------- <meta-internal-firewall-program> ...egress 222327 164648 -57679 (-25.94%) <meta-internal-firewall-program> ..._tc_eg 222839 164772 -58067 (-26.06%) <meta-internal-firewall-program> ...egress 222327 164648 -57679 (-25.94%) <meta-internal-firewall-program> ..._tc_eg 222839 164772 -58067 (-26.06%) Total progs: 1540 total_insns diff min: -26.06% total_insns diff max: 6.69% -30 .. -20 %: 4 -15 .. -5 %: 6 -5 .. 0 %: 36 0 .. 5 %: 1493 5 .. 10 %: 1 ========= cilium: master vs cnums-everywhere-v2 ========= File Program Insns (A) Insns (B) Insns (DIFF) ---------- ------------------------------- --------- --------- --------------- bpf_host.o tail_handle_ipv4_cont_from_host 20962 26024 +5062 (+24.15%) bpf_host.o tail_handle_ipv6_cont_from_host 17036 18672 +1636 (+9.60%) Total progs: 134 total_insns diff min: -3.32% total_insns diff max: 24.15% -5 .. 0 %: 12 0 .. 5 %: 120 5 .. 15 %: 1 20 .. 25 %: 1 --- ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260424-cnums-everywhere-rfc-v1-v3-0-ca434b39a486@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

Leon Hwang says: ==================== bpf: Extend BPF syscall with common attributes support This patch series builds upon the discussion in "[PATCH bpf-next v4 0/4] bpf: Improve error reporting for freplace attachment failure" [1]. This patch series introduces support for *common attributes* in the BPF syscall, providing a unified mechanism for passing shared metadata across all BPF commands, initially used by BPF_PROG_LOAD, BPF_BTF_LOAD, and BPF_MAP_CREATE. The initial set of common attributes includes: 1. 'log_buf': User-provided buffer for storing log output. 2. 'log_size': Size of the provided log buffer. 3. 'log_level': Verbosity level for logging. 4. 'log_true_size': Actual log size reported by kernel. With this extension, the BPF syscall will be able to return meaningful error messages (e.g., map creation failures), improving debuggability and user experience. Links: [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250224153352.64689-1-leon.hwang@linux.dev/ Changes: v13 -> v14: * Replace __u64 with __aligned_u64 in struct bpf_common_attr in patch #1 (per bot+bpf-ci). * Add a single line comment for preserving original error in patch #6 (per bot+bpf-ci and Alexei). * Drop unused label in patch #6 (per bot+bpf-ci). * v13: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260511152817.89191-1-leon.hwang@linux.dev/ v12 -> v13: * Rebase on bpf-next tree to resolve code conflict. * Report log_true_size on success path in patch #6. * Check size instead of common->log_buf in patch #6 (per bot+bpf-ci). * v12: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260420141804.27179-1-leon.hwang@linux.dev/ v11 -> v12: * Drop "log_" prefix in struct bpf_log_attr in patch #3. * Drop "log_" prefix in struct bpf_log_opts in patch #7. * Copy log_true_size using copy_to_bpfptr_offset() in patch #3 (per Alexei). * v11: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260216150445.68278-1-leon.hwang@linux.dev/ v10 -> v11: * Collect Acked-by from Andrii, thanks. * Validate whether log_buf, log_size, and log_level are valid by reusing bpf_verifier_log_attr_valid() in patch #4 (per Andrii). * v10: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260211151115.78013-1-leon.hwang@linux.dev/ v9 -> v10: * Collect Acked-by from Andrii, thanks. * Address comments from Andrii: * Drop log NULL check in bpf_log_attr_finalize(). * Return -EFAULT early in bpf_log_attr_finalize(). * Validate whether log_buf, log_size, and log_level are set. * Keep log_buf, log_size, log_level, and user-pointer log_true_size in struct bpf_log_attr. * Make prog_load and btf_load work with the new struct bpf_log_attr. * Add comment to log_true_size of struct bpf_log_opts in libbpf. * Address comment from Alexei: * Avoid using BPF_LOG_FIXED as log_level in tests. * v9: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260202144046.30651-1-leon.hwang@linux.dev/ v8 -> v9: * Rework reporting 'log_true_size' for prog_load, btf_load, and map_create to simplify struct bpf_log_attr (per Alexei). * v8: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260126151409.52072-1-leon.hwang@linux.dev/ v7 -> v8: * Return 0 when fd < 0 and errno != EFAULT in probe_sys_bpf_ext(), then simplify probe_bpf_syscall_common_attrs() (per Alexei and Andrii). * v7: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260123032445.125259-1-leon.hwang@linux.dev/ v6 -> v7: * Return -errno when fd < 0 and errno != EFAULT in probe_sys_bpf_ext(). * Convert return value of probe_sys_bpf_ext() to bool in probe_bpf_syscall_common_attrs(). * Address comments from Andrii: * Drop the comment, and handle fd >= 0 case explicitly in probe_sys_bpf_ext(). * Return an error when fd >= 0 in probe_sys_bpf_ext(). * v6: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260120152424.40766-1-leon.hwang@linux.dev/ v5 -> v6: * Address comments from Andrii: * Update some variables' name. * Drop unnecessary 'close(fd)' in libbpf. * Rename FEAT_EXTENDED_SYSCALL to FEAT_BPF_SYSCALL_COMMON_ATTRS with updated description in libbpf. * Use EINVAL instead of EUSERS, as EUSERS is not used in bpf yet. * Rename struct bpf_syscall_common_attr_opts to bpf_log_opts in libbpf. * Add 'OPTS_SET(log_opts, log_true_size, 0);' in libbpf's 'bpf_map_create()'. * v5: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260112145616.44195-1-leon.hwang@linux.dev/ v4 -> v5: * Rework reporting 'log_true_size' for prog_load, btf_load, and map_create (per Alexei). * v4: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260106172018.57757-1-leon.hwang@linux.dev/ RFC v3 -> v4: * Drop RFC. * Address comments from Andrii: * Add parentheses in 'sys_bpf_ext()'. * Avoid creating new fd in 'probe_sys_bpf_ext()'. * Add a new struct to wrap log fields in libbpf. * Address comments from Alexei: * Do not skip writing to user space when log_true_size is zero. * Do not use 'bool' arguments. * Drop the adding WARN_ON_ONCE()'s. * v3: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20251002154841.99348-1-leon.hwang@linux.dev/ RFC v2 -> RFC v3: * Rename probe_sys_bpf_extended to probe_sys_bpf_ext. * Refactor reporting 'log_true_size' for prog_load. * Refactor reporting 'btf_log_true_size' for btf_load. * Add warnings for internal bugs in map_create. * Check log_true_size in test cases. * Address comment from Alexei: * Change kvzalloc/kvfree to kzalloc/kfree. * Address comments from Andrii: * Move BPF_COMMON_ATTRS to 'enum bpf_cmd' alongside brief comment. * Add bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero() for extra checks. * Rename sys_bpf_extended to sys_bpf_ext. * Rename sys_bpf_fd_extended to sys_bpf_ext_fd. * Probe the new feature using NULL and -EFAULT. * Move probe_sys_bpf_ext to libbpf_internal.h and drop LIBBPF_API. * Return -EUSERS when log attrs are conflict between bpf_attr and bpf_common_attr. * Avoid touching bpf_vlog_init(). * Update the reason messages in map_create. * Finalize the log using __cleanup(). * Report log size to users. * Change type of log_buf from '__u64' to 'const char *' and cast type using ptr_to_u64() in bpf_map_create(). * Do not return -EOPNOTSUPP when kernel doesn't support this feature in bpf_map_create(). * Add log_level support for map creation for consistency. * Address comment from Eduard: * Use common_attrs->log_level instead of BPF_LOG_FIXED. * v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250911163328.93490-1-leon.hwang@linux.dev/ RFC v1 -> RFC v2: * Fix build error reported by test bot. * Address comments from Alexei: * Drop new uapi for freplace. * Add common attributes support for prog_load and btf_load. * Add common attributes support for map_create. * v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250728142346.95681-1-leon.hwang@linux.dev/ ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260512153157.28382-1-leon.hwang@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

strset_add_str_mem() might reallocate the strset data buffer in order to accommodate the provided string 's'. However, if 's' points to a string already present in the buffer, it becomes dangling after the realloc. This leads to a use-after-free when attempting to memcpy() the string into the new buffer. One scenario that triggers this problematic path is when resolve_btfids attempts to patch kfunc prototypes using existing BTF parameter names: | resolve_btfids: function bpf_list_push_back_impl already exists in BTF | Segmentation fault (core dumped) Compiling resolve_btfids with fsanitize=address generates a detailed report of the UAF: | ================================================================= | ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x7f4c4a500bd4 | ==1507892==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x7f4c4a500bd4 at pc 0x55d25155a2a8 bp 0x7ffcef879060 sp 0x7ffcef878818 | READ of size 5 at 0x7f4c4a500bd4 thread T0 | #0 0x55d25155a2a7 in memcpy (tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/resolve_btfids+0xcf2a7) | #1 0x55d2515d708e in strset__add_str tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:162:2 | #2 0x55d2515c730b in btf__add_str tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2109:8 | #3 0x55d2515c9020 in btf__add_func_param tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:3108:14 | #4 0x55d25159f0b5 in process_kfunc_with_implicit_args tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/main.c:1196:9 | #5 0x55d25159e004 in btf2btf tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/main.c:1229:9 | #6 0x55d25159cee7 in main tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/main.c:1535:6 | #7 0x7f4c78e29f76 in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16 | #8 0x7f4c78e2a026 in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:360:3 | #9 0x55d2514bb860 in _start (tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/resolve_btfids+0x30860) | | 0x7f4c4a500bd4 is located 13268 bytes inside of 2829000-byte region [0x7f4c4a4fd800,0x7f4c4a7b02c8) | freed by thread T0 here: | #0 0x55d25155b700 in realloc (tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/resolve_btfids+0xd0700) | #1 0x55d2515c426c in libbpf_reallocarray tools/lib/bpf/./libbpf_internal.h:220:9 | #2 0x55d2515c426c in libbpf_add_mem tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:224:13 | | previously allocated by thread T0 here: | #0 0x55d25155b2e3 in malloc (tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/resolve_btfids+0xd02e3) | #1 0x55d2515d6e7d in strset__new tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:58:20 While resolve_btfids could be refactored to avoid this call path, let's instead fix this issue at the source in strset__add_str() and avoid similar scenarios. Let's check if set->strs_data was reallocated and whether 's' points to an internal string within the old strset buffer. In such case, 's' is reconstructed to point to the new buffer. While already here, also fix strset__find_str() which suffers from the same problem by factoring out the common operations into a new helper function strset_str_append(). Fixes: 90d76d3 ("libbpf: Extract internal set-of-strings datastructure APIs") Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Suggested-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com> Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260523162722.2718940-1-cmllamas@google.com

A deadlock occurs in the audit subsystem when duplicating executable-related rules. When a file is moved (e.g., via do_renameat2()), the VFS layer locks the parent directory (I_MUTEX_PARENT), which synchronously triggers an fsnotify_move event. If an existing executable audit rule matches the file being moved, the audit subsystem catches this event and calls audit_dupe_exe() to duplicate the watch and update the rule. Then, audit_alloc_mark() would call kern_path_parent() to resolve the path, leading to a blind attempt to acquire the exact same I_MUTEX_PARENT lock already held by the task, resulting in the following recursive locking deadlock: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.12.0-55.27.1.el10_0.x86_64+debug #1 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- mv/5099 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888132845358 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __kern_path_locked+0x10a/0x2f0 but task is already holding lock: ffff888132846b58 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_two_directories+0x13f/0x2b0 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1); lock(&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 6 locks held by mv/5099: #0: ffff888112a9c440 (sb_writers#13) at: do_renameat2+0x34c/0xbc0 #1: ffff888112a9c790 (&type->s_vfs_rename_key#3) at: do_renameat2+0x415/0xbc0 #2: ffff888132846b58 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1) at: lock_two_directories+0x13f/0x2b0 #3: ffff888132845358 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/5) at: lock_two_directories+0x175/0x2b0 #4: ffffffffb3a1fb10 (&fsnotify_mark_srcu) at: fsnotify+0x454/0x28a0 #5: ffffffffaf886230 (audit_filter_mutex) at: audit_update_watch+0x36/0x11e0 stack backtrace: Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0 print_deadlock_bug.cold+0xbd/0xca validate_chain+0x83a/0xf00 __lock_acquire+0xcac/0x1d20 lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x360 down_write_nested+0x9f/0x230 __kern_path_locked+0x10a/0x2f0 kern_path_locked+0x26/0x40 audit_alloc_mark+0xfb/0x4f0 audit_dupe_exe+0x6c/0xe0 audit_dupe_rule+0x6c2/0xc00 audit_update_watch+0x4cc/0x11e0 audit_watch_handle_event+0x12c/0x1b0 send_to_group+0x5d0/0x8b0 fsnotify+0x615/0x28a0 fsnotify_move+0x1d8/0x630 vfs_rename+0xdcd/0x1df0 do_renameat2+0x9d4/0xbc0 __x64_sys_renameat+0x192/0x260 do_syscall_64+0x92/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f0491fe8c4e Code: 0f 1f 40 00 48 8b 15 c1 e1 16 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 08 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 0a c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 15 89 RSP: 002b:00007ffc7210bf38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000108 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f0491fe8c4e RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 00007ffc7210e6c8 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 00005575eb2dae2a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005575eb2dae2a R13: 00007ffc7210e6c8 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 00000000ffffff9c </TASK> The aforementioned deadlock can be consistently reproduced by running the script below: audit-dupe-exe-deadlock.sh -------------------------- #!/bin/bash auditctl -D mkdir -p /tmp/foo touch /tmp/file auditctl -a always,exit -F exe=/tmp/file -F path=/tmp/file -S all -k dr mv /tmp/file /tmp/foo/file rm -Rf /tmp/foo This patch fixes the issue by introducing struct audit_watch_ctx to pass the fsnotify event context down to audit_alloc_mark(). By utilizing the already-resolved directory inode provided by the event, we bypass the kern_path_parent() path resolution entirely, safely avoiding the recursive lock. Furthermore, it explicitly allows duplicate fsnotify marks (allow_dups = 1) during the rename update, allowing the new rule's mark to safely coexist with the old rule's mark until the old rule is freed. P.S.: This issue was identified and reproduced during a comprehensive code coverage analysis of the audit subsystem. The full report is available at the link below: https://people.redhat.com/rrobaina/audit-code-coverage-analysis.pdf P.P.S: With the permission of both Ricardo and Nathan, I've squashed a fixup patch from Nathan that addresses a compile time error when CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL=n. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 34d99af ("audit: implement audit by executable") Acked-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ricardo Robaina <rrobaina@redhat.com> [PM: move link metadata into the msg, apply fix from NC] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

In binder_free_transaction(), the t->to_proc is read under the t->lock. However, once the t->lock is dropped, the to_proc can die in parallel. This leads to a use-after-free error when we attempt to acquire its inner lock right afterwards: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x1a0 Write of size 4 at addr ffff00001125da70 by task B/672 CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 672 Comm: B Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6-00284-g8e65320d91cd #4 PREEMPT Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x1a0 binder_free_transaction+0x8c/0x320 binder_send_failed_reply+0x21c/0x2f8 binder_thread_release+0x488/0x7e0 binder_ioctl+0x12c0/0x29a0 [...] Allocated by task 675: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x174/0x444 binder_open+0x118/0xb70 do_dentry_open+0x374/0x1040 vfs_open+0x58/0x3bc [...] Freed by task 212: __kasan_slab_free+0x58/0x80 kfree+0x1a0/0x4a4 binder_proc_dec_tmpref+0x32c/0x5e0 binder_deferred_func+0xc48/0x104c process_one_work+0x53c/0xbc0 [...] ================================================================== To prevent this, pin the target thread (t->to_thread) to guarantee the target process remains alive. Undelivered transactions without a target thread are already safe, as the target process can only be the current context in those paths. Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Reported-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aikJKVuny_eOivwN@google.com/ Fixes: a370003 ("binder: fix possible UAF when freeing buffer") Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260619185233.2194678-2-cmllamas@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

quic-viskuma and others added 5 commits November 3, 2025 15:09

Tets: Update README

df4030c

Staging Signed-off-by: VISHAL KUMAR <viskuma@qti.qualcomm.com>

Merge pull request #1 from qualcomm-linux-stg/quic-viskuma-patch-1

7d2ca6c

Tets: Update README

Update README

728b975

test Signed-off-by: VISHAL KUMAR <viskuma@qti.qualcomm.com>

Merge pull request #2 from qualcomm-linux-stg/quic-viskuma-patch-2

ed5267e

Update README

Update README

d2b75ce

Signed-off-by: Salendarsingh Gaud <sgaud@qti.qualcomm.com>

sgaud-quic force-pushed the qcom-next-staging branch from ed5267e to 963d754 Compare November 13, 2025 05:30

sgaud-quic closed this Nov 13, 2025

sgaud-quic deleted the sgaud-quic-patch-1 branch November 13, 2025 05:31

Navigation Menu

Uh oh!

Update README - #4

Update README#4
sgaud-quic wants to merge 5 commits into
qcom-next-stagingfrom
sgaud-quic-patch-1

sgaud-quic commented Nov 11, 2025

Uh oh!

Reviewers

Assignees

Labels

Projects

Milestone

Development

Uh oh!

2 participants

Uh oh!

Conversation

sgaud-quic commented Nov 11, 2025

Uh oh!

Reviewers

Assignees

Labels

Projects

Milestone

Development

Uh oh!

2 participants