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v2.2.0

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@github-actions github-actions released this 06 Jun 07:42

Release notes: v2.2.0

Why this release

v2.2.0 is the trust-layer release. It turns Akmon from "the review-aware agent" into the
producer-agnostic, tamper-evident evidence & verification layer that sits on top of whatever agent
you already run
— and makes that claim provable: a third party can verify an Akmon bundle's
signature, and now its operator attestation, offline with nothing but openssl — no Akmon
binary, no cloud. Everything is additive; existing journals and bundles remain readable.

Top user-facing wins

  • Import any agent (OpenTelemetry GenAI): akmon otel import <trace.json> turns an OTLP/JSON
    trace into a verifiable AGEF session — including the legacy ≤ v1.36 message-event form that
    most deployed instrumentations still emit by default, not only the v1.37 structured attributes.
    Capture fidelity is honest: imports are capture_level=structural (metadata only), never silently
    presented as a full recording.
  • Generate a signing key: akmon bundle keygen produces a usable Ed25519 key (PKCS#8 v2) with a
    0600 private-key file. (openssl genpkey emits PKCS#8 v1, which is rejected.)
  • Verify offline with stock openssl (metric F.1): akmon bundle prove-openssl emits
    statement.bin / signature.bin / pubkey.pem so anyone can check a signature with no Akmon and
    no cloud.
  • Operator-identity binding (AGEF v0.1.3): akmon bundle attest records a separately-signed
    AGEF-OPERATOR-v1 claim binding an accountable operator/human to a session — addressing the EU AI
    Act Art. 14 / Art. 12(3) "which operator" requirement without PKI, DID, or cloud. akmon bundle verify and agef-verify gain --operator-key / --require-operator; prove-openssl --operator-key makes the operator claim openssl-verifiable too. Verification attaches trust to the
    key, never to the self-asserted identity string.
  • Standalone agef-verify is now shipped in the release alongside akmon, with SHA-256 checksums
    and an SBOM, so auditors can verify on an air-gapped machine.

Upgrade notes

  • Safe, additive upgrade from v2.1.0. AGEF bumps 0.1.1 → 0.1.3, but the bumps are minor/additive:
    0.1.1/0.1.2 readers still read 0.1.3 bundles and ignore the optional signatures[] /
    operator_attestations[] fields. Unsigned/unattributed bundles serialize byte-identically.
  • The AGEF-SIG-v1 head signature and the prove-openssl byte output are unchanged by the operator
    layer — adding an operator attestation never invalidates an existing head signature.
  • The canonical AGEF specification (radotsvetkov/agef) is being updated to v0.1.3 in lockstep.

Verifying your download

Each release publishes SHA256SUMS. After downloading, check it:

sha256sum --check SHA256SUMS

Full Changelog: v2.1.0...v2.2.0