Architecture

Architecture

flowchart LR
  subgraph AGENT["Remote agent (untrusted)"]
    direction TB
    B1["binary bytes<br/>AgentState.java"] --> M["Measurer<br/>SHA-256 x3"]
    B2["config/<br/>agent-config.json"] --> M
    B3["memory whitelist<br/>mode / limit / version"] --> M
    M --> H["hBin, hCfg, hMem<br/>hComb = SHA256(raw32 x3)"]
    H --> S["Signer - Ed25519 seal<br/>agentId / seq / ts / hashes / prevHash"]
  end

  subgraph CHAIN["Local chain :8545"]
    SOL["Integrity.sol<br/>enroll / anchor<br/>Anchored events = history"]
  end

  subgraph BOSS["Boss / Verifier (trusted)"]
     RE["re-measure (single host)"] --> V["Verifier - 6 checks<br/>comb / seal / link /<br/>recompute / baseline / freshness"]
    BASE[("baseline.json<br/>golden, enrolled Phase 0")] --> V
  end

  S -->|"signed JSON, every 5s"| V
  S -->|"anchor() tx, every 5s"| SOL
  S -->|"always append"| LED[("ledger.jsonl<br/>FALLBACK")]
  SOL -. "block.timestamp authoritative" .-> V
  V --> D["Dashboard :8080<br/>GREEN / RED / STALE"]
  V -->|"counter-signs every verdict"| W["Witness (boss key)<br/>witness.jsonl hash chain"]

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Boxes and jobs

Box	Job	File
Measurer	3 SHA-256 fingerprints + deterministic memory canonicalization	measure/Measurer.java
Signer	Ed25519 wax seal over the 8-field payload	sign/Signer.java
Chain anchor	Real anchor() tx every cycle + getLatest readback (CHAIN_MISMATCH on divergence), locally signed EIP-155 raw tx (pure-JDK secp256k1 + RLP submitted via eth_sendRawTransaction, falls back to eth_sendTransaction), raw JSON-RPC (HTTP/1.1), Keccak + manual ABI	chain/ChainAnchor.java, chain/Secp256k1.java, chain/Rlp.java, chain/Keccak.java, chain/Abi.java
Verifier	6 independent checks, per-component blame	verify/Verifier.java
Witness	Boss counter-attestation: own key, hash-chained witness.jsonl (rotates to a timestamped archive past 50k lines; a signed carry line keeps the chain verifiable across files)	witness/Witness.java
Baseline	Golden hComb from Phase 0 enrollment, never overwritten from chain; pins the public key and (when config/chain.json exists) chainContract + chainId	config/baseline.json
Dashboard	Status light + attack buttons + witness panel + /metrics (Prometheus text), PORT / RPC_URL env overrides, JDK HttpServer	ui/Dashboard.java, web/
Contract	Diary: enroll once, anchor per cycle, history in events	contract/contracts/Integrity.sol

Why baseline AND chain

• Chain only cannot tell "new honest measurement" from "honest Checker anchoring a hash of the attacker's edited file".
• Baseline only cannot prove when things happened or in what order.
• The Verifier demands both: H_recomputed == H_chain == H_baseline.

Trust boundaries

• The agent machine is untrusted: it measures and signs, it never decides what is good.
• The Boss stores truth: baseline.json (golden hashes + pinned public key) and the witness key live outside the writable agent area.
• The chain orders truth: Anchored events give history and block.timestamp gives freshness. ledger.jsonl is a tamper-evident file fallback so the engine survives node death; it and the witness file rotate to timestamped archives past 50k lines.