StackPulse runs on your machine, reads sensitive local files (AI-tool session logs), and detects the presence of credentials. We take its security posture seriously, and we designed it to be conservative by default.

StackPulse is pre-1.0. Security fixes are applied to the latest released version (currently the 0.1.x line). There is no long-term support branch yet.

Please do not open a public GitHub issue for a security vulnerability.

Report privately using GitHub's "Report a vulnerability" (Security Advisories) on the repository, or email security@stackpulse.dev. Include:

• A description of the issue and its impact.
• Steps to reproduce, or a proof of concept.
• Affected version(s) and your environment (macOS, Rust, Swift versions).
• Any suggested remediation.

Please redact secrets and personal data from anything you send. Never include full session logs, tokens, or Keychain contents.

• We aim to acknowledge a report within 3 business days.
• We will work with you on a fix and a coordinated disclosure timeline.
• We will credit reporters who wish to be credited once a fix ships.

StackPulse's design intentionally minimizes attack surface. The full threat model and per-threat mitigations are documented in docs/SECURITY_BOUNDARIES.md. Highlights:

• Read-only, local-only. v0.1.0 scans local logs and makes no network calls. It executes no provider commands and writes nothing to provider data.
• Credentials are never read. Auth detection checks only for the presence of a credential file or Keychain item. The macOS Keychain probe explicitly requests no secret data (kSecReturnData: false), which also avoids the interactive "allow access" prompt.
• No symlink following. The filesystem scanner does not traverse symlinked directories, guarding against symlink loops and path traversal outside an intended root.
• Bounded, resilient parsing. Log traversal is depth-bounded; malformed or partial log lines are skipped rather than trusted; a panic in one provider is caught and downgraded so it cannot corrupt or abort the rest of a scan.
• Small, explicit FFI contract. The C ABI is JSON-in / JSON-out with a documented single-owner memory contract; unwinding is caught at the boundary.

Session logs are treated as untrusted data, because their contents can include text pasted from repositories, web pages, or tool output (potential prompt/log-injection payloads). StackPulse parses these logs for numeric usage data only; it does not execute, evaluate, or act on their textual content.

The planned release pipeline is Developer ID signing + hardened runtime + notarization, distributed as a signed DMG with a published SHA-256, and updated through a Sparkle appcast (stable and beta channels) with signed updates. Sparkle is not yet integrated; until it is, build from source or verify any provided artifact's signature and checksum yourself.

In scope: the Rust core, the FFI bridge, the CLI, and the macOS app in this repository. Out of scope: vulnerabilities in the third-party AI tools whose logs StackPulse reads, and issues that require an already-compromised local account.