v5.1.0 — Security Hardening

RedAmon v5.1.0 — Security Hardening

A focused hardening release. RedAmon now contains the blast radius of a compromised worker — if a hostile scan target pops the Kali sandbox, it can no longer reach the host, steal secrets, persist, or tamper with your data.

🛡️ Container & Host Isolation

• docker-broker — a filtering Docker-socket proxy: the recon orchestrator's spawned scan containers reach the daemon through it, so they can only launch the known tool images (allowlisted, no host mounts, no --privileged, no arbitrary images)
• De-privileged recon containers — privileged: true replaced with a scoped NET_RAW; the worker drops the unused SYS_PTRACE
• Read-only MCP server source — closes restart-surviving persistence in the worker

🔑 Secrets Off the Worker

• The worker no longer holds INTERNAL_API_KEY (it never used it) or the master NEO4J_PASSWORD
• Graph access from the worker is proxied read-only + tenant-scoped through the agent — a compromised worker can read its own project, and nothing else

🌐 Orchestrator Lockdown

• The recon orchestrator (the Docker-socket holder) is network-isolated on its own segment and bound to loopback
• Every orchestrator API route now requires an X-Orchestrator-Key, held only by the webapp
• Tool Docker images are allowlisted; the orchestrator ignores client-supplied webapp_api_url (SSRF / key-leak)

🧠 Agent Prompt-Injection Boundary

• Untrusted tool output (a hostile target controls every byte) is wrapped in per-call random-nonce sentinels before it enters the agent's prompt, across the ReAct loop and side subsystems — a crafted response can no longer forge the framing and inject instructions into the trusted agent

🛠️ Tooling & Upgrade

• redamon.sh registers docker-broker in the start + update flow, auto-generates ORCHESTRATOR_API_KEY, and self-heals future updates via re-exec
• One-time upgrade onto this release: ./redamon.sh update && ./redamon.sh up

Full changelog: v5.0.0...v5.1.0