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Deadbolt v1.0.2
Deadbolt v1.0.2 is a maintenance release for teams evaluating a local, cooperative execution gate for software agents. A trusted executor must check each protected action immediately before dispatch and act only on an explicit allow. Kill denies later admissions for an identity and its registered descendants; it does not cancel an already-running action.
This release reduces SQLite writer contention by committing default spend updates, evidence sequence, and primary evidence row in one transaction. It also fixes an operator-grant failure found in our internal security review: on the default sink, approve, resume, and policy updates now roll back if primary evidence writing fails, instead of returning an error after making the grant live. The original intermittent Windows StoreUnavailable event did not recur in ten diagnostic repetitions; its exact initial trigger is still unproven. This release addresses a demonstrated partial write failure, not every storage outage.
Four native archives are attached: Linux x86_64, Windows x86_64, macOS arm64, and macOS x86_64. Verify SHA256SUMS or the archive-specific .sha256 file before extracting. Run deadbolt --version and deadbolt drill, then use the first evaluation for 11 disposable real file-effect checks. The release ZIPs include the source, documentation, Python/Node source clients, tests, license notices, and BUILD.json with the exact merged source revision and executable hash.
The release candidate and merged main passed Rust 1.85 and Linux/macOS/Windows source checks, native packaging, pinned Hermes MCP transport with 13 observable checks, and a tested original-state upgrade. The downloaded macOS arm64 executable also passed the drill and 11-effect Python evaluation locally. A disposable Ubuntu 24.04 arm64 systemd container test verified empty-token startup denial, tokened admission and policy, wrong-token rejection, operator kill, restart persistence, and unrelated-agent isolation. Its report is attached. Native Linux-host and adopter-application acceptance remain separate work.
Start with installation, the evaluator brief, the demonstration, and the pilot checklist.
Distribution and trust limits: the archives have no verified publisher signature; macOS binaries carry only ad hoc signatures and are not Developer ID signed or notarized. Checksums detect file mismatch but do not prove publisher identity. The stdio MCP proxy gates routed tools/call, not a complete model turn or every host tool. Destination and spend fields are caller-supplied conventions. The sidecar token authorizes all routes. The trusted executor and downstream MCP server remain in the trust boundary. No crates.io/npm/pip package, outside security certification, Hermes endorsement, or customer adoption is claimed.
Release source: 9c11053740a2e66678fbebdaa2daaa494bbe5b5e.