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Releases: shawnbure/elm-chat

elm.chat v0.1.1 — clearer boundaries, easier continuation

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@shawnbure shawnbure released this 03 Aug 19:25
c61cd80

elm.chat v0.1.1 — clearer boundaries, easier continuation

This release makes elm.chat's early-stage security status easier to inspect and
improves the path from joining a room to creating another one.

What changed

  • Published a central security status and limitations
    page and an independent-review request.
  • Changed the invited-participant “make your own” action to open a new tab, so
    it no longer disconnects the active room.
  • Added a press kit, practical temporary-handoff
    guides, public-interest and technical articles, structured metadata, and a
    12-entry RSS feed.
  • Added a repository changelog
    and clearer contributor and self-hosting routes.

Try, inspect, or deploy

Security status

elm.chat has not completed an independent security audit. Message
authentication and replay/duplicate protection remain unfinished. The
Cloudflare relay can observe ordinary connection metadata, and participants or
compromised devices can retain message or file copies. This release is not an
anonymity system, high-risk source channel, compliance product, or
production-ready financial communications system.

elm.chat v0.1.0 — disposable encrypted rooms

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@shawnbure shawnbure released this 28 Jul 16:35

elm.chat v0.1.0 — disposable encrypted rooms

The first tagged release of elm.chat: an open-source web app for creating a
temporary room, sharing a single-use invite, having one conversation, and
destroying the room when it is finished.

Included

  • Browser-side encryption for messages and files
  • Single-use and revocable room invitations
  • Manual and timed room destruction
  • No accounts or contact lists
  • No server-side transcript or file persistence
  • One Durable Object per live room on Cloudflare
  • One-click Deploy to Cloudflare path
  • Public architecture and threat-model documentation
  • AGPL-3.0 source

Try or deploy it

Security status

This release has not had an independent security audit. The threat model
documents current limits, including relay-visible timing, sizes, and presence.
Use the project as early-stage software and review the threat model before
relying on it for a sensitive use case.

Feedback on the invite model, browser key handling, abuse controls, mobile UX,
and self-hosting path is especially welcome.