Tokenomics

Token Overview

Property	Value
Name	Voidmap
Symbol	VOID
Standard	ERC-20
Chain	Base (L2)
Total Supply	1,000,000,000 VOID (fixed, immutable)
Decimals	18
Owner	None (ownerless from day one)
Minter	MiningPool (locked after one-time `migrateMinter()`)

Token Distribution (at Deploy)

Allocation	Percentage	Amount	Vesting
GPU Miners	90%	900,000,000 VOID	Halving schedule (continuous)
Developer Fund	5%	50,000,000 VOID	4 years linear
Treasury/DAO	5%	50,000,000 VOID	None (unlocked at genesis)

No inflation. MAX_SUPPLY = 1,000,000,000 × 10¹⁸ is enforced in the contract.

Halving Schedule (Bitcoin-Inspired)

Block reward starts at 50 VOID and halves every 210,000 submissions.

Epoch	Subscriptions	Block Reward	Total Issued in Epoch
0	0 – 209,999	50 VOID	10,500,000 VOID
1	210,000 – 419,999	25 VOID	5,250,000 VOID
2	420,000 – 629,999	12.5 VOID	2,625,000 VOID
3	630,000 – 839,999	6.25 VOID	1,312,500 VOID
4	840,000 – 1,049,999	3.125 VOID	656,250 VOID
5	1,050,000 – 1,259,999	1.5625 VOID	328,125 VOID
6	1,260,000 – 1,469,999	0.78125 VOID	164,062.5 VOID
7	1,470,000 – 1,679,999	0.390625 VOID	82,031.25 VOID
8	1,680,000 – 1,889,999	0.1953125 VOID	41,015.625 VOID
9	1,890,000+	0.1 VOID (floor)	21,000 VOID / 210K subs

MIN_BLOCK_REWARD = 0.1 VOID (no zero reward — every submission earns something).

Note: Actual issuance per epoch depends on quality, elastic multiplier, and pool fees. The table above shows maximum possible issuance at quality=100, no elastic adjustment, no pool fee.

Halving Math

submissions_to_halving = 210,000
reward_after_n_halvings = INITIAL_BLOCK_REWARD / (2^n)

For example:

After 1 halving: 50 / 2 = 25 VOID
After 2 halvings: 50 / 4 = 12.5 VOID
After 10 halvings: 50 / 1024 ≈ 0.0488 VOID → floored to 0.1 VOID

Elastic Mint (Network Quality Adjustment)

The reward is scaled by an elastic multiplier based on the network's rolling 10-submission average quality. This prevents runaway issuance during high-quality periods and incentivizes more miners during low-quality periods.

Formula

avgQuality = sum(qualityRing) / 10
TARGET_QUALITY = 75
EPSILON = 5  // dead zone

if avgQuality > TARGET + EPSILON:  // 80+
    multiplier = 100 - (excess * 2)
    floor: 80 (0.8x dampener)
elif avgQuality + EPSILON < TARGET:  // 70-
    multiplier = 100 + (deficit * 2)
    cap: 120 (1.2x boost)
else:
    multiplier = 100  // dead zone

Examples

Avg Quality	Multiplier	Effect
50	160 (1.6x)	Boost (deficit = 20) → capped at 120 (1.2x)
60	130 (1.3x)	Boost (deficit = 10)
70	100 (1.0x)	Dead zone (within ±5)
75	100 (1.0x)	Dead zone (target)
80	100 (1.0x)	Dead zone (within ±5)
85	90 (0.9x)	Dampener (excess = 5)
90	80 (0.8x)	Dampener floor

Rationale: When the network is doing well (high quality), slow down issuance to extend the supply runway. When the network is struggling (low quality), boost rewards to attract more miners.

Reward Formula (Final)

reward = blockReward × quality × qualityMultiplier × elasticMultiplier
        ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
                              10 × 100

Where:

blockReward = current halving-epoch reward (50 → 25 → 12.5 → ... → 0.1 VOID)
quality = 50–100 (with deterministic noise floor applied)
qualityMultiplier = 10 (base, 50-69), 12 (good, 70-89), 15 (excellent, 90-100)
elasticMultiplier = 80–120 (0.8x–1.2x)

Example Calculations

Excellent work in epoch 0 (no elastic adjustment):

quality = 95, qualityMultiplier = 15, elasticMultiplier = 100, blockReward = 50e18
reward = (50e18 × 95 × 15 × 100) / (10 × 100) = 7.125e21 wei = 7,125 VOID

Good work with elastic boost:

quality = 75, qualityMultiplier = 12, elasticMultiplier = 120 (low avg), blockReward = 25e18
reward = (25e18 × 75 × 12 × 120) / (10 × 100) = 2.7e22 wei = 27,000 VOID

Base work with elastic dampener:

quality = 60, qualityMultiplier = 10, elasticMultiplier = 80 (high avg), blockReward = 50e18
reward = (50e18 × 60 × 10 × 80) / (10 × 100) = 2.4e21 wei = 2,400 VOID

Quality Tiers

Quality Range	Tier	Multiplier	Status
< 50	Rejected	—	Work not accepted, no reward
50 – 69	Accepted	1.0x	Base reward
70 – 89	Good	1.2x	20% bonus
90 – 100	Excellent	1.5x	50% bonus

Quality is derived from model confidence with a deterministic noise factor (0–9) computed from keccak256(inputHash, outputHash, block.timestamp). This prevents gaming by submitting the same input multiple times.

Developer Fund (5%)

Amount: 50,000,000 VOID
Vesting: 4 years, linear, no cliff
Release: devClaim(address to) callable by dev fund address after vesting ends
Transparency: All addresses published at genesis

Vesting Schedule

Year 1:  12,500,000 VOID claimable (after vesting end)
Year 2:  25,000,000 VOID claimable
Year 3:  37,500,000 VOID claimable
Year 4:  50,000,000 VOID claimable (fully vested)

Note: Vesting ends 4 years after deploy timestamp. devClaim can be called once for the full balance at that point. No continuous streaming.

Treasury (5%)

Amount: 50,000,000 VOID
Control: DAO/treasury multisig at genesis
Use cases:
- Community grants for researchers using the data
- Bounties for new ML models
- Partnership incentives
- Ecosystem development
Unlock: Available immediately at deploy

Anti-Gaming Mechanisms

Deterministic Noise

noise = keccak256(inputHash, outputHash, block.timestamp) % 10
quality -= noise  // floored at MIN_QUALITY

Miners can't predict the noise because it depends on block.timestamp. Different submissions get different noise values.

Submission Cooldown

SUBMISSION_COOLDOWN = 12 seconds per miner. Prevents spam and limits the effective submission rate to 5/min per miner.

Anti-ASIC Timing

MIN_COMPUTE_DURATION = 2 seconds enforced on-chain. Sub-2s results rejected.

Challenge/Slash

SLASH_BPS = 20% of submitter's reward slashed if quality is provably below floor (see mainnet-features.md).

Why 90% to Miners?

Traditional crypto projects allocate 20–40% to miners. We chose 90% because:

The computation IS the product — miners produce scientifically valuable data
No company taking a cut — no 20% VC allocation, no 10% marketing budget
Transparent — all allocation visible on-chain
Incentive aligned — miners earn directly for useful work
No founder, no team allocation — the protocol has no team to pay

Token Utility

VOID is used for:

Mining rewards — earned for processing astronomical data
Pool fees — 2% fee on pool submissions
Governance — proposer stake for time-locked param changes
Challenge bonds — 1 VOID burned to challenge a submission
Burns — 50% of slashed amounts burned (deflationary pressure)

Contract Details

VoidmapToken (Ownerless)

function migrateMinter(address newMinter) external;  // one-time only
function mintMinerReward(address miner, uint256 amount, uint256 taskId, uint256 quality) external;
function burnFromMiner(address from, uint256 amount) external;
function devClaim(address to) external;  // 4yr vesting

MiningPool (Autonomous)

// Halving
function getHalvingEpoch() external view returns (uint256);
function getHalvingProgress() external view returns (uint256, uint256, uint256);
function getCurrentBlockReward() external view returns (uint256);

// Elastic mint
function getAvgNetworkQuality() external view returns (uint256);
function getCurrentElasticMultiplier() external returns (uint256);

// Challenge / Slash
function fileChallenge(uint256 submissionId) external;
function resolveChallenge(uint256 challengeId) external;

// Time-locked governance
function stakeAsProposer(uint256 amount) external;
function proposeTimelock(bytes32 dataHash) external returns (bytes32);
function executeTimelock(bytes32 proposalId) external;

Deployment

export DEPLOYER_PK=0x...  # needs ~$0.0001 ETH on Base
export DEV_ADDR=0x...     # dev fund (multisig recommended)
export DAO_ADDR=0x...     # treasury (defaults to DEV_ADDR)
export RPC_URL=https://mainnet.base.org

bash deploy.sh

The deploy script:

Deploys MiningPool (with placeholder token)
Deploys VoidmapToken (ownerless)
Calls migrateMinter(poolAddress) — locks the minter
Stakes 1 VOID as initial proposer (deployer)
Creates 3 default tasks

Total gas: ~3.5M gas (~0.00007 ETH at 19 Gwei).

No Rug, No Team, No Promises

No Ownable — Token and pool are ownerless from day one
No multisig — Protocol has no privileged signer
No upgrade path — Contracts are not upgradeable
No team allocation — 5% dev is vested 4 years, no team tokens
No VC allocation — No pre-mine, no private sale
Halving is automatic — Enforced in code, no human intervention
Total supply is fixed — MAX_SUPPLY = 1B enforced in contract
No inflation — No minting outside the MiningPool

The dev's only way to get VOID is by mining it (or by the 4-year dev vesting). The dev fund starts with 50M VOID (5% of supply) and can only be claimed after 4 years. The dev has no other control over the protocol.

Tokenomics

Tokenomics

Token Overview

Token Distribution (at Deploy)

Halving Schedule (Bitcoin-Inspired)

Halving Math

Elastic Mint (Network Quality Adjustment)

Formula

Examples

Reward Formula (Final)

Example Calculations

Quality Tiers

Developer Fund (5%)

Vesting Schedule

Treasury (5%)

Anti-Gaming Mechanisms

Deterministic Noise

Submission Cooldown

Anti-ASIC Timing

Challenge/Slash

Why 90% to Miners?

Token Utility

Contract Details

VoidmapToken (Ownerless)

MiningPool (Autonomous)

Deployment

No Rug, No Team, No Promises

Uh oh!

Uh oh!

Uh oh!

Uh oh!

Uh oh!

Uh oh!

Uh oh!

Uh oh!

Uh oh!

Uh oh!

Uh oh!

Uh oh!

Uh oh!

Uh oh!

Uh oh!

Navigation

Quick Links

Protocol

Mining

Reference

Clone this wiki locally