wip(tbtc): ABI 3.5 inventory/state-witness consumers and signing readiness#4199
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mswilkison wants to merge 5 commits into
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wip(tbtc): ABI 3.5 inventory/state-witness consumers and signing readiness#4199mswilkison wants to merge 5 commits into
mswilkison wants to merge 5 commits into
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…iness Adds Go consumers for the Rust signer's ABI 3.5 inventory and state-witness symbols, plus interactive-signing readiness checks wired into the node. INCOMPLETE - committed to preserve the work, not because it is ready: - Native inventory parsing is unfixed. The Rust keyGroup is a lowercase 66-character compressed SEC1 key; the parser must accept both valid 64-character x-only test keys and 66-character compressed keys via TaprootOutputKeyFromTBTCSignerKey, and require the resulting x-only key to equal walletID. Frozen vector to pin: walletID = 11*32, keyGroup = 02 + 11*32, threshold 2, participants 3, epoch 0, public commitment 33*32, seat 1/3 commitments 44*32 and 55*32, expected inventory commitment bd6ec36fa27a57dd9926883bb2ff4dee7ececd28de940df7294f0e0f0dedd150. - The read-only state anchor is still an interface. It needs a concrete authenticated Read + CompareAndSwap service with a durable PostgreSQL schema, fresh nonce, store/protocol/trust-domain/operator/authority/client identity binding, signed responses with bounded ancestry verification, unknown-outcome recovery by readback, and rejection of stale, divergent, ahead, over-window or wrong-identity states. It must anchor every security-relevant native mutation before Round1 commitments or Round2 shares leave the process. An interface-only implementation is not acceptable. - Casing asymmetry to verify against the Rust side: DurableStoreIdentityResult is snake_case, while RetainedKeyPackageInventoryResult, StateWitnessProofRequest (deny_unknown_fields, maximumEntries is u16 bounded 1..=256) and StateWitnessProofResult are camelCase. Verified only that `go build ./pkg/tbtc/... ./pkg/frost/...` succeeds. No test run, no cgo integration run, no cross-language vector check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012KZb3W6TwYtKTw1mb2sfpS
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Lockstep bump for the signer's ABI 3.5 -> 4.0 change (keep-core #4198). Per this file's own rule, the Go constants and ci/frost-signer-pin.env move together with the lib commit that provides them. Under ABI 3, `durable_store_fingerprint` mixed the stable `.store-id` with the parent directory's path string and inode, the filesystem device, and the advisory lock file's inode — and that composite was the first field of every state commitment. So deleting the zero-byte lock file, restoring the data directory from backup at the same path, renaming it, or remounting where st_dev is unstable made every committed record unverifiable and the signer unstartable, with no in-band recovery: the failure is raised inside StateFileLock::acquire, before the corruption policy can apply. ABI 4.0 binds commitments to the stable `.store-id` alone. The path, filesystem and lock fingerprints are still computed and still enforced at open — they simply no longer enter any committed transcript. The symbol set is unchanged, but the VALUES of existing wire fields differ, so an ABI-3 library must not be linked by this bridge. requiredTBTCSignerABIMajor 3 -> 4 requiredTBTCSignerABIMinMinor 5 -> 0 FROST_SIGNER_MIRROR_REF 6e0fa97 -> a5363e9 Minor 0 is the initial ABI-4 surface and carries forward every symbol added through 3.5 under the v2 identity and transcript schemas. Verified: go build ./pkg/frost/... ./pkg/tbtc/... clean; go test ./pkg/frost/signing/ passes, including the contract-pin guard. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012KZb3W6TwYtKTw1mb2sfpS
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Based on #3866. Draft — incomplete, opened to make the work reviewable and durable, not because it is ready.
Adds Go consumers for the Rust signer's ABI 3.5 inventory and state-witness symbols (see keep-core #4198), plus interactive-signing readiness checks wired into the node.
What is NOT done
Native inventory parsing is unfixed. The Rust
keyGroupis a lowercase 66-character compressed SEC1 key. The parser must accept both valid 64-character x-only test keys and 66-character compressed keys viaTaprootOutputKeyFromTBTCSignerKey, and require the resulting x-only key to equalwalletID. Frozen vector to pin:The state anchor is still an interface. It needs a concrete authenticated Read + CompareAndSwap service with a durable PostgreSQL schema, fresh nonce, store/protocol/trust-domain/operator/authority/client identity binding, signed responses with bounded ancestry verification, unknown-outcome recovery by readback, and rejection of stale, divergent, ahead, over-window or wrong-identity states. It must anchor every security-relevant native mutation before Round1 commitments or Round2 shares leave the process. An interface-only implementation is not acceptable for activation.
Casing asymmetry to verify against the Rust side:
DurableStoreIdentityResultis snake_case;RetainedKeyPackageInventoryResult,StateWitnessProofRequest(deny_unknown_fields,maximumEntriesis u16 bounded 1..=256) andStateWitnessProofResultare camelCase.Verification performed
Only
go build ./pkg/tbtc/... ./pkg/frost/...— succeeds. No test run, no cgo integration run, no cross-language vector check.