Please report security vulnerabilities privately — do not open a public GitHub issue.

Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting ("Report a vulnerability" under this repository's Security tab).

Maintainers: that tab only appears once Private vulnerability reporting is switched on in Settings → Advanced Security. Enable it before making the repository public, or this page describes a channel that does not exist.

If private reporting is unavailable to you for any reason, open a public issue containing only "security issue, need a private channel" — no details, no proof-of-concept — and a maintainer will open one.

Please include:

• A description of the issue and its impact.
• Steps to reproduce (a proof-of-concept if possible).
• The version / commit you tested.

We aim to acknowledge reports within a few days and will keep you updated on the fix. Please give us a reasonable window to release a patch before any public disclosure.

Be clear about what is and is not encrypted on disk:

• The SQLite database file is NOT encrypted. Workflow definitions, run history, and scraped/extracted data are stored in plaintext inside writ.db. Use full-disk (or volume-level) encryption if you need content-level protection of that data.

• Secrets are encrypted at the column level. The vault, persona credentials and cookies, TOTP seeds, AI/notification provider keys, and webhook secrets are stored in Fernet-encrypted columns, keyed by SECRET_ENCRYPTION_KEY from your environment.

• Back up SECRET_ENCRYPTION_KEY separately from the writ-data volume. The two halves are only dangerous — or useful — together:

  • A DB backup without the key: the encrypted secrets are unrecoverable.
  • The key and the DB stolen together: every stored secret is exposed.

  Store the key in a password manager or secrets vault, not next to the database backups.

The coordinator is a single-owner application: the first account created is the sole administrator. It is designed to run behind your own network boundary — the shipped compose file binds to loopback only.

• Set strong secrets. In production (ENVIRONMENT=production) the app refuses to boot with default/placeholder API_SECRET_KEY, HMAC_SECRET_KEY, JWT_SECRET_KEY, and requires SECRET_ENCRYPTION_KEY. ./scripts/gen-env.sh generates all of them for you.
• Enable MFA on the admin account. After enrolling a second factor in the app, set REQUIRE_ADMIN_MFA=true so admin logins always require it.
• Terminate TLS in front of the coordinator (reverse proxy) and set ALLOWED_HOSTS + CORS_ORIGINS to your real origin in production. See docs/DEPLOYMENT.md.
• Fleet tokens authorize an agent to connect. Treat them as secrets; revoke unused ones from the Fleet page.
• Stored provider/AI keys are encrypted at rest and never returned to the client (only a masked hint).