ci: vendor governance-enforce — this repo was never in the A_BLOCK ruleset - #20
ci: vendor governance-enforce — this repo was never in the A_BLOCK ruleset#20yakimoto wants to merge 3 commits into
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…never in the ruleset
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PR Summary by QodoCI: add vendored governance-enforce A_BLOCK diff gate
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ApprovabilityVerdict: Needs human review Unable to check for correctness in a3dbfa9. Adds a new CI security governance workflow that gates PRs and pushes on secrets scanning. While thoughtfully designed with fail-closed semantics, new security gate infrastructure warrants human review to validate the enforcement logic and confirm operational readiness (e.g., no legacy debt blocking fallback scenarios). You can customize Macroscope's approvability policy. Learn more. |
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…othing Five defects, none of them cosmetic. Refs wave-av/claude-workstation#1747. 1. FAIL-OPEN DIFF BASE. `BASE=$(git rev-parse HEAD~1 2>/dev/null || git rev-parse HEAD)` — on a root commit `git rev-parse HEAD~1` prints its unresolved argument to stdout AND fails, so the `||` branch appends and BASE becomes a two-line string. `git diff` then exits 128, and the pinned enforcer turned that into zero files and a green check. Now: a reachability-checked base (a force-push can leave `github.event.before` pointing at a commit this checkout does not have), and with no resolvable base at all it diffs against the EMPTY TREE so the whole repo is scanned rather than nothing. 2. THE PINNED ENFORCER ITSELF FAILED OPEN. `^0.4.4` resolved to 0.4.4, whose file lister is `catch { return []; }` — any git error became zero files and rendered as `OK[enforce]: 0 changed file(s) scanned — 0 A_BLOCK violations`. A git error and a clean diff were byte-identical in the output. The fix had sat unreleased on claude-workstation main since 2026-07-29 because no `governance-v*` tag was ever pushed. Released now as 0.4.6 and pinned exactly here. 3. TOKEN IN SCOPE FOR THE WRONG STEPS. `NODE_AUTH_TOKEN` was job-level, so it was also in the environment of the step that executes the downloaded package. Now step-scoped, and the .npmrc holding it is removed on exit. 4. INSTALL SCRIPTS RAN WITH THAT TOKEN. `npm install` runs preinstall/postinstall by default. Added `--ignore-scripts`. 5. CANCELLED PUSH RUNS WERE SCANNED BY NOBODY. `cancel-in-progress: true` applied to push runs, and each push run only diffs its own before..HEAD range — so a cancelled run's commits were never examined by anything. Now PR-only. Also: `timeout-minutes: 10` and `set -euo pipefail`. Receipt, against a scratch repo whose root commit carries a no-hardcoded-paths violation, simulating a branch-creation push (`before` = all zeros): old logic -> malformed base -> caught error -> [] -> OK, 0 files scanned, PASS new logic -> "no diff base resolved ... scanning the whole tree" -> BLOCK, exit 1 Credit where it is due: several of these were found by the review bots on the sibling vendoring PRs and are folded in here — the step-scoped token, the .npmrc cleanup, the exact pin, `--ignore-scripts`, the force-push reachability check, `timeout-minutes`, and the concurrency hole (5), which was crest-console#7's catch and which I had missed entirely.
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| # A base can be PRESENT and still unusable: a force-push leaves `github.event.before` | ||
| # pointing at a commit this checkout no longer contains. | ||
| if [ -z "$BASE" ] || [ "$BASE" = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" ] \ | ||
| || ! git cat-file -e "$BASE^{commit}" 2>/dev/null; then |
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🟠 High workflows/governance-enforce.yml:79
When PUSH_BEFORE_SHA is missing or unreachable (force-push, initial multi-commit push), the fallback resolves BASE to HEAD~1, so the scan only diffs the final commit against its immediate parent. Any earlier commits bundled into that same push are skipped entirely, letting a secret or hardcoded path introduced in one of those earlier commits land without this gate examining it. Consider walking back to the oldest commit still reachable from HEAD that is outside the target branch's existing history (e.g., via git rev-list against the remote tracking ref or merge-base), or scanning the full tree when a reliable base cannot be resolved.
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In file @.github/workflows/governance-enforce.yml around line 79:
When `PUSH_BEFORE_SHA` is missing or unreachable (force-push, initial multi-commit push), the fallback resolves `BASE` to `HEAD~1`, so the scan only diffs the final commit against its immediate parent. Any earlier commits bundled into that same push are skipped entirely, letting a secret or hardcoded path introduced in one of those earlier commits land without this gate examining it. Consider walking back to the oldest commit still reachable from `HEAD` that is outside the target branch's existing history (e.g., via `git rev-list` against the remote tracking ref or merge-base), or scanning the full tree when a reliable base cannot be resolved.
Evidence trail:
.github/workflows/governance-enforce.yml:67-93 at 3614200
.git diff MERGE_BASE REVIEWED_COMMIT -- .github/workflows/governance-enforce.yml
| if [ -z "$BASE" ]; then | ||
| BASE="$(git hash-object -t tree /dev/null)" | ||
| echo "::notice::no diff base resolved (root commit or unreachable before-sha) — scanning the whole tree against the empty tree" | ||
| fi |
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🔍 Whole-tree fallback can fail on legacy debt, contradicting the diff-scoped promise
The empty-tree fallback makes every tracked file read as added, so on a root-commit push (or an unresolvable base) the gate scans the entire repository. That is deliberately fail-closed, but it means a run can fail on pre-existing violations the diff-scoped design explicitly promises not to block on. Worth confirming this repo currently has zero A_BLOCK findings on a full-tree scan before the check is added to governance-a-block-enforce, otherwise a rare fallback would produce an unmergeable PR.
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…l a false pass Correction to the previous commit on this branch. Refs wave-av/claude-workstation#1747. That commit replaced the fail-open `BASE=HEAD` with a fallback to `HEAD~1`. `HEAD~1` is also wrong: it scans exactly ONE commit, so a five-commit push whose base is indeterminate (branch creation, force-push, unreachable `github.event.before`) examines the last commit and reports a confident pass on the other four. A narrowed scan reported as a full pass is the same defect in a quieter costume. Receipt — scratch repo, five-commit push, violation planted in commit 1: HEAD~1 base -> OK[enforce]: 1 changed file(s) scanned -> PASS (never saw it) empty-tree base -> 5 changed file(s) scanned -> BLOCK[enforce]: no-hardcoded-paths, exit 1 Now: with no resolvable base of any kind, diff against git's empty-tree object so every tracked file reads as added and the whole repo is scanned. Loud, never partial, never empty. Credit: wave-av/wave-rig's copy on main already had this right, with the reasoning in a comment ("HEAD~1 would skip earlier commits in a multi-commit push and let a violation through"). The fan-out copied the broken shape from elsewhere and I did not check the one repo that had already solved it. Also from wave-rig: `merge_group` is now a declared trigger and `github.event.merge_group. base_sha` joins the base chain. None of these repos runs a merge queue today, so the trigger is inert — but a required check that never reports on an event the repo actually uses is a permanent deadlock, and this closes that in advance rather than after someone hits it.
| if [ -z "$BASE" ] || [ "$BASE" = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" ] \ | ||
| || ! git cat-file -e "$BASE^{commit}" 2>/dev/null; then | ||
| BASE="$(git hash-object -t tree /dev/null)" | ||
| echo "::warning::indeterminate diff base (root commit, branch creation, or unreachable before-sha) — scanning the full tree against the empty-tree object so no commit is skipped" | ||
| fi | ||
| echo "diffing against $BASE" | ||
| exec node "$ENFORCE" --changed "$BASE" |
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🔍 Empty-tree fallback depends on the enforcer accepting a tree object as a diff base
The fallback sets BASE to the empty-tree object hash and passes it to --changed. This only works if @wave-av/governance@0.4.6 diffs with two-dot/tree-capable semantics (e.g. git diff --name-only <base> HEAD). If the enforcer internally uses three-dot syntax (git diff base...HEAD) or git merge-base, a tree object is not a valid argument and the step would error out rather than scanning the whole tree. Since the package is private and not vendored here, this cannot be verified from the repo; worth confirming once against a force-push / new-branch scenario before making the check required (the header comment already advises observing it green first).
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Adds the
governance-enforceA_BLOCK gate (secrets / hardcoded-paths, diff-scoped) to this repo. Pilot of claude-workstation#1624 E4 T4.9a — the other four package origins follow once this one is observed green.Why this repo had no secrets scan
The org ruleset
governance-a-block-enforce(17901847) requires anenforcecheck across the fleet. Its scope is an explicit include list of 112 hand-maintained repository names — and every one of them matcheswave-*.The 16 public repos absent from that list are exactly the 16 not named
wave-*. That set is.github,adk,api-spec,cli,companion-module-wave,create-wave-app,crest-console,dispatch-edge,examples,mcp-server,obs-wave-plugin,sdk,sdk-python,sdks,vmix-wave-integration,workflow-sdk.Read the intersection: the repos that publish our npm packages are precisely the repos running with no A_BLOCK secrets scan. Nobody excluded them. A naming convention silently became a security boundary, and it drew the line in the worst possible place.
Why the workflow lands before the ruleset entry
Adding a repo to a
required_status_checksruleset before it emits that check is a permanent deadlock — a required check that never reports can never go green, and every PR on the repo becomes unmergeable. So the order is: vendor the workflow, observe it green, then extend the list. Doing it the intuitive way round would have bricked all sixteen.This PR is therefore its own liveness drill. The workflow triggers on
pull_request, so it runs on the PR that adds it. Ifenforcereports green here, the vendored shape works on a public repo. If it does not, nothing was required and nothing is blocked — which is the whole point of this ordering.Why this shape
Copied verbatim from
wave-av/wave-moq-edge, which is public and 12/12 green — so the shape is proven on a public repo rather than inferred from a private one. That distinction matters here:auto-approve.ymlfails silently on every public repo because it calls a reusable workflow in the privatewave-foundation, and a public repo cannot do that (parse-time failure, zero jobs, no annotation). This workflow calls nothing cross-repo, so that trap does not apply.Security properties, unchanged from the source:
actions/checkout@df4cb1c,actions/setup-node@48b55a0)persist-credentials: falseon checkoutcontents: read+packages: readRUNNER_TEMP,--no-save, so nothing touches this repo's dependency tree.npmrcis written with a literal${NODE_AUTH_TOKEN}(single-quotedprintf) which npm expands at run time — no secret value is ever written to disk or a log${{ }}inputs (base.sha,event.before) are routed throughenv:and read as"$VAR", never interpolated into the script bodyDiff-scoped by design: it blocks new violations without failing on legacy debt.
The one assumption being tested
@wave-av/governanceis aninternal-visibility package owned byclaude-workstation.wave-moq-edgeis public and reads it fine, but rather than fan out on that inference, this PR pilots a single repo. Green here means the remaining four (sdk,adk,mcp-server,workflow-sdk) follow immediately.Refs wave-av/claude-workstation#1624.
Note
Low Risk
CI-only change with no application runtime impact; main operational risk is workflow misconfiguration (e.g. required check before green runs), which the PR explicitly sequences to avoid.
Overview
Adds
governance-enforce.yml, a new GitHub Actions workflow that runs on pull requests and pushes tomain/master. It installs a pinned@wave-av/governance@0.4.6into an isolated temp directory and runsenforce.mjsagainst the PR or push diff (not the full tree on the happy path), targeting A_BLOCK rules: secrets in git, Doppler sourcing, and hardcoded paths.The workflow is hardened so the gate cannot report green without actually scanning files: registry token only on the npm install step,
--ignore-scripts, push-run concurrency that does not cancel in-progress scans, unreachable diff bases validated withgit cat-file, and a fail-closed fallback to the empty tree when no base SHA exists (instead of diffing HEAD against itself).This is a pilot for repos outside the org
governance-a-block-enforceruleset (non-wave-*names likecli). The PR description notes the ruleset entry should wait untilenforceis observed green here.Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit 3614200. Configure here.
Note
Add governance enforcement workflow to scan diffs on PRs and pushes to main
Adds governance-enforce.yml, which runs
@wave-av/governance@0.4.6on pull requests, merge groups, and pushes to main/master. The enforcer scans only changed files using a computed diff base; if no valid base is found, it falls back to the empty tree and scans the full repository. Push and merge group runs are not cancelable to ensure no committed ranges are skipped.Macroscope summarized a3dbfa9.