Deepen security/privacy reviewer coverage

skills/wgo/references/reviewers/security-privacy/reviewer.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 ---
 id: security-privacy
 name: Security and Privacy
-summary: What material identity, credential, exposure, privacy, PII, and operating-control risks are evidenced?
-version: 0.1
+summary: What material identity, credential, exposure, privacy, PII, supply-chain, and operating-control risks are evidenced?
+version: 0.2
 codegraph: optional
 depends_on:
   - architecture
@@ -15,14 +15,22 @@ depends_on:
 Assess evidence-bounded security and privacy posture without copying secrets or
 claiming an unperformed penetration test or compliance certification. Reconcile
 material public security, privacy, and disclosure claims with the available
-implementation and operational evidence.
+implementation and operational evidence. Answer the applicable
+vulnerability-class checklist items selected from topology. For every trust
+anchor the source produces, such as signatures, checksums, or provenance,
+locate its consuming verifier; absent or unclear verifier use is a finding.
+Identify material product-class abuse paths and assess project countermeasures
+as security controls. When the brief declares an OSPS Baseline tier, assess
+against that tier without claiming certification.
 
 ## Output Menu
 
 | Category | Output and canonical path | Trigger |
 |---|---|---|
 | Required | Security/privacy posture | Always, in `reviewer-reports/security-privacy/report.md` |
+| Required | Vulnerability-class checklist verdicts, using `vulnerability-class-checklist.md` | Always, in the report; mark non-applicable classes with reason |
 | Conditional | Secret surface, credential exposure, privilege/offboarding, or trust/data-flow view in `controls/security/` | A material secret, identity, privilege, data, or boundary question is found |
+| Conditional | Supply-chain and tooling results view: `controls/security/supply-chain-and-tooling.md` | Tooling, dependency, release-provenance, SBOM, or verifier evidence is material |
 | Conditional | Edge exposure view: `controls/security/diagrams/edge-exposure-view.md` | Detailed work has approved DNS, TLS, ingress, WAF, or reachability evidence |
 | Not owned | Business continuity ownership and technical model | Link Business Continuity and Architecture |
 
@@ -51,16 +59,22 @@ writes artifacts; collectors never call CodeGraph or shared collectors.
 |---|---|---|
 | Identity, secrets, and privacy boundaries | Authn/authz, service identity, secret consumers/metadata, PII/data boundaries, and lifecycle controls | `workers/identity-secrets-data-boundaries.md` |
 | Edge and runtime exposure | Ingress, DNS/TLS/WAF declarations, network paths, admin/public routes, and runtime exposure configuration | `workers/edge-runtime-exposure.md` |
+| Supply chain and tooling | Authorized local Scorecard, OSV, and secret-scanner runs; dependency, release-provenance, SBOM, and trust-anchor consumption evidence | `workers/supply-chain-and-tooling.md` |
 
 ## Completion Criteria
 
-State material exposed surfaces, evidence limits, selected controls, and closure
-routes without secret values or unbounded claims.
+State material exposed surfaces, checklist verdicts, claim reconciliation,
+trust-anchor consumption, abuse-control position, strongest security assets for
+the mandate outcome, evidence limits, selected controls, and closure routes
+without secret values or unbounded claims.
 
 ## Escalation Conditions
 
 - A credential-like surface may have production privilege or unknown revocation.
 - PII, tenant, or privilege boundaries are unknown on a critical path.
+- A produced trust anchor has no locatable verifier on a consumption path.
+- A public security, privacy, or disclosure claim materially contradicts
+  implementation evidence.
 
 ## Cross-Reviewer Links
 

skills/wgo/references/reviewers/security-privacy/vulnerability-class-checklist.md

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+# Vulnerability-Class Checklist
+
+Loaded by the Security and Privacy reviewer. Select applicable classes from the
+Architecture topology and approved evidence boundary. Answer each selected item
+`verified` with a locator, `finding` with a locator, `not-applicable` with a
+reason, or `unknown` with the limitation. Do not skip a selected class silently.
+This checklist is derived from OWASP ASVS-style source-review questions and is
+not a penetration test or certification claim.
+
+## Input Handling And Injection
+
+- Canonicalization: untrusted paths, slugs, URLs, hostnames, and identifiers are
+  normalized before validation, and validation happens after decoding.
+- Injection sinks: query, command, template, header, log, and analytics sinks
+  use parameterization or encoding appropriate to the sink.
+- Redirect or forward targets: externally influenced targets constrain protocol,
+  host, credentials, protocol-relative forms, backslashes, and encoded variants.
+- Deserialization and parsing: untrusted formats are bounded for size, depth,
+  entity expansion, prototype pollution, and parser-specific hazards.
+
+## Authentication, Session, And Access
+
+- Verifier correctness: token signatures, issuers, audiences, algorithms, and
+  time claims are verified, and verification failures close access.
+- Key lifecycle: verification keys have bounded fetch, cache, rotation, and
+  pinning behavior; stale or attacker-supplied keys are not accepted silently.
+- Authorization placement: privileged routes are guarded at the handler or
+  enforceable boundary, not only in routing, UI state, or documentation.
+
+## Web Platform And Edge Defenses
+
+- Response headers: CSP, frame, content-type, and referrer policies match each
+  response class; relaxed policies are scoped and justified.
+- CORS: allowed origins are explicit and non-reflective; credentialed responses
+  do not pair with permissive origins.
+- Cache and CDN behavior: responses do not vary on attacker-controlled keys in a
+  way that enables poisoning or shared-cache data leakage.
+- Request construction: no layer constructs outbound requests or headers from
+  untrusted input without validation and encoding.
+
+## Data Protection And Privacy
+
+- Data minimization: collected, logged, or forwarded fields match public
+  disclosure exactly, including non-pageview, background, and error events.
+- Secrets in motion: secrets, tokens, and private identifiers cannot enter logs,
+  analytics, URLs, diagnostics, or error responses.
+- Protection claims: declared transport, storage, retention, and deletion
+  protections are implemented where the data actually flows.
+
+## Configuration, Operations, And Supply Chain
+
+- Fail posture: each guard has an evidenced absent-config or dependency-failure
+  behavior, and the behavior matches documented intent.
+- Trust-anchor consumption: every produced signature, checksum, or attestation is
+  verified where consumed, or the absence is reported.
+- Diagnostic surfaces: debug, test, and admin surfaces are discoverable from
+  source, guarded, and excluded from production paths where required.
+- Dependency and build integrity: lockfiles, install scripts, CI token
+  permissions, release provenance, and scanner results are bounded as evidence.
+
+## Product-Class Abuse
+
+- Identify the dominant real-world abuse paths for this product class from the
+  brief, topology, and public claims.
+- Assess specific countermeasures as controls: presence, coverage, bypass paths,
+  reporting or takedown flow, and evidence limits.

skills/wgo/references/reviewers/security-privacy/workers/supply-chain-and-tooling.md

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+You collect supply-chain and tooling evidence for Security and Privacy; you do not write audit artifacts.
+Scope: authorized local security-tool runs, dependency and lockfile state, release provenance, SBOM presence, and trust-anchor consumption.
+Use the reviewer's topology packet; do not invoke CodeGraph or shared collectors.
+Run tools only when the brief approves local execution; record tool name, exact version, command, and scope for every run.
+Run OpenSSF Scorecard when available and authorized; record each check name, score, and unauthenticated-API limitation where it applies.
+Run OSV-Scanner or the ecosystem's native audit against committed lockfiles; record each finding identifier, package, version, and fixed version.
+Run a recognized secret scanner, such as gitleaks, across full history; record rule matches by locator without copying candidate secret values.
+Never install project dependencies, modify lockfiles, alter repository state, or send repository content to unapproved external services.
+Record whether releases publish an SBOM, provenance attestation, signed artifact, or checksum, with exact release locators.
+For each produced trust anchor, locate its consuming verifier in source or documentation; record verifier presence, locator, or absence.
+Do not infer exploitability, compromise, live exposure, or compliance from tool results; record bounded evidence and limitations.
+If a tool cannot run, record the blocker and affected decision instead of substituting judgment.
+Verify every result and give exact file, release, identifier, or check-name locators.
+Separate executed observation, declared configuration, and unknown.
+Return each material observation concisely:
+- statement and exact locator or check identifier;
+- observed / inferred / unknown status and limitation;
+- affected dependency, release, anchor, or repository-control boundary;
+- stable file/symbol target for shared history when rationale matters;
+- candidate for the supply-chain results view or a report finding, with reason.
+Combine duplicate evidence only; stop when this scope's material observations are exhausted.

tests/test_skill_contract.py

@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@
     "product-value", "project-health", "revenue-risk", "scalability",
     "security-privacy",
 }
+EXPECTED_REVIEWER_VERSIONS = {
+    "security-privacy": "0.2",
+}
 
 
 def reviewer_card(reviewer_id: str) -> Path:
@@ -67,7 +70,8 @@ def test_every_reviewer_has_a_compact_output_menu(self) -> None:
         for reviewer_id, path in files.items():
             content = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
             self.assertRegex(content, rf"(?m)^id: {re.escape(reviewer_id)}$")
-            self.assertRegex(content, r"(?m)^version: 0\.1$")
+            expected_version = EXPECTED_REVIEWER_VERSIONS.get(reviewer_id, "0.1")
+            self.assertRegex(content, rf"(?m)^version: {re.escape(expected_version)}$")
             self.assertRegex(content, r"(?m)^codegraph: (?:none|optional|required)$")
             dependencies = set(frontmatter_dependencies(path))
             self.assertLessEqual(dependencies, EXPECTED_REVIEWERS)
@@ -660,6 +664,17 @@ def test_minor_evidence_and_reviewer_improvements_remain_bounded(self) -> None:
         self.assertIn("public security, privacy, and disclosure claims", security)
         self.assertIn("abuse or\nmisuse controls", security)
         self.assertIn("trust material to its consumer validation", identity)
+        self.assertIn("vulnerability-class checklist", security)
+        self.assertIn("OSPS Baseline tier", security)
+        self.assertIn("trust-anchor consumption", security)
+        self.assertIn("supply-chain-and-tooling.md", security)
+
+        checklist = (REVIEWERS / "security-privacy/vulnerability-class-checklist.md").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        tooling = (REVIEWERS / "security-privacy/workers/supply-chain-and-tooling.md").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        for phrase in ("Canonicalization", "Data minimization", "Product-Class Abuse"):
+            self.assertIn(phrase, checklist)
+        for phrase in ("OpenSSF Scorecard", "OSV-Scanner", "gitleaks", "SBOM", "trust anchor"):
+            self.assertIn(phrase, tooling)
 
     def test_structural_validation_is_optional(self) -> None:
         workflow = (SKILL / "references/common/reviewer-audit.md").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
@@ -730,7 +745,7 @@ def test_workerized_reviewers_have_one_preflight_and_compact_collectors(self) ->
             "architecture": 3,
             "code-quality": 4,
             "product-value": 5,
-            "security-privacy": 2,
+            "security-privacy": 3,
             "business-continuity": 2,
             "scalability": 2,
             "contributor-vendor-value": 1,