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OwnFramework Loop v0.9.1 — Host Capability Runtime

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@william-london william-london released this 02 Sep 16:19
d23cadc

OwnFramework Loop v0.9.1 — Host Capability Runtime

Frozen release target: d23cadc

This is the canonical official publication of the v0.9.1 closed source/master
line. The release is immutable; release tags are historical truth and are
not rewritten.

10/10 hosted CI lanes are green at the frozen release target:

  • security
  • adapter-contract
  • claude-adapter
  • codex-adapter-static
  • core Ubuntu Python 3.12
  • core Ubuntu Python 3.13
  • core macOS Python 3.12
  • core macOS Python 3.13
  • release-gate Python 3.12
  • release-gate Python 3.13

The canonical 87/87 release gate is also green locally.

What 0.9.1 delivers

Portable host capability runtime

  • Packets may declare portable semantic capabilities; the trusted runtime
    resolves exact host executables, versions, read/write paths, and derived
    network authority before the model starts.
  • Every semantic attempt receives an immutable capability-resolution receipt
    referencing a run-level CAPABILITY_BINDING.json; stable capability,
    host-manifest, network, privileged-canary and runner-profile identity is
    exact-matched before every later model launch.
  • ofloop capabilities probe|preflight|fingerprint|profile|commission
    exposes host inventory, named runner profiles, and trusted privileged-canary
    commissioning without a semantic model call.
  • HOME remains broadly denied; tools discovered under HOME now require
    explicit operator commissioning instead of relying on contradictory PATH
    discovery.
  • Per-pass scratch is separated from durable repository-scoped package and
    browser caches, preventing repeated downloads without introducing
    cross-client writable-cache poisoning.
  • Privileged container.docker is broker-only: direct daemon sockets,
    inherited Docker/Kubernetes/agent IPC selectors, and unsandboxed Docker
    exceptions are never granted; conventional Docker/Podman/containerd daemon
    sockets are explicitly denied, and the Bash guard requires the resolved
    privileged capability marker before Docker invocation, including common
    shell-wrapper forms.
  • local.http-service is explicit and unavailable until a safe local-binding
    provider is commissioned and proven for the exact host runtime.
  • Privileged and local authority requires core-receipted trusted canary
    evidence bound to platform/architecture/Claude runtime, provider/broker
    identity, and executable digests; a copied runtime fingerprint alone is
    insufficient.
  • Trusted named runner profiles can select only model and effort, are frozen
    into run identity, and cannot override sandbox/tool/MCP/session authority.
  • Funded supervisor runs propagate their exact remaining durable cost
    ceiling to Claude's native print-mode per-pass budget while aggregate
    Loop accounting remains canonical; reviewer tool caches remain
    pass-ephemeral.
  • Capability-resolution failures are terminalized as proven pre-provider
    semantic attempts instead of leaving a reserved attempt for stale recovery.

Terminal source hardening

  • Semantic replay is authorized only after durable resource accounting and
    an explicit acceptance publication bound to the exact semantic artifact
    digest and role-specific candidate identity; drifted bytes or candidate
    identity fail closed without a second semantic charge.
  • Preflight output carries the same proved effort-attestation identity used
    at launch and marks explicit manifest/profile overrides as diagnostic
    rather than launch-parity evidence.
  • Redacted secret scanning refuses unreadable or oversized inputs instead
    of collapsing unknown scan state into a clean result.
  • Browser runtime proof binds the top-level Playwright version to the
    verified installed distribution identity and rejects contradictory proof.
  • Source authority, recovery, claim ownership, cost accounting, capability
    binding, browser identity, runner-profile truth, secret scanning,
    worktree ownership, and state/event integrity remain covered by the
    canonical multi-platform release gate.

Public contract and runner normalization

  • Durable supervisor runner availability is now explicit and distinct from
    adapter installation; unsupported --runner values are refused before a
    job row can be created, while Codex remains an experimental foreground
    Agent-Skills adapter rather than an implied unattended runner.
  • Commissioned Claude model selection is documented as packet/profile truth:
    restricted workers do not inherit interactive settings.json; named
    operator profiles bind explicit model/effort policy before provider launch.
  • Claude and Codex coordinator skills are parity-gated on critical authority
    doctrine so duplicated host UX cannot silently drift.
  • Packet examples are executable documentation validated by the current
    packet admission path, including a modern v3 PROGRAM example with
    checkpoint-scoped acceptance and runner/capability declarations.

Repository hygiene

  • Operator-facing adapter and supervisor lifecycle commands live under
    bin/; platform-specific service implementations live under
    scripts/supervisor/; repository root retains only the deliberate core
    install, uninstall, validation, and release-gate entrypoints.
  • Maintained docs, templates, scripts, and tests now have explicit indexes;
    one-off implementation reports and retired policy examples are absent
    from the active repository surface while provenance-bearing regression
    names are retained.

Material limitations preserved

  • Claude Code is the first production-hardened unattended semantic runner;
    other adapters are not equivalent commissioned unattended runners.
  • Codex remains experimental/static-distribution proven; it is not an
    equivalent commissioned unattended runner.
  • Native Windows is not a commissioned-supervisor target.
  • WSL user service does not itself keep the WSL VM alive.
  • APPROVED does not authorize push, merge, deploy, publish, payment,
    messaging, or any unrelated external effect; promotion remains
    human-controlled.
  • Deferred defense-in-depth observations (executable symlink rejection in
    the host-manifest executable field, a read_paths policy gate against
    sensitive directories, and platform-specific os.link(2) semantics
    for broken symlink targets) remain unreachable through the current
    production authority path because every authority artifact is owner-gated
    by manifest ownership, installation-time mode and ownership checks, and
    Python's portable atomic-write pattern; they are not patched here.