Security Model

Security Model

This plugin handles security data, so it is deliberately conservative about identity, data at rest, and data egress.

Identity & attribution

• The acting user is resolved only from the OpenSearch Security plugin — there is no request-header fallback that a client could spoof.
• When identity cannot be established, actions are attributed to an explicit anonymous state rather than a guessed user.
• Every workflow change (status, assignment, case link, automated rule action) is written to an append-only history with the actor and timestamp.

Data isolation

• The plugin never modifies wazuh-alerts-*. It reads them and stores workflow state in its own indices (see Architecture).
• Plugin-owned fields (status, assigned_to, case_id, history) are protected on re-sync — a same-named field arriving from Wazuh cannot clobber an analyst's decision.

AI egress boundary

When AI Analysis is enabled, what leaves your network is tightly controlled:

• Only a branded, allowlisted projection of an alert can be sent to the provider. Passing a raw _source through the egress boundary is a compile-time error, not a runtime check — it cannot happen by accident.
• Comment bodies are never sent — only a count.
• Long free-text fields such as full_log are truncated.
• Nothing is sent unless AI analysis is explicitly enabled and a provider/key is configured.

Automation & blast radius

• Rules run under a leader lock (single writer) inside the sync tick, so there is no double-execution across replicas.
• Automatic case creation is de-duplicated per rule + entity and rate-limited per pass, so a noisy source cannot flood you with cases.
• Auto-close / auto-assign act on attacker-influenceable fields (source IP, user). Treat these like any detection content: scope the match conditions, and use Dry run before enabling. Prefer opening a case over silently closing when in doubt.

Deliberately not included

Active Response (pushing commands back to agents) is intentionally not shipped in this release. It warrants a dedicated review of the command path and authorization model before it can be trusted.

Recommended hardening

• Apply document-level security to wazuh-alert-status directly if you restrict who can see which alerts — restrictions on wazuh-alerts-* do not carry through the sync copy.
• Enable at-rest encryption for the stored AI key (see AI Analysis).