Once 1.0.0 ships, the support window becomes "current minor" plus "current minor − 1" with critical-only fixes for the previous minor.

sfs has not had an independent cryptographic or security audit. It is a developer preview and is not intended for third-party data until such an audit and field operating time exist. docs/SECURITY-MODEL.md records the threat model, per-component maturity, and the accepted at-rest limits.

The high-severity findings from internal review are fixed (test-key-gated first-run path, header MAC, context-bound GCM nonces, iterative trie DoS guard, metadata GCM). Documented, accepted preview limits include: a concurrent FUSE + kernel mount on one image is unsupported (self-inflicted corruption, not enforced); insider sign_mode downgrade is an at-rest limit of the same class as LUKS/dm-crypt; key zeroization is partial.

Do not open a public issue for security vulnerabilities.

Report privately via one of:

• GitHub Security Advisory — https://github.com/zero-objects/sfs/security/advisories/new (preferred; private until coordinated disclosure)
• Email — security@zero-objects.dev

Please include:

• Affected crate(s) / component(s) and version(s)
• Reproduction steps or a proof-of-concept
• A CVSS 3.1 vector if you can compute one

We aim to acknowledge within a few business days and to coordinate a disclosure timeline with you.