Releases: 26zl/cybersec-toolkit
Releases · 26zl/cybersec-toolkit
Release list
v1.2.1
Improvements
- Richer tool definitions for
list_toolsandmanage_remote_hosts— fuller descriptions andLiteralenum types formethod/action, so the input schema every MCP client sees is self-documenting and validated.
Maintenance
- Add
glama.json(Glama maintainer metadata) and skip image rebuilds for doc-only / glama.json changes.
Full changelog: v1.2.0...v1.2.1
v1.2.0
Features
- MCP server: crypto solver venv, install-aware advisors, and AI-directive sanitizing.
Fixes
- MCP registry manifest is now accepted — the OCI package no longer carries a
versionfield, and the image ships the requiredio.modelcontextprotocol.server.namelabel. - Resolve
HOMEbeforeset -ureads; installuvin the prerequisite phase.
Docs & maintenance
- Document DeepSeek Harness (dsh) as an MCP client; correct the PUBLISHING guide; add the Glama score badge.
- Image builds skip doc-only commits via
paths-ignore. - Dependency bumps: uv, CodeQL action, harden-runner.
Full changelog: v1.1.1...v1.2.0
v1.1.1
Patch release.
Distribution & discoverability
- Prebuilt container image on GHCR — no local build needed:
docker run --rm ghcr.io/26zl/cybersec-toolkit --profile ctf - MCP registry manifest (
server.json) forio.github.26zl/cybersec-toolkit - GitHub Discussions enabled with Q&A / Show-and-tell templates and issue routing
Maintenance
make bump VERSION=x.y.zsyncs every release surface in one step; the release-version validator now also coversCITATION.cffandserver.json- Rolls up prior fixes landed on
mainsince v1.1.0
Full changelog: v1.1.0...v1.1.1
v1.1.0
Highlights
MCP server security hardening
- Blocked command-execution options on allowlisted utilities that reached RCE with
CYBERSEC_MCP_ALLOW_SCRIPTS=0(sede/r/w/s///e,zip --unzip-command/-TT,exiftool -if/-p,wget --use-askpass,openssl -engine). - Guarded scanner output flags (
nmap -oN/-oA,tcpdump/tshark -w) against sensitive-path clobber. - Timeout now kills the whole process group so forked children die; DNS resolution runs in a bounded pool; credential-bearing long flags (
--api-token,--client-secret) are redacted from the audit log.
Installer: provenance and safe uninstall
- Tools already present before install are recorded as
existing, so--rollbackandremove.shnever uninstall what the user already had. - Rollback now covers source/special/snap/docker and system packages, and only forgets a
.versionsentry once the tool is actually gone. - Backup restore is per-target transactional with an archive-bomb guard and a
find-availability check.
Cross-distro correctness
lib/distro_compat.tsvpackage names audited against live apt/dnf/pacman/zypper repos; the CI package-name check is now blocking.- New
scripts/test-distros.sh(make test-distros) smoke-tests install across all four package managers via rootless podman.
Other
scripts/agent-guard.shenforces MCP-first target work;scripts/check_doc_links.pyreports dead doc links.- Pinned
pip-auditandmarkdownlint; refreshed AGENTS/CLAUDE guidance; trimmed skill descriptions under the spec cap.
Full Changelog: v1.0.0...v1.1.0