v1.1.0

Highlights

MCP server security hardening

• Blocked command-execution options on allowlisted utilities that reached RCE with CYBERSEC_MCP_ALLOW_SCRIPTS=0 (sed e/r/w/s///e, zip --unzip-command/-TT, exiftool -if/-p, wget --use-askpass, openssl -engine).
• Guarded scanner output flags (nmap -oN/-oA, tcpdump/tshark -w) against sensitive-path clobber.
• Timeout now kills the whole process group so forked children die; DNS resolution runs in a bounded pool; credential-bearing long flags (--api-token, --client-secret) are redacted from the audit log.

Installer: provenance and safe uninstall

• Tools already present before install are recorded as existing, so --rollback and remove.sh never uninstall what the user already had.
• Rollback now covers source/special/snap/docker and system packages, and only forgets a .versions entry once the tool is actually gone.
• Backup restore is per-target transactional with an archive-bomb guard and a find-availability check.

Cross-distro correctness

• lib/distro_compat.tsv package names audited against live apt/dnf/pacman/zypper repos; the CI package-name check is now blocking.
• New scripts/test-distros.sh (make test-distros) smoke-tests install across all four package managers via rootless podman.

Other

• scripts/agent-guard.sh enforces MCP-first target work; scripts/check_doc_links.py reports dead doc links.
• Pinned pip-audit and markdownlint; refreshed AGENTS/CLAUDE guidance; trimmed skill descriptions under the spec cap.

Full Changelog: v1.0.0...v1.1.0