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SECURITY_ARCHITECTURE.md
Version: 1.0 Project: CeloHT Security Model: Defense in Depth Blockchain: Celo
This document defines the security architecture of the CeloHT ecosystem.
CeloHT is a modular Web3 ecosystem involving users, wallets, applications, APIs, databases, smart contracts, blockchain infrastructure, community agents, and governance systems.
Security therefore cannot depend on a single control.
CeloHT follows a defense-in-depth model in which multiple independent security layers protect users, assets, infrastructure, applications, and data.
USERS
│
▼
┌─────────────────┐
│ USER SECURITY │
│ Education │
│ Authentication │
└────────┬────────┘
│
▼
┌─────────────────┐
│ WALLET SECURITY │
│ Signing │
│ Permissions │
└────────┬────────┘
│
▼
┌─────────────────┐
│ APPLICATION │
│ SECURITY │
│ Frontend / API │
└────────┬────────┘
│
▼
┌─────────────────┐
│ DATA SECURITY │
│ Database / APIs │
└────────┬────────┘
│
▼
┌─────────────────┐
│ SMART CONTRACT │
│ SECURITY │
└────────┬────────┘
│
▼
┌─────────────────┐
│ CELO NETWORK │
│ Blockchain │
└─────────────────┘
CeloHT security follows these principles:
- Defense in depth
- Least privilege
- Zero trust between application components
- Secure defaults
- Explicit authorization
- Minimal data collection
- No private-key custody by applications
- Auditable financial operations
- Continuous monitoring
- Rapid incident response
CeloHT contains several trust boundaries.
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ USER │
└───────────────────┬─────────────────────┘
│
Trust Boundary
│
▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ CELOHT APP │
└───────────────────┬─────────────────────┘
│
Trust Boundary
│
▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ API / BACKEND SERVICES │
└───────────────────┬─────────────────────┘
│
Trust Boundary
│
▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ DATABASE / EXTERNAL SERVICES │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ WALLET PROVIDER │
└───────────────────┬─────────────────────┘
│
▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ CELO NETWORK │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
Every boundary should validate inputs and permissions rather than implicitly trusting the component on the other side.
Users are part of the security architecture.
CeloHT should educate users about:
- Wallet security
- Seed-phrase protection
- Phishing
- Fake websites
- Malicious transactions
- Private-key security
- Transaction verification
- Social engineering
CeloHT applications must never ask users to submit their seed phrase or private key.
The wallet is the user's primary authorization mechanism for blockchain transactions.
CeloHT Application
│
▼
Transaction Request
│
▼
Wallet
│
▼
User Reviews
│
▼
User Signs
│
▼
Celo Network
The application should request only the permissions required for the intended operation.
Private keys must remain under the control of the appropriate wallet owner.
CeloHT applications must not:
- Request seed phrases
- Request private keys
- Store user private keys
- Log private keys
- Transmit seed phrases to APIs
Any deployment key used for infrastructure must be separately protected and never exposed in client-side code.
Frontend applications should protect against:
- Cross-site scripting
- Malicious third-party scripts
- Insecure dependencies
- Phishing impersonation
- Unauthorized wallet requests
- Unsafe user input
Recommended controls include:
- Content Security Policy
- Secure HTTP headers
- Input validation
- Dependency monitoring
- HTTPS
- Minimal third-party scripts
Backend APIs should implement:
- Authentication where required
- Authorization
- Input validation
- Rate limiting
- Request logging
- Error handling
- Secure CORS configuration
- Secret management
APIs must not trust data received from clients.
Databases should be protected through:
- Strong authentication
- Least-privilege access
- Network restrictions where applicable
- Encryption
- Backups
- Monitoring
- Access auditing
Database credentials must never be exposed to browser clients.
Smart contracts represent a potentially high-risk security boundary because blockchain transactions can be irreversible.
Security controls include:
- Unit testing
- Integration testing
- Static analysis
- Access-control review
- Reentrancy protection where applicable
- Input validation
- Safe external calls
- Event monitoring
- Independent review for high-value contracts
Administrative functions should be minimized.
Potential privileged operations include:
- Configuration changes
- Treasury transfers
- Contract upgrades
- Emergency pauses
Privileged functions should have documented authorization requirements.
Where appropriate, high-value administrative operations should use multisignature controls.
Treasury security requires stronger controls than ordinary application functionality.
Conceptual model:
Governance
│
▼
Proposal
│
▼
Authorization
│
▼
Treasury Controls
│
▼
Transaction
│
▼
Celo Blockchain
│
▼
Public Verification
Treasury transactions should be documented and auditable.
Secrets must be stored outside source control.
Examples:
Database Credentials
API Secrets
Deployment Credentials
RPC Credentials
Authentication Secrets
Contract Deployment Keys
Never commit secrets to:
- GitHub repositories
- Documentation
- Source code
- Client-side bundles
- Public issue trackers
The deployment pipeline is part of the attack surface.
Security controls should include:
- Protected branches
- Required pull-request reviews
- Restricted deployment permissions
- Secret isolation
- Dependency scanning
- Code scanning
- Build verification
- Environment protection
Third-party dependencies can introduce vulnerabilities.
CeloHT repositories should:
- Monitor dependencies
- Remove unused packages
- Review critical updates
- Scan for known vulnerabilities
- Lock dependency versions where appropriate
Production infrastructure should use:
- HTTPS
- Secure DNS configuration
- Access controls
- Firewall rules where applicable
- Environment isolation
- Monitoring
- Backups
Infrastructure access should follow least privilege.
Authentication establishes identity.
Authorization establishes what that identity can do.
Identity
│
▼
Authentication
│
▼
Authorization
│
▼
Permitted Action
Administrative actions must require stronger authorization than ordinary public actions.
Agents can represent an additional operational security boundary.
Agent systems should address:
- Identity verification
- Role permissions
- Transaction verification
- Fraud prevention
- Operational limits
- Account security
- Dispute procedures
Agent credentials should never be shared.
Security monitoring should detect:
- Repeated failed authentication
- Suspicious API activity
- Abnormal transaction patterns
- Contract events
- Administrative changes
- Infrastructure failures
- Unexpected deployment activity
The incident response lifecycle is:
Detection
│
▼
Triage
│
▼
Containment
│
▼
Investigation
│
▼
Remediation
│
▼
Recovery
│
▼
Post-Incident Review
Critical incidents should be documented.
If a serious vulnerability affects an application:
- Identify affected component.
- Determine whether funds or user data are at risk.
- Restrict affected functionality.
- Preserve relevant evidence.
- Patch the vulnerability.
- Test the fix.
- Deploy the fix.
- Monitor the system.
- Document the incident.
For smart-contract vulnerabilities, response options depend on the contract's design and administrative controls.
Security fixes should be prioritized according to:
- Severity
- Exploitability
- User impact
- Financial impact
- Data exposure
- Availability impact
Critical vulnerabilities should receive immediate attention.
Security vulnerabilities should be reported privately when public disclosure could increase exploitation risk.
The repository should maintain a clear security-reporting process through SECURITY.md.
Security-related documentation should include:
SECURITY.md
SECURITY_ARCHITECTURE.md
THREAT_MODEL.md
NO_TOKEN_POLICY.md
GOVERNANCE.md
FUNDING_POLICY.md
- Wallet education
- Phishing awareness
- Transaction verification
- Input validation
- Authentication
- Authorization
- HTTPS
- Security headers
- Rate limiting
- Authentication
- Authorization
- Secure CORS
- Least privilege
- Backups
- Encryption
- Monitoring
- Tests
- Access control
- Static analysis
- Contract verification
- Security review
- Secrets management
- Protected branches
- CI security
- Monitoring
- Incident response
Document: Security Architecture Version: 1.0 Security Model: Defense in Depth Project: CeloHT
© 2026 CeloHT - Open Source. Global Impact. Licensed under Apache.