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THREAT_MODEL.md
Version: 1.0
Project: CeloHT
Security Method: Threat Modeling
Blockchain: Celo
This document identifies the primary threats that may affect CeloHT users, applications, infrastructure, blockchain interactions, smart contracts, agents, treasury operations, and governance systems.
The objective is not to claim that the system is risk-free.
The objective is to identify realistic attack scenarios and establish controls that reduce their probability and impact.
The following assets require protection.
CELO
cUSD
Treasury funds
Program funds
Community funds
Source code
Smart contracts
Deployment infrastructure
Domains
Application credentials
Wallet addresses
Account information
Educational records
Application data
Administrative permissions
Governance credentials
Treasury authorization
Proposal systems
CeloHT's credibility with:
Users
Communities
Partners
Developers
Donors
Investors
is also a critical asset.
Potential threat actors include:
Attempting to compromise public applications or infrastructure.
Attempting to steal wallet credentials or trick users into signing malicious transactions.
Attempting to abuse application functionality.
Agents whose credentials or operational access have been compromised.
Authorized individuals abusing legitimate permissions.
Attempting to compromise dependencies, build systems, or third-party services.
Attempting to exploit vulnerabilities in deployed contracts.
User
│
▼
Frontend
│
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API
│
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Database
User
│
▼
Wallet
│
▼
Celo
Developer
│
▼
GitHub
│
▼
CI/CD
│
▼
Production
Each connection represents a potential security boundary.
Major threat categories include:
Wallet theft
Phishing
Unauthorized transactions
Smart-contract exploitation
API abuse
Account takeover
Database compromise
Secret leakage
Supply-chain compromise
Insider abuse
Treasury compromise
Governance manipulation
Denial of service
Data leakage
Infrastructure compromise
| Threat | Likelihood | Impact | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|
| Phishing | High | High | Critical |
| Wallet compromise | Medium | Critical | Critical |
| Smart-contract exploit | Medium | Critical | Critical |
| Secret leakage | Medium | Critical | Critical |
| API abuse | Medium | Medium | High |
| Account takeover | Medium | High | High |
| Database breach | Medium | High | High |
| Supply-chain attack | Low/Medium | High | High |
| Treasury compromise | Low/Medium | Critical | Critical |
| Insider abuse | Low/Medium | High | High |
| DDoS | Medium | Medium | Medium |
| Data leakage | Medium | High | High |
Potential loss of funds, major contract vulnerability, or complete production compromise.
Significant user, infrastructure, or data impact.
Limited security impact requiring remediation.
Minor weakness with limited practical impact.
Alert
│
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Validate
│
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Classify Severity
│
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Contain
│
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Investigate
│
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Remediate
│
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Recover
│
▼
Document
│
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Improve Controls
The architecture assumes:
The Celo network provides the underlying blockchain security.
Users are responsible for protecting their wallets.
Third-party infrastructure may fail.
External dependencies may contain vulnerabilities.
Human error is possible.
No single security control is sufficient.
CeloHT security should preserve:
Protect sensitive application information.
Prevent unauthorized modification.
Keep critical services operational.
Ensure users interact with legitimate systems.
Maintain sufficient records to investigate important actions.
CeloHT should not represent itself as "risk-free" or "fully secure."
Security is an ongoing process.
The objective is to:
Identify risks
Reduce attack surfaces
Protect users
Protect funds
Protect infrastructure
Detect attacks
Respond quickly
Learn from incidents
Document: Threat Model
Version: 1.0
Project: CeloHT
Method: Risk-based threat modeling
Review Frequency: After major architectural or security changes
© 2026 CeloHT - Open Source. Global Impact. Licensed under Apache.