fix(simulator): add genesis wallet documentation and fix logger name#3
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8lecramm merged 2 commits intoFeb 5, 2026
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- Changed logger name from 'derod' to 'simulator' for clarity - Added genesis wallet address, seed, and restore command display - Helps developers access the funded genesis wallet (~1.12 DERO) - Other 22 wallets only get 0.002 DERO registration bonus in mainnet The genesis wallet is the only one with significant funds in mainnet simulator mode since the premine list is skipped for mainnet.
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This was referenced Jun 23, 2026
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…l scrub test Addresses the DEROFDN#21 six-perspective review: - Self-send sites set SenderVerified=true + RingSize (both decode arms): a wallet-authored tx has a certain sender at any ring size, so a contract- following consumer no longer distrusts the user's own sends. (review DEROFDN#2) - Add Test_Attribution_Scrub_Behavior: drives the real receiver decode on a sim chain and asserts the scrub effect (ring2 keeps Sender+Data[0]; ring>2 blanks Sender + zeroes Data[0]). Rebuilds until the receiver lands in a non-zero ring slot so the Data[0]==0 assertion has teeth. Mutation-checked. The source-grep guard is kept as a tripwire. (review DEROFDN#3) - Document the (RingSize, SenderVerified, Sender) renderer truth table on the field; drop the redundant exported_payload[:] slice. (review DEROFDN#6, DEROFDN#9) The <=->< bounds guard is sufficient: rpc.NewAddress panics on an undecompressable ring key before the Publickeylist rebuild, so len(Publickeylist)==RingSize holds and the index cannot go out of range. (review #1)
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…anon Addresses the DEROFDN#22 review: - curatedRingCandidates canonicalizes the sender, recipient, and every preferred decoy to its base address before the distinctness/dedup checks, and the ring carries the base form. A ring member is identified by its pubkey, not its address string, so an integrated/payment-id encoding of an account already in the ring (sender, recipient, or another decoy) no longer slips the string-keyed checks and lands a duplicate pubkey that consensus rejects AFTER signing. Test_CuratedRing_AltEncoding_NoDuplicate_A2 covers recipient / sender / decoy-vs-decoy / cross-network, each mutation-proven. (review #1) - Anonymous attribution now fails closed at ring size < 4 (no decoy slot) instead of silently falling through to honest attribution. (review DEROFDN#8) - Port the unverified-attribution export scrub + self-send flag into the decode arms (this stack predates it); behavioral scrub test + an honest-byte guard that asserts honest mode writes the receiver slot (closes the grep guard's reassignment blind spot). (review DEROFDN#3, DEROFDN#9) The bounds guard is sufficient for the same reason as DEROFDN#21: bad ring keys panic at NewAddress before the Publickeylist rebuild, so len==RingSize. (review DEROFDN#4)
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…s (review DEROFDN#13/DEROFDN#14/DEROFDN#15) Addresses Dirtybird99's re-review of DEROFDN#22: - DEROFDN#13 (correctness): curated-decoy distinctness was string-keyed, so a deroproof (Proof-flag) encoding of an in-ring account rendered a distinct base string and slipped the dedup, landing a duplicate pubkey that consensus rejects after the user signs. Key the dedup on the raw 33-byte pubkey (hex(addr.PublicKey.EncodeCompressed())) — the identity consensus dedups on — so Mainnet, Proof, and integrated axes all collapse to one key; clear Proof on the emitted base so a deroproof-supplied decoy resolves to a registered base address. Removes the now-dead caller-side recipient Mainnet pin (was only needed to keep the string canon in lockstep). New deroproof-decoy-alt vector mutation-proves it (revert canon.Proof=false -> RED "axis is OPEN"). - DEROFDN#14 (maintainability): the unverified-attribution scrub and the self-authored trust block were copy-pasted across the CBOR/CBOR_V2 decode arms; a future one-arm edit could silently reopen the DEROFDN#3 sender-deanonymization leak. Factor scrubExportedPayload() + markSelfAuthored() as the single source of truth, called from every arm. Byte-identical behavior; scrub behavioral test unchanged + green. - DEROFDN#15 (test): wgenesis reused the receiver's temp DB; give it its own path + cleanup. Build + vet clean. Alt-encoding suite (6 vectors incl. 2 deroproof) and scrub behavioral test green (no -race per the pre-existing sim-daemon flake). Pre-existing flaky sim tests (Test_Creation_TX_morecheck, Test_Payload_TX) fail on the unmodified DEROFDN#22 head too — unrelated to this change.
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…ecoy-probe failures (review DEROFDN#2/DEROFDN#3) DEROFDN#2 — at ring 2 the assembly loop ("for ringsize != 2") never runs, so curatedRingCandidates — the only decoy validator — is never invoked: Strict garbage decoys built and could broadcast while the identical input at ring 4 hard-errors. Fixed with a fail-closed guard beside the anon ring-2 guard (after effective-ringsize resolution — the wallet default can legally be 2 — and before any daemon call, so it validates offline). Strict-only: lenient has no ring-2/ring-4 asymmetry, and its documented silent-drop contract is load-bearing for the DEROFDN#23 CLI (Strict:false, ambient session decoys, any ring size). Lenient ring-2 drops feed the funnel below. DEROFDN#3 — the registration probe treated EVERY failure as "decoy invalid": for a decoy address the daemon's "Account Unregistered" verdict and a transport failure return as the same opaque error (the unregistered special-cases require self or non-zero SCID), so a transient blip in lenient mode silently stripped all curation — the user signed a fully random ring believing it curated. Probe errors are now classified via isUnregisteredError (the repo's existing detection idiom): unregistered verdict -> unchanged (Strict errors, lenient skips); any other failure -> hard error in BOTH modes ("could not verify … — retry the send"). No in-probe retry (Keep_Connectivity heals on ~5s; retry belongs at the send layer). A daemon that rewords the verdict fails closed. Strict's transient-failure message changes from "not registered" to "could not verify" (nothing pinned the old text). O9, same surface — decoy slot capacity: a ring holds at most ringsize-2 curated decoys, but nothing checked the supplied count: valid decoys beyond capacity were probed, then silently never placed. Strict over-supply is now a hard error (pre-guarded on the supplied count before any RPC, re-checked in the validator); lenient surplus drops through the funnel with a "no decoy slot left" record. Lenient ring-2 gets the same upgrade, so the former log-only residual now gets the default-verbosity summary. The guard caught an in-repo instance: the A2 finalization fixture supplied 8 Strict decoys at ring 8; two validated and were never placed — it now supplies exactly ring-2. Two hardenings on the same surface: - Lenient drops are never invisible: all four drop reasons (unparseable / own address / duplicate / unregistered verdict) funnel through one recorder — a per-decoy V(1) log and a default-verbosity reduced-curation summary before signing. Recording only the daemon-verdict class would keep the bug alive for the wallet-side classes (an all-duplicate ambient list from the hardcoded-lenient DEROFDN#23 CLI signs a random ring with zero signal on a healthy chain). TRUST NOTE on RingPreference: a malicious daemon can still veto lenient curation by lying "unregistered" — visible, not preventable wallet-side (it already controls random member selection); Strict is the fail-closed mode. - Probe cost bounded and flat: registration verdicts are memoized per build (canonical-base-address key, shared by both call sites) — one probe per distinct decoy per build instead of O(decoys) per pass under transfer_mutex. Sound: registration is permanent; a stale unregistered verdict only defers the decoy to the next send. PreferredDecoys is capped at 256 (2x max ringsize) — hard error in both modes; list length is caller cost, not decoy quality. Tests, each red pre-fix: curated_ring2_guard_test (offline: Strict garbage at ring 2 passed every validation pre-fix); curated_probe_classification_test (sim; client websocket killed so IsDaemonOnline() stays true and the failure lands inside the probe's RPC — pre-fix lenient returned curated=0, err=nil); curated_slot_cap_test (offline, memo-seeded: lenient surplus records, Strict surplus errors at guard and validator); curated_drop_signal_test (offline: all three wallet-side drops recorded with reasons, no double-count across passes, Strict records nothing); rpc_call_timeout_test gains the classification leg (a hung daemon's probe deadline -> "could not verify", never a silent drop). Keep_Connectivity deliberately not started in the probe test (no quit path). RingPreference / curatedRingCandidates docs updated where the fixes falsified them. Test_Payload_TX / Test_Creation_TX_morecheck fail identically at base (pre-existing), as does attribution_self_behavior_test.go's gofmt drift.
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Description
This PR adds documentation to the simulator CLI output to help developers understand and access the genesis wallet.
Problem:
When running the simulator in mainnet mode (default), users couldn't easily identify:
Solution:
This helps developers understand the simulator's wallet setup and access the funded genesis wallet to perform transfers and tests.
Type of change:
Which part is impacted:
Checklist:
License:
I am contributing & releasing the code under DERO Research License.