Pr/blocktime-check#4
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This was referenced Jun 23, 2026
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…anon Addresses the DEROFDN#22 review: - curatedRingCandidates canonicalizes the sender, recipient, and every preferred decoy to its base address before the distinctness/dedup checks, and the ring carries the base form. A ring member is identified by its pubkey, not its address string, so an integrated/payment-id encoding of an account already in the ring (sender, recipient, or another decoy) no longer slips the string-keyed checks and lands a duplicate pubkey that consensus rejects AFTER signing. Test_CuratedRing_AltEncoding_NoDuplicate_A2 covers recipient / sender / decoy-vs-decoy / cross-network, each mutation-proven. (review #1) - Anonymous attribution now fails closed at ring size < 4 (no decoy slot) instead of silently falling through to honest attribution. (review DEROFDN#8) - Port the unverified-attribution export scrub + self-send flag into the decode arms (this stack predates it); behavioral scrub test + an honest-byte guard that asserts honest mode writes the receiver slot (closes the grep guard's reassignment blind spot). (review DEROFDN#3, DEROFDN#9) The bounds guard is sufficient for the same reason as DEROFDN#21: bad ring keys panic at NewAddress before the Publickeylist rebuild, so len==RingSize. (review DEROFDN#4)
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…etroactive scrub (review #1/DEROFDN#4/DEROFDN#5/DEROFDN#6) DEROFDN#6 — Entry.String() printed "Sender: %s" unconditionally: a scrubbed ring>2 transfer rendered a bare "Sender: " line that reads as a decode bug — the exact "looks broken" outcome the design meant to avoid, contradicting the truth table documented on SenderVerified in the same file. The Sender line now follows the table: verified -> the address; scrubbed (no payload error) -> "unknown (unverifiable, ring size N)"; decode failure -> a distinct "unknown (payload decode failed)". Blast radius: two CLI debug dumps (%+v in show_transfers error paths); JSON marshalling untouched. Pinned by rpc/wallet_rpc_test.go (offline, sub-second): all three arms, plus forbids the bare line and scrub/decode-failure conflation. DEROFDN#4/DEROFDN#5 — the non-retroactive caveat lived only in commit 4e9de56's message. Now in the docs consumers read: SenderVerified's doc comment states the scrub is decode-time only (pre-upgrade entries keep their guessed Sender and unscrubbed Data[0], served as-is by Get_Transfers; the guarantee holds only for blocks decoded post-upgrade), the upgrade is one-way for the privacy property, and pre-upgrade entries deserialize SenderVerified=false, RingSize=0 — indistinguishable from a scrub without re-decoding, so a migration MUST re-derive RingSize from chain data (a read-path scrub keyed on persisted fields would wrongly blank the wallet's own verified sends — why the rescan is a follow-up, not this commit). RingSize's doc gains the "0 = pre-upgrade/unknown, not a real ring" note; the GetTransfers handler doc points RPC consumers at the contract. #1 hardening — both decode arms bounded sender_idx against Statement.RingSize while indexing Statement.Publickeylist. Safe today (len(Publickeylist)==RingSize holds at that point), but the guard now bounds against the slice actually indexed, so it survives any future break of that invariant. Existing pins green: the scrub-behavior sim test and the source-grep guard (its regexes key on the scrub lines, untouched here).
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DOS prevention.
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Im am contributing & releasing the code under DERO Research License (which can be found here).