This PR contains the following updates:
| Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [Adoption](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [Passing](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| [google.golang.org/grpc](https://redirect.github.com/grpc/grpc-go) | `v1.82.0` → `v1.82.1` |  |  |  |  |
---
> [!WARNING]
> Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the [Dependency Dashboard](../issues/33469) for more information.
---
### gRPC-Go has an authorization bypass via missing leading slash in :path
[CVE-2026-33186](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33186) / [GHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3)
<details>
<summary>More information</summary>
#### Details
##### Impact
_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_
It is an **Authorization Bypass** resulting from **Improper Input Validation** of the HTTP/2 `:path` pseudo-header.
The gRPC-Go server was too lenient in its routing logic, accepting requests where the `:path` omitted the mandatory leading slash (e.g., `Service/Method` instead of `/Service/Method`). While the server successfully routed these requests to the correct handler, authorization interceptors (including the official `grpc/authz` package) evaluated the raw, non-canonical path string. Consequently, "deny" rules defined using canonical paths (starting with `/`) failed to match the incoming request, allowing it to bypass the policy if a fallback "allow" rule was present.
**Who is impacted?**
This affects gRPC-Go servers that meet both of the following criteria:
1. They use path-based authorization interceptors, such as the official RBAC implementation in `google.golang.org/grpc/authz` or custom interceptors relying on `info.FullMethod` or `grpc.Method(ctx)`.
2. Their security policy contains specific "deny" rules for canonical paths but allows other requests by default (a fallback "allow" rule).
The vulnerability is exploitable by an attacker who can send raw HTTP/2 frames with malformed `:path` headers directly to the gRPC server.
##### Patches
_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_
Yes, the issue has been patched. The fix ensures that any request with a `:path` that does not start with a leading slash is immediately rejected with a `codes.Unimplemented` error, preventing it from reaching authorization interceptors or handlers with a non-canonical path string.
Users should upgrade to the following versions (or newer):
* **v1.79.3**
* The latest **master** branch.
It is recommended that all users employing path-based authorization (especially `grpc/authz`) upgrade as soon as the patch is available in a tagged release.
##### Workarounds
_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_
While upgrading is the most secure and recommended path, users can mitigate the vulnerability using one of the following methods:
##### 1. Use a Validating Interceptor (Recommended Mitigation)
Add an "outermost" interceptor to your server that validates the path before any other authorization logic runs:
```go
func pathValidationInterceptor(ctx context.Context, req any, info *grpc.UnaryServerInfo, handler grpc.UnaryHandler) (any, error) {
if info.FullMethod == "" || info.FullMethod[0] != '/' {
return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Unimplemented, "malformed method name")
}
return handler(ctx, req)
}
// Ensure this is the FIRST interceptor in your chain
s := grpc.NewServer(
grpc.ChainUnaryInterceptor(pathValidationInterceptor, authzInterceptor),
)
```
##### 2. Infrastructure-Level Normalization
If your gRPC server is behind a reverse proxy or load balancer (such as Envoy, NGINX, or an L7 Cloud Load Balancer), ensure it is configured to enforce strict HTTP/2 compliance for pseudo-headers and reject or normalize requests where the `:path` header does not start with a leading slash.
##### 3. Policy Hardening
Switch to a "default deny" posture in your authorization policies (explicitly listing all allowed paths and denying everything else) to reduce the risk of bypasses via malformed inputs.
#### Severity
- CVSS Score: 9.1 / 10 (Critical)
- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N`
#### References
- [https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/security/advisories/GHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3](https://redirect.github.com/grpc/grpc-go/security/advisories/GHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3)
- [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33186](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33186)
- [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3)
This data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>
---
### gRPC-Go: xDS RBAC and HTTP/2 Vulnerabilities
[GHSA-hrxh-6v49-42gf](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-hrxh-6v49-42gf)
<details>
<summary>More information</summary>
#### Details
Multiple security vulnerabilities have been identified and addressed in grpc-go affecting the xDS RBAC authorization engine (internal/xds/rbac) and the HTTP/2 transport server implementation (internal/transport). These vulnerabilities could result in:
- Authorization Bypass (Fail-Open) when translating xDS RBAC policies containing `Metadata` or `RequestedServerName` fields.
- Denial of Service (High CPU Consumption) due to an HTTP/2 Rapid Reset mitigation bypass during client-initiated stream resets.
- Denial of Service (Server Panic) when parsing crafted xDS RBAC policies containing `NOT` rules around unsupported fields.
##### Impact
_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_
##### xDS RBAC Authorization Bypass via `Metadata` & `RequestedServerName` matchers
- Affected Component: xDS RBAC
- Impact: When building policy matchers for gRPC RBAC from xDS configurations, unsupported `permission` and `principal` rules (specifically `Metadata` and `RequestedServerName`) were silently ignored and treated as no-ops.
- If an authorization policy relied purely on these matchers for access control, treating those rules as no-ops effectively removed the restrictions.
- If these unsupported rules were nested inside logical `NOT` rules (`Permission_NotRule` / `Principal_NotId`) or multi-condition `OR/AND` rules, silently dropping them changed the boolean logic flow of the authorization engine.
As a result, policy evaluation decisions could fail open, allowing unauthorized clients to access protected gRPC services or resources.
##### HTTP/2 Rapid Reset Mitigation Bypass / Denial of Service via Stream Aborts
- Affected Component: HTTP/2 transport
- Impact: Earlier mitigations in grpc-go for HTTP/2 Rapid Reset only applied threshold checks to items that directly resulted in control frames being written back to the wire, such as `SETTINGS` ACKs or server-initiated `RST_STREAM`s.
When a client initiated a rapid flood of stream creation (`HEADERS`) immediately followed by stream termination `RST_STREAM`, items queued up in the control buffer without counting against the transport response frame threshold. An attacker can repeatedly trigger this flood sequence to bypass reader blocking, resulting in high CPU usage, and Denial of Service (DoS).
##### Denial of Service (Panic) in xDS RBAC Engine via Unsupported Fields inside NOT Rules
- Affected Component: xDS RBAC
- Impact: The xDS RBAC policy translators recursively generate matchers for nested rules. When a `NOT` rule wrapped an unsupported or unhandled field (such as `SourcedMetadata`), the recursive step returned an empty matcher. This could result in a runtime panic when the RBAC engine attempts to authorize an incoming request.
An attacker or misconfigured/malicious xDS management server delivering an LDS/RDS update containing a `NOT` rule around an unhandled field causes the gRPC server process to crash immediately (CWE-248 / Denial of Service).
##### Patches
_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_
All three issues have been fixed in `master` and will be released in 1.82.1 shortly.
##### Workarounds
_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_
If upgrading grpc-go immediately is not possible, apply the following workarounds based on your deployment architecture:
* For xDS RBAC Vulnerabilities & Panics: Ensure that upstream xDS management servers do not push RBAC policies containing `Metadata`, `RequestedServerName`, or `NOT` rules wrapping unsupported fields (such as `SourcedMetadata`) to grpc-go servers.
* For HTTP/2 Rapid Reset DOS: Configure upstream reverse proxies or load balancers (such as Envoy) with strict HTTP/2 `max_concurrent_streams` limits and active rate limiting on `RST_STREAM` frequency per connection.
##### Severity
| Vulnerability | Qualitative Severity | Approximate CVSS v3.1 Score | Primary Impact |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **xDS RBAC Authorization Bypass** | **High** | `8.2` | Unauthorized Access / Fail-Open |
| **HTTP/2 Rapid Reset DOS Bypass** | **High** | `7.5` | High CPU Consumption / Denial of Service |
| **xDS RBAC Engine Server Panic** | **Medium** | `5.9` | Process Crash / Denial of Service |
#### Severity
- CVSS Score: 8.8 / 10 (High)
- Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`
#### References
- [https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/security/advisories/GHSA-hrxh-6v49-42gf](https://redirect.github.com/grpc/grpc-go/security/advisories/GHSA-hrxh-6v49-42gf)
- [https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/pull/9236](https://redirect.github.com/grpc/grpc-go/pull/9236)
- [https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/commit/4ea465d4ab98013f72a142fe0fc89c19770b2935](https://redirect.github.com/grpc/grpc-go/commit/4ea465d4ab98013f72a142fe0fc89c19770b2935)
- [https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/releases/tag/v1.82.1](https://redirect.github.com/grpc/grpc-go/releases/tag/v1.82.1)
- [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hrxh-6v49-42gf](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-hrxh-6v49-42gf)
This data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-hrxh-6v49-42gf) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>
---
### Release Notes
<details>
<summary>grpc/grpc-go (google.golang.org/grpc)</summary>
### [`v1.82.1`](https://redirect.github.com/grpc/grpc-go/releases/tag/v1.82.1): Release 1.82.1
[Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/grpc/grpc-go/compare/v1.82.0...v1.82.1)
### Security
- server: Stop reading from the connection when flooded by HTTP/2 frames. The default value for this limit is 100 frames, excluding DATA and HEADERS, and may be changed by setting environment variable `GRPC_GO_EXPERIMENTAL_CONTROL_BUFFER_THROTTLE_LIMIT`.
- xds/rbac: Support `Metadata` and `RequestedServerName` permissions matcher fields. If present in a DENY rule, previously these would be ignored and fail-open.
- xds/rbac: Fix panic when parsing unsupported fields in `NotRule`/`NotId` permissions.
- xds/rbac: Support the deprecated `source_ip` principal identifier by treating it as equivalent to `direct_remote_ip`.
</details>
---
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Co-authored-by: rdesgroppes <rdesgroppes@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: regis.desgroppes <regis.desgroppes@datadoghq.com>
