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r0r0x-xx edited this page Jul 30, 2026 · 3 revisions

PWNCUBE

A hardware-based CubeSat platform for aerospace cybersecurity research and training.

PWNCUBE is developed by PWNSAT in partnership with ElectronicCats. It is a deliberate port of FlatSat's protocol, architecture, and vulnerability catalog onto real, different flight-computer hardware — a dual-core Rockchip RV1106 (Cortex-A7 running Linux + a RISC-V coprocessor running RT-Thread) — to demonstrate that the same class of satellite command-and-control vulnerabilities is not an artifact of one specific board, but reproduces faithfully across genuinely different hardware.

Why this exists

Modern small satellites increasingly run on commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and standardized protocols (CCSDS Space Packet Protocol) instead of bespoke, obscure flight software. That shift trades "security by obscurity" for a much larger, much more familiar attack surface — the same one embedded and IoT security researchers already know how to exploit. PWNCUBE (and its sibling project FlatSat) exist to make that attack surface concrete, physical, and safe to practice against.

Quick specs

SoC Rockchip RV1106 — Cortex-A7 (Linux) + RISC-V SCR1 (RT-Thread), dual-core AMP
Radios 2x Semtech SX1262 (LoRa), SPI, owned by the RISC-V core
Sensors BME280 (temp/pressure/humidity) + ICM-42670 (6-axis IMU), I2C0
GPS Real u-blox NEO-6M receiver, UART0
Protocol CCSDS Space Packet Protocol — identical framing to FlatSat
Uplink 918 MHz, LoRa SF7/BW250/CR4:5
Downlink 916 MHz, LoRa SF7/BW250/CR4:5
Encryption None by default (plaintext telemetry)
Command link USB gadget console (vendor-specific bulk, VID:PID 2207:0011) — no external UART/Ethernet

Start here

  • Getting Started — build the firmware from source and flash a board, from zero.
  • Hardware Anatomy — physical layout, wiring, the dual-core architecture, USB topology.
  • Firmware Architecture — how the two cores split responsibilities, boot sequence, IPC.
  • CCSDS / Space Packet Protocol — the command protocol itself, packet format, APID map.
  • Attack Vectors — PWNCUBE inherits FlatSat's documented vulnerability catalog (30+ findings); 8 of these are built into standalone, hardware-validated attack scripts covering every major exploitation class.
  • Ground Station — PWNSAT-C3, the dual-platform ground station used to operate PWNCUBE (USB + RF). Full documentation coming soon.

Repository layout

This repository's code lives in two top-level folders:

Folder What's in it
Firmware/ The complete RV1106 SDK — clone, build, flash.
Case/ 3D-printable enclosure files.

The 8 hardware-validated attack scripts (USB and real RF, fully documented, no external dependencies) live in a companion Attacks/ repository, to be published separately.

Relationship to FlatSat

FlatSat PWNCUBE
MCU/SoC RP2040, bare-metal RV1106 — Cortex-A7 (Linux) + RISC-V (RT-Thread), dual-core
Radios 2x SX1262, driven directly 2x SX1262, owned by the RISC-V core, exposed to Linux over rpmsg
Protocol CCSDS SPP Identical — same header, same bit layout
Payload encryption AES-128-ECB, static key, by default None by default (plaintext)
RF parameters 918/916 MHz, SF7/BW250/CR4:5 Identical
Command transport USB CDC (real serial port to an external host) Internal rpmsg between two cores of the same chip, bridged to a USB gadget console for external access
GPS Real NEO-6M Real NEO-6M (added later in this project's timeline) + a deliberately unauthenticated debug-injection hook
Ground-station auth handshake Yes (XOR against a static key) Yes (same XOR scheme, same finding)

Same protocol, same bug classes, different silicon — that pairing is the point.

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