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Authority Candidates And Source Limits

sergio velderrain edited this page Nov 9, 2026 · 1 revision

Authority Candidates And Source Limits

The following comparisons are read-only research, not a selection, host capability check, deployment plan, or approval to transmit state to any third party.

Candidate Documented properties Unresolved proof boundary
Protected local journal Linux rename atomically replaces an existing pathname; fsync says a separate directory sync is needed for the directory entry. Windows FlushFileBuffers flushes a file's buffers. These operations do not detect a valid older host-state image. Actual filesystem, storage, crash-recovery, and custody guarantees need host-specific proof.
Protected journal plus physical-host TPM counter TPM tool documentation describes an eight-byte counter index modified through increment, and an authorized operation can delete an index. Physical TPM identity, ownership, authorization, command availability, resource limits, counter lifecycle, journal-digest binding, migration, and crash recovery are unproven. A guest vTPM or any TPM state restored with the journal is not automatically independent.
Independently operated transactional authority As an example, etcd documents durable atomic KV transactions and linearizable reads by default. Its own snapshot can restore older data, so its availability or a larger revision alone is not anti-rollback proof. Independent custody, recovery, identity, network authorization, and confidentiality remain unproven.
Retained immutable object versions As an example, S3 Object Lock protects specified object versions during their retention or hold. New versions and delete markers can still be added; retention alone does not establish the latest trusted head. No cloud account, service, or data transfer is assumed or authorized.

Any eventual backend must meet the same candidate authority contract:

  1. A verified read binds the authority identity and epoch, VM UUID, generation, complete protected state, and committed receipt history. Missing state, unverifiable origin, an unexpected epoch, or an unavailable authority is not genesis and remains UNKNOWN.
  2. Before dispatch, establish that the exact request remains recoverable across host-storage rollback through independently durable intent or a proven equivalent authority-enumeration and fencing mechanism. Ambiguous preparation is UNKNOWN, not permission to dispatch.
  3. A compare-and-commit binds the expected head and a unique transaction ID to the complete proposed transition. It can report committed only after the state and any terminal receipt are durably and authentically bound. A definite conflict changes no state for that invocation; an ambiguous response is UNKNOWN. The UUID mutation lock remains necessary and is not a third-party VirtualBox interlock.
  4. Reconciliation of an ambiguous transaction verifies the exact transaction ID and contents against trustworthy current state or retained committed history. A retry or a later conflicting request does not establish that the earlier request failed. Reusing an ID for different contents is rejected, and history needed to settle an unresolved transaction cannot be silently discarded.

Microsoft documents that ReplaceFileW does not support REPLACEFILE_WRITE_THROUGH; some failure cases may leave the replaced pathname absent or renamed. Flags that ignore ACL merge errors can also report success without preserving ACLs. Therefore neither the old pathname nor its custody may be assumed after an error or ignored ACL failure. MoveFileExW documents cross-volume moves as copy/delete operations; do not equate those with same-volume atomic replacement. The exact Windows durable commit protocol remains a feasibility gate.

Windows TPM Base Services restricts TPM commands; on Windows 10 version 1809 and later the TPM 2.0 allowlist is fixed in the driver. This source does not establish whether the required commands are available to the intended identity on a target host. Microsoft also says a successful Tbsip_Submit_Command submission can still contain a TPM failure response. Both layers must be checked; do not change platform policy or retry an uncertain increment blindly. A TPM counter alone does not authenticate a journal's contents.

etcd's restore procedure can restore a snapshot with older application data and optionally bump the store revision. A higher revision therefore cannot prove that pending obligations or the latest accepted state survived. Likewise, S3 If-None-Match can succeed when a versioned object's current version is a delete marker; that success is not proof of baseline-free genesis. Both cases require independently verified continuity or remain UNKNOWN.

An authority write or TPM command whose response is lost may have taken effect. Recover by checking the independently authenticated current state and the exact intended transaction, rather than assuming failure or issuing a non-idempotent increment again. The required reconciliation, authority-restore detection, and multiple-host coordination are unproven; an ambiguous result cannot release a success receipt.

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