fix: restrict forwarded IP trust - #4700
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The built-in nginx previously trusted X-Forwarded-For from every IPv4 and IPv6 peer whenever Weblate proxy handling was enabled. A client able to reach the container directly could therefore choose the address recorded by nginx and consumed by Weblate security controls. Require operators to identify trusted proxy addresses, resolve the chain in nginx so access logs retain the real client IP, and forward one normalized address to Weblate at offset zero. This preserves useful logging while preventing the application from reinterpreting an attacker-controlled chain.
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Documentation companion in WeblateOrg/weblate#21168 |
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The built-in nginx previously trusted X-Forwarded-For from every IPv4 and IPv6 peer whenever Weblate proxy handling was enabled. A client able to reach the container directly could therefore choose the address recorded by nginx and consumed by Weblate security controls.
Require operators to identify trusted proxy addresses, resolve the chain in nginx so access logs retain the real client IP, and forward one normalized address to Weblate at offset zero. This preserves useful logging while preventing the application from reinterpreting an attacker-controlled chain.