github.com/faustbrian/go-http-signature v1.0.0

1.0.0 - 2026-08-25

Fixed

• Invoke comparison benchmarks directly from their owning module and resolve
  its stable root-module requirement from the current standalone source.

Changed

• Upgrade cryptography dependencies in comparison and differential modules to
  the current security-fixed release.

• Exclude intentional nested modules from root local-proxy archives so local,
  bootstrap, CI, and public module checksums describe the same source
  boundary.

• Track the pinned documentation-tool lockfile so clean CI checkouts install
  the exact validated cspell dependency.

• Reconcile standalone dependency checksums against deterministic current
  module archives so CI, local verification, and release consumers resolve
  identical content.

• Harden standalone documentation validation with deterministic spelling and
  link checks, package-specific documentation gates, and repository-local
  contributor guidance.

Fixed

• Prove escaped quoted-string scanning before repairing a following integral
  RFC 8941 Decimal, killing the previously surviving conditional mutant.

Documentation

• Link the package README to the repository-wide Golib documentation portal.

Added

• Add an auditable RFC 8941, RFC 9421, and RFC 9530 specification decision
  register with explicit compatibility and security consequences.
• Add isolated equivalent request sign-and-verify benchmarks against pinned
  yaronf/httpsign and dadrus/httpsig, with separate correctness proof,
  repeated samples, environment capture, and documented policy-cost
  differences.
• Convert Structured Fields dependency panics on hostile extension syntax into
  typed parse failures across signature, digest, and canonicalization entry
  points.
• Combine multiple Structured Field lines with the RFC-mandated comma and space
  before parsing, reject leading horizontal tabs outside RFC 8941
  optional-whitespace positions, and retain the required fractional zero when
  canonicalizing integral Decimal values.
• Add isolated compatibility RoundTripper and verification middleware seams
  for Cavage drafts, AWS SigV4, OAuth 1.0, and explicitly named vendor schemes;
  outbound callbacks cannot replace request identity or RFC 9421 signature
  fields, and inbound callback mutations cannot reach later RFC verification.
• Add streaming response digest/signature trailers with canonical application
  declarations, bounded authenticated late-trailer support, fail-closed
  protocol constraints, and client-side verification that waits for EOF before
  releasing response content.
• Make buffered response signing inherit outer ordinary headers with normal
  handler replacement semantics and reject handler-managed transfer or trailer
  framing, protocol switching, and successful CONNECT before signing.
• Fail streaming adapters on zero-progress body readers and reject protocol
  switching where digest/signature trailers cannot complete.
• Preserve application trailer values populated at EOF across buffered request
  digest generation and verification without losing caller-declared framing.
• Prevent streaming request downgrade by forcing supported HTTP/1 attempts to
  chunk even empty bodies, preserving and authenticating only predeclared EOF
  trailers, rejecting early responses and CONNECT, and refusing profiles that
  cover transport-dependent connection or framing fields.
• Clear handler-injected protected response trailers on every late streaming
  failure, omit mutable TLS state from verification callback snapshots, and
  report signed buffered-response short, invalid, or failed writes once through
  a redacted late diagnostic path.
• Add deterministic RFC 9530 SHA-256 and SHA-512 integrity-field generation,
  strict byte-sequence parsing, immutable ordered values, and policy-selected
  constant-time verification.
• Add ordered RFC 9530 integrity-preference parsing and serialization with
  strict integer weights, duplicate rejection, and unknown-algorithm retention.
• Add explicit and default-bounded parser resource limits across signature,
  digest, and negotiation fields.
• Bound complete signature-base canonicalization by default and permit a
  stricter per-message ceiling.
• Bind transport-owned Host, content-length, transfer-encoding, trailer, and
  connection components to deterministic net/http wire state, including
  method- and status-sensitive zero-length request and response emission,
  exact transfer-coding spelling and order, and response body-probe ambiguity,
  with an explicit received-versus-Response.Write transport mode that rejects
  ambiguous zero-value contexts, unavailable inbound trailer identity, and
  stale outbound header aliases.
• Reject noncanonical or multi-line Cookie coverage and require binary wrapping
  for multiple Set-Cookie field lines to prevent transformation collisions.
• Add strict ordered parsing for Signature-Input and Signature, rejecting
  duplicate labels, wrong Structured Fields member types, duplicate covered
  component identifiers, and RFC 9651-only values outside RFC 8941.
• Preserve RFC 8941 Item parameters on Signature, Content-Digest, and
  Repr-Digest members instead of rejecting legal extensions.
• Add ordered Accept-Signature parsing and serialization with distinct
  Boolean creation and expiration request semantics.
• Add request signature-base construction for registered derived components,
  header and trailer selection, field combination, explicit external request
  context, request-response component binding, and Structured Fields modes.
• Add all active IANA signature algorithms with exact RFC encodings, strict key
  compatibility, Go-managed cryptographically secure RSA-PSS and ECDSA
  randomness, cancellation, and secret-safe typed verification failures;
  retain the former caller-random inputs as ignored compatibility parameters so
  weak or blocking readers cannot affect signing.
• Add explicit verification profiles with mandatory coverage, parameter,
  algorithm, time, tag, key-resolution, cache-freshness, and nonce policy.
• Reject zero-length verification-key validity windows even when configured
  clock skew would otherwise make the instant appear acceptable.
• Add explicit signing profiles and context-bounded rotating-key providers that
  create deterministic matching field pairs without mutating messages or
  consuming bodies.
• Add profile-level mandatory trusted external request context that fails
  before signing-provider or verification-resolver access.
• Reject trusted external-origin contexts whose scheme or authority
  contradicts an absolute-form request target.
• Preserve double-slash origin-form paths and reject request-target fragments,
  user information, opaque targets, and absolute targets without authority.
• Reconstruct authority-form and asterisk-form target URIs with an empty
  path/query while retaining the normalized / value for @path, and reject
  special forms used with the wrong method.
• Normalize authority ports numerically so leading-zero default ports are
  omitted and other ports have a stable decimal representation.
• Reject authority values containing query, fragment, or opaque URI data.
• Add explicit outbound signing round-tripper and inbound verification
  middleware adapters with caller-owned label selection, trusted external
  request context, failure mapping, existing-field policy, and body ownership.
• Add bounded fail-closed response-signing middleware and a response-verifying
  round-tripper with request-response binding, authenticated digest coverage,
  callback isolation, transparent-decompression rejection, and replayable
  verified bodies; buffered digest and trailer paths reject 101 and successful
  CONNECT before reading opaque protocol or tunnel bytes.
• Match body suppression for HEAD, 204, 205, and 304 when signing responses,
  including rejecting RFC-forbidden 205 handler content and digesting only
  content actually emitted.
• Add explicit bounded Content-Digest round-tripper and verification
  middleware with caller-body closure, replayable clones, and no partial
  delegation after size or digest failure.
• Add a bounded streaming request adapter that computes Content-Digest while
  the transport reads, then signs the declared digest trailer at EOF without
  falsely advertising replayability.
• Add eager inbound trailer verification that waits for EOF, checks the
  bounded content digest, authenticates a profile-required trailer component,
  and only then delegates a replayable body.
• Fail buffered body processing closed when releasing caller-owned body
  resources fails, without exposing the underlying close error.
• Add an atomic bounded process-local replay store and a context-aware durable
  replay adapter contract with fail-closed capacity and backend semantics.
• Pin the RFC texts, errata records, and relevant IANA registries with explicit
  decisions for every currently listed erratum.

Changed

• Publish the module from its standalone github.com/faustbrian/go-http-signature identity while preserving its documented API and behavior.
• Breaking: ResponseSigningMiddlewareConfig.ReportError is now required.
  Callers must provide a concurrency-safe callback that records redacted late
  output failures; MapError remains responsible only for failures that can be
  mapped before response commitment.

Release integrity

• Source commit: 490c6455b1921d63bfd690b6b4c5b70051e15255
• Exact-head CI: https://github.com/faustbrian/go-http-signature/actions/runs/32907455679
• Release dry-run: urn:sha256:325c0eb64ec91796126dd325279c8b877407498b397b804e336205fb964939a7
• Assets include a CycloneDX SBOM, SLSA v1 in-toto provenance, and SSH-signed checksums.

Verify the checksum attestation with:

`ssh-keygen -Y verify -f A...