v0.44.1: our pinned PyJWT and urllib3 clear sixteen advisories

Our pinned PyJWT and urllib3 clear sixteen advisories.
Sixteen advisories published on 2026-09-29 and 2026-09-30, and raised on this repository on 2026-10-02, cover two packages Proximo's own artifacts pin: thirteen against PyJWT (one critical, five high) and three against urllib3 (two high). The lock, both hash-pinned requirements/*.txt exports, the container image and the SBOM move from pyjwt==2.13.0 to 2.15.0 and from urllib3==2.7.0 to 2.8.0. No other package moved. The wheel and sdist hashes match PyPI's own listing for both releases, and pip-audit reports the sixteen on the old pins and nothing on the new ones.

PyJWT reaches Proximo two ways: through mcp, and through the optional A2A face's card signing (a2a/signing.py). The signing path accepts ES256 only, which already refused the HMAC key-confusion class several of these advisories describe, but the parser-level ones (a deeply nested header raising RecursionError before any key is consulted) sit in front of that allowlist, so an A2A card from an untrusted peer could reach them. tests/test_a2a_signing.py signs and verifies with the real library, no mocks, and passes on 2.15.0. urllib3 is not in the runtime install at all: it reaches the dev export only, through requests.

Nothing an adopter pinned changes. Neither package is named in pyproject.toml, so a fresh pip install already resolved the current releases. The pins that were stale were ours: the lock, and the image built from it.

The image build actions move to their current releases.
docker/setup-buildx-action 4.4.1, docker/setup-qemu-action 4.4.0 and docker/build-push-action 7.4.0, each pinned by commit sha with the exact version in the comment. build-push-action had been commented # v7, a moving major that hid which release the sha was; it now names one. All three shas were dereferenced against the upstream tags before this shipped.

Where to read more

• The two-deployment trust model, and the honest scope notes saying what does not hold: SECURITY.md
• Wiring it into an MCP client, least-privilege tokens, pinning the tool surface: docs/SETUP.md
• Every tool, per plane: docs/TOOLS.md
• Verifying the image signature, the SBOM and the provenance yourself: VERIFY.md
• Full change detail: CHANGELOG.md

Install: uvx proximo-proxmox · pip install proximo-proxmox · ghcr.io/john-broadway/proximo:0.44.1