feat(project-profiling): vuln reporting protocol [CM-1331]

backend/src/osspckgs/migrations/V1785283200__reporting_protocol.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+-- Content-keyed parse cache for declared security policies (files + linked pages),
+-- and the assembled per-repo reporting protocol. See ADR-0010 addendum.
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS security_policy_parses (
+    blob_oid       TEXT PRIMARY KEY, -- git blob oid for files; sha256 of extracted text for linked pages
+    source_kind    TEXT NOT NULL,    -- 'security-file' | 'linked-page'
+    url            TEXT,             -- linked-page rows only: the fetched URL (join key from linked_urls)
+    parser         TEXT NOT NULL,    -- 'deterministic' | 'llm'
+    parser_version INT  NOT NULL,
+    status         TEXT NOT NULL,    -- 'ok' | 'template' | 'degraded'
+    parsed         JSONB NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}',
+    linked_urls    TEXT[] NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}',
+    parsed_at      TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS security_policy_parses_linked_page_url_idx
+    ON security_policy_parses (url)
+    WHERE source_kind = 'linked-page';
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS repo_reporting_protocols (
+    repo_id      BIGINT PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES repos(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+    declared     BOOLEAN NOT NULL,
+    methods      JSONB NOT NULL DEFAULT '[]',
+    guidelines   JSONB,
+    sources      JSONB NOT NULL DEFAULT '[]',
+    assembled_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
+);

docs/adr/0010-security-contacts-worker.md

@@ -281,3 +281,108 @@ derived at read time as the band of the highest contact score, not stored.
 - **Source-format drift** — SECURITY-INSIGHTS schema versions, registry API shapes, and GitHub's
   `stats/contributors` 202-polling behavior all change over time. Extractor isolation limits blast
   radius to one source; fixture-based tests catch parser regressions.
+
+
+## Addendum (2026-07-29): Vulnerability reporting protocol
+
+Adds a sister data model answering "**how** does this project expect external vulnerability
+reporting?" per repo — distinct from security contacts, which answer *who*. The source of truth
+is what the project itself declared: security files from the enricher's `repo_well_known_files`
+inventory, the pages they link to, and the authoritative `pvr_enabled` flag. Inferred contacts
+from `security_contacts` never blend in as if declared; they appear only as clearly-labeled
+fallback when nothing was declared.
+
+### Volume and parser split (prod analysis, 2026-07-28)
+
+Of 114,045 critical GitHub repos, 10,349 (9.1%) have a security file: 10,495 files collapsing
+to 6,125 distinct blobs (top-20 shared blobs cover ~1,900 repos of boilerplate). A probe over
+all 6,120 reachable blobs showed **69.2% deterministically resolvable** (a single declared
+method, or several with exactly one preference-cued), **14% pointer-only** (the file is just a
+link to an external policy page), **21.6% with conditional routing** ("only email if a GHSA is
+not possible"), **53% with negation language** ("do NOT open a public issue"), 2.3% GitHub
+default template. Volume is not the constraint; precision is — hence **hybrid,
+deterministic-first**: the classifier fully settles clean blobs, an LLM handles the residue and
+prose fields, and a deterministic validator gates every LLM write.
+
+### Data model
+
+- **`security_policy_parses`** — content-keyed parse cache. PK `blob_oid` (git blob oid for
+  files; sha256 of the URL for linked pages, so two URLs with identical content stay
+  independently joinable from `linked_urls`), `source_kind`
+  (`security-file`/`linked-page`), `url` (linked-page rows), `parser`
+  (`deterministic`/`llm`), `parser_version`, `status` (`ok`/`template`/`degraded`), `parsed`
+  JSONB (methods + guidelines), `linked_urls`. Identical content across repos is parsed once,
+  ever; a `parser_version` bump is a targeted re-parse, not a migration.
+- **`repo_reporting_protocols`** — assembled per-repo answer. PK `repo_id`, `declared`,
+  `methods` JSONB (ordered array of `{type, status, endpoint, condition, confidence,
+  provenance}`), `guidelines` JSONB, `sources` JSONB, `assembled_at`. Method `type` ∈
+  github-pvr | email | web-form | bounty-platform | security-txt | mailing-list; `status` ∈
+  preferred | accepted | fallback | prohibited (`prohibited` captures negation language);
+  `confidence` ∈ declared | inferred. Plain upsert — fully derived and recomputable, no
+  soft delete.
+
+### Parse stage (blob-driven)
+
+`repo_well_known_files` is the work queue (live `security` rows for critical GitHub repos whose
+`blob_oid` lacks a parse at the current version); this pipeline never probes repos for files.
+Blobs are fetched once by oid through the shared GitHub gateway. The classifier (same
+windowing family as the B1 extractor) emits a `clean` verdict — single usable method, or
+exactly one preference-cued among several, no conditional language, negation on a method's own
+line marks it `prohibited` — which is stored as-is. Residue goes to the LLM; the validator
+requires every emitted endpoint to appear in the source (URLs verbatim; emails also via
+deobfuscation normalization — "security at python dot org"), valid enums, and at most one
+`preferred` — failures are stored `status='degraded'` (classifier partials, no guidelines).
+The LLM can never invent a channel. Pointer-only parses record up to 3 linked URLs; each
+linked page is fetched once per URL (SSRF-guarded: http(s) only, private/loopback/link-local
+and metadata hosts blocked, redirects revalidated per hop, body capped at 500 KB while
+streaming) and parsed as a `linked-page` row. For a pointer-only blob the file row is written
+only after every linked page has a parse row, so a transient page failure leaves the blob
+unmarked and the next daily sweep retries the whole unit. Batches are drawn in random order so
+permanently failing blobs cannot starve the queue.
+
+### Assembly
+
+Repos are re-assembled when inputs change (no protocol row, `contacts_last_refreshed` newer
+than `assembled_at`, or a newer parse for one of their blobs). Merge rules: `ok`/`template`
+parses contribute methods and guidelines with provenance — **`degraded` parses contribute
+nothing**; `pvr_enabled = true` adds a `github-pvr` method when the files are silent, and
+`pvr_enabled = false` **vetoes** a declared github-pvr method (the A2-vetoes-B1 rule applied
+to the protocol); github-pvr sentinel endpoints are rewritten per repo to
+`…/security/advisories/new`; dedup on type+endpoint; at most one `preferred`; sort preferred >
+accepted > fallback > prohibited. Only when nothing is declared: up to 3 `inferred`/`fallback`
+methods derived from live `security_contacts` (email, github-pvr, web-form channels, by score).
+Every repo in the population gets a row — `declared=false` with an empty `methods` array for
+the ~89 no-signal repos.
+
+### LLM contract
+
+Direct AWS Bedrock calls (`@aws-sdk/client-bedrock-runtime`, module-local in `llmExtract.ts`)
+— deliberately **not** the legacy class-based `LlmService` in `common_services` (class pattern
++ prompt-history DB coupling) and **not** a shared provider-agnostic lib speaking to a LiteLLM
+proxy (built during implementation, then dropped: no LiteLLM infra today; revisit if CDP
+standardizes multi-provider LLM infrastructure — schema and prompt carry over unchanged).
+Existing `CROWD_AWS_BEDROCK_ACCESS_KEY_ID`/`CROWD_AWS_BEDROCK_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` credentials;
+default `LlmModelType.CLAUDE_HAIKU_4_5` with region from `LLM_MODEL_REGION_MAP`. The JSON
+schema is embedded in the system prompt (Bedrock InvokeModel has no structured-output mode);
+`parseLlmJson` parses the answer. Missing credentials or any failure → `degraded` parse, never
+a thrown error. No prompt-history persistence.
+
+### Scheduling
+
+Own Temporal schedule `reporting-protocol-ingestion` (daily 07:00, `SKIP` overlap, 24 h
+execution timeout) inside the security-contacts worker, independent of the contacts schedule so
+a slow LLM pass never stalls contact ingestion. The workflow drains parsing first
+(`continueAsNew` while a batch parsed anything; an all-failed batch falls through to assembly
+instead of recursing — failed blobs get no row and retry on the next daily tick), then drains
+assembly. Batch sizes: 200 blobs (parse), 2,000 repos (assemble). Both activities ride the
+shared 30-minute proxy and heartbeat on a fixed 30 s cadence under its 2-minute
+`heartbeatTimeout`.
+
+### Deferred
+
+Other interaction-profile domains (contribution intake, governance, maintainer roster,
+communication channels, code of conduct — the content-keyed cache and section pattern extend
+to them); org-level `.github` default files (GitHub serves them for repos without their own
+SECURITY.md; the inventory doesn't capture them — measure the gap first); non-GitHub declared
+parsing (no file inventory; such repos assemble as `declared=false` + inferred fallback); API
+exposure on the akrites endpoints.

services/apps/packages_worker/package.json

@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@
     "@crowd/slack": "workspace:*",
     "@crowd/types": "workspace:*",
     "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.3.216",
+    "@aws-sdk/client-bedrock-runtime": "^3.572.0",
     "@dsnp/parquetjs": "^1.7.0",
     "@google-cloud/bigquery": "^8.3.1",
     "@google-cloud/storage": "7.19.0",

services/apps/packages_worker/src/activities.ts

@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ export { processRubyGemsCoreBatch, processRubyGemsCriticalBatch } from './rubyge
 export {
   processSecurityContactsBatch,
   ingestSecurityContactsForPurlActivity,
+  runProtocolParseBatch,
+  runProtocolAssembleBatch,
 } from './security-contacts/activities'
 export {
   blastRadiusStart,

services/apps/packages_worker/src/bin/security-contacts-worker.ts

@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
+import { scheduleReportingProtocolIngestion } from '../security-contacts/protocol/schedule'
 import { scheduleSecurityContactsIngestion } from '../security-contacts/schedule'
 import { svc } from '../service'
 
 setImmediate(async () => {
   await svc.init()
   await scheduleSecurityContactsIngestion()
+  await scheduleReportingProtocolIngestion()
   await svc.start()
 })

services/apps/packages_worker/src/config.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+import { LlmModelType } from '@crowd/types'
+
 function requireEnv(name: string): string {
   const val = process.env[name]
   if (!val) throw new Error(`Missing required environment variable: ${name}`)
@@ -119,3 +121,17 @@ export function getDockerhubConfig() {
     idleSleepSec: requireEnvInt('DOCKERHUB_IDLE_SLEEP_SEC'),
   }
 }
+
+export function getReportingProtocolConfig() {
+  return {
+    parseBatchSize: parseInt(process.env.REPORTING_PROTOCOL_PARSE_BATCH_SIZE ?? '200', 10),
+    assembleBatchSize: parseInt(process.env.REPORTING_PROTOCOL_ASSEMBLE_BATCH_SIZE ?? '2000', 10),
+    concurrency: parseInt(process.env.REPORTING_PROTOCOL_CONCURRENCY ?? '10', 10),
+    fetchTimeoutMs: parseInt(process.env.REPORTING_PROTOCOL_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS ?? '15000', 10),
+    llmModelId: process.env.REPORTING_PROTOCOL_LLM_MODEL_ID ?? LlmModelType.CLAUDE_HAIKU_4_5,
+    llmTimeoutMs: parseInt(process.env.REPORTING_PROTOCOL_LLM_TIMEOUT_MS ?? '60000', 10),
+    llmConcurrency: parseInt(process.env.REPORTING_PROTOCOL_LLM_CONCURRENCY ?? '4', 10),
+    llmAccessKeyId: process.env.CROWD_AWS_BEDROCK_ACCESS_KEY_ID,
+    llmSecretAccessKey: process.env.CROWD_AWS_BEDROCK_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY,
+  }
+}

services/apps/packages_worker/src/security-contacts/activities.ts

@@ -1,10 +1,18 @@
+import { heartbeat } from '@temporalio/activity'
+
 import { getServiceChildLogger } from '@crowd/logging'
 
-import { getSecurityContactsConfig } from '../config'
+import { getReportingProtocolConfig, getSecurityContactsConfig } from '../config'
 import { getCdpDb, getPackagesDb } from '../db'
 
+import { githubApiGet } from './githubToken'
 import { IngestSingleResult, ingestSecurityContactsForPurl } from './ingestSingle'
 import { BatchResult, processBatch } from './processBatch'
+import { runAssembleStage } from './protocol/assembleStage'
+import { fetchLinkedPage } from './protocol/fetchContent'
+import { llmExtractProtocol } from './protocol/llmExtract'
+import { runParseStage } from './protocol/parseStage'
+import { AssembleStageResult, ParseStageResult } from './protocol/types'
 
 const log = getServiceChildLogger('security-contacts-activity')
 
@@ -29,3 +37,42 @@ export async function ingestSecurityContactsForPurlActivity(
   log.info({ purl, ...result }, 'On-demand security contacts ingest activity complete')
   return result
 }
+
+// Fixed-cadence heartbeat, same rationale as processBatch.ts: a slow blob (LLM call) can
+// outlast the 2-minute heartbeatTimeout on the shared activity proxy.
+async function withHeartbeat<T>(fn: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
+  const heartbeatTimer = setInterval(() => {
+    try {
+      heartbeat()
+    } catch (err) {
+      log.warn({ errMsg: (err as Error).message }, 'Heartbeat failed')
+    }
+  }, 30_000)
+  try {
+    return await fn()
+  } finally {
+    clearInterval(heartbeatTimer)
+  }
+}
+
+export async function runProtocolParseBatch(): Promise<ParseStageResult> {
+  const cfg = getReportingProtocolConfig()
+  const qx = await getPackagesDb()
+  const result = await withHeartbeat(() =>
+    runParseStage(
+      qx,
+      { githubGet: githubApiGet, fetchPage: fetchLinkedPage, llmExtract: llmExtractProtocol },
+      cfg,
+    ),
+  )
+  log.info({ ...result }, 'Reporting protocol parse batch activity complete')
+  return result
+}
+
+export async function runProtocolAssembleBatch(): Promise<AssembleStageResult> {
+  const cfg = getReportingProtocolConfig()
+  const qx = await getPackagesDb()
+  const result = await withHeartbeat(() => runAssembleStage(qx, cfg))
+  log.info({ ...result }, 'Reporting protocol assemble batch activity complete')
+  return result
+}