Document the Net F/T network security model

README.md

@@ -163,6 +163,21 @@ last error, current calibration, rates, and sequence progress before deciding wh
 a new session. Callback exceptions are counted; they remain non-fatal under reconnect policy
 and become a callback fault under fail-stop policy.
 
+## Network security
+
+ATI Net F/T configuration discovery uses HTTP and RDT streaming uses UDP. These device protocols
+do not provide transport encryption, peer authentication, or message integrity through this
+library. Run the sensor and client on a trusted, isolated network segment; do not expose the
+sensor HTTP or RDT ports directly to the Internet or an untrusted shared network. Use firewall
+allowlists and an authenticated network boundary when traffic must cross an untrusted network.
+
+Automatic discovery values are not authenticated solely because they came from the configured
+sensor address. Verify the discovered calibration and units before enabling a controller. A
+complete manual calibration override avoids HTTP discovery when independently verified values
+are required, but it does not authenticate the UDP measurement stream. See
+[SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) for the supported network model, deployment controls, and private
+vulnerability reporting.
+
 ## Hardware safety
 
 Force/torque data can feed motion, force-control, and protective-limit decisions. Treat the

SECURITY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+# Security Policy
+
+## Supported versions
+
+Security fixes are applied to the latest released version and the `main` branch. Older releases
+may not receive backports.
+
+## Reporting a vulnerability
+
+Please do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability. Use
+[GitHub private vulnerability reporting](https://github.com/netft/netft-cpp/security/advisories/new)
+when available. If private reporting is unavailable, contact the maintainer at
+hanxudong159@126.com.
+
+Include the affected version, deployment assumptions, a minimal reproduction or data-flow
+description, and the security impact. Remove sensor addresses, credentials, and private network
+details before submitting a report.
+
+## Network security model
+
+ATI Net F/T devices expose configuration through HTTP and stream RDT records through UDP.
+`netft-cpp` implements those device protocols and does not add transport encryption, peer
+authentication, or message integrity. Automatic discovery data and RDT records must therefore
+not be treated as authenticated solely because they came from the configured sensor address.
+
+The supported deployment model assumes that the sensor and client run on a trusted, isolated
+network segment. Do not expose the sensor, its HTTP interface, or its RDT port directly to the
+Internet or to an untrusted shared network. Where traffic must cross an untrusted network, place
+the complete sensor connection inside an authenticated network boundary such as a managed VPN
+or equivalent industrial-network gateway.
+
+Recommended deployment controls include:
+
+- isolate the sensor network with a dedicated interface or VLAN;
+- restrict traffic with host and network firewalls to the expected client and sensor addresses;
+- prevent untrusted devices from joining, routing to, or bridging the sensor segment;
+- monitor unexpected calibration, unit, sensor-address, and connection changes.
+
+The library disables HTTP redirects and proxy use and strictly validates the configuration
+response, but those controls do not authenticate its origin.
+
+## Configuration integrity and hardware safety
+
+Automatic discovery reads calibration scales and units over unauthenticated HTTP. Verify the
+discovered values against the intended sensor configuration before enabling a controller. When
+an application must use fixed, independently verified calibration values, configure a complete
+manual calibration override. A manual override avoids HTTP discovery but does not authenticate
+the UDP measurement stream.
+
+Force/torque data can affect motion and protective-limit decisions. Use fail-stop behavior where
+appropriate, detect stale or invalid data, and retain an independent safety-rated control path.
+This library is not a substitute for an emergency stop or other safety system.
+
+## Known protocol limitations
+
+A report that depends only on the absence of HTTPS or authenticated UDP in the ATI device
+protocol may describe a known protocol limitation rather than a defect that this library can
+correct independently. Reports remain valuable when they demonstrate an unexpected exposure,
+a bypass of the stated trusted-network model, unsafe handling of unauthenticated data, or a
+practical mitigation that remains compatible with the device.