I am opening this issue to document a Codex security report that was rejected by Bugcrowd on an incorrect factual basis.
The response stated:
Unfortunately we were unable to reproduce your submission, as not enough information (no PoC files etc.) was provided to replicate your findings.
A PoC package was attached to the submission.
The submitted archive contained:
emit_aimed_variants.pyfixture_manifest.jsonREADME.mdstrict-scope-control.txtsuccessful-run-1.txtsuccessful-run-2.txt
The SHA-256 hash of the submitted archive is:
62f2098efa6da875984bb53439bf9f62e1a2ea6a3af119ae21253464a6234c84
The package included a deterministic fixture generator, byte-layout information, reproduction instructions, successful test results, and a restrictive control. It was not a theoretical description submitted without reproduction material.
Reported behavior
The report concerns deterministic tool-output truncation in Codex.
Under the tested conditions, security-relevant corrective or authorization context can be omitted from the active context while earlier action-inducing content remains visible. Codex may then act on the retained content without access to the later instruction that corrected, revoked, or restricted that action.
In observed tests, this resulted in filesystem or process activity that did not reflect the complete instruction state supplied to the agent.
The security concern is not simply that output is shortened. The concern is that truncation can alter which instructions remain available at the point where Codex decides whether to perform a tool action.
Additional testing
Since the original submission, I have run further tests covering:
- truncation and compaction behavior;
- restart-point selection;
- inherited and forked context;
- persisted-history copying;
- storage deduplication;
- corrective context omitted across history boundaries;
- whether retained instructions continue to influence later tool decisions.
These tests further isolate the mechanism and distinguish logical session lineage from content loss introduced during storage, truncation, or compaction.
A later review package was also created with the following SHA-256 hash:
7cba121a6340a9c551f496abd3e7b886e72c2bb983b621f8bcc6d4c14e27c728
Why I am opening this publicly
The submission was not rejected because the attached PoC was executed and found not to reproduce. It was rejected with the claim that no PoC files had been supplied.
That claim is demonstrably incorrect.
I am not attaching the executable reproduction package or publishing the operational trigger details in this public issue. This issue is intended to:
- create an accurate public record of what was submitted;
- document that the report included a deterministic PoC package;
- notify the Codex maintainers of the unresolved security behavior;
- request an internal review of the original submission and its attachments.
I am not requesting another bounty evaluation through this issue. I am requesting that the technical report be reviewed on its actual contents rather than closed under the false premise that no PoC was provided.
The original archive, its exact hash, and the later supporting evidence have been preserved.
I am opening this issue to document a Codex security report that was rejected by Bugcrowd on an incorrect factual basis.
The response stated:
A PoC package was attached to the submission.
The submitted archive contained:
emit_aimed_variants.pyfixture_manifest.jsonREADME.mdstrict-scope-control.txtsuccessful-run-1.txtsuccessful-run-2.txtThe SHA-256 hash of the submitted archive is:
The package included a deterministic fixture generator, byte-layout information, reproduction instructions, successful test results, and a restrictive control. It was not a theoretical description submitted without reproduction material.
Reported behavior
The report concerns deterministic tool-output truncation in Codex.
Under the tested conditions, security-relevant corrective or authorization context can be omitted from the active context while earlier action-inducing content remains visible. Codex may then act on the retained content without access to the later instruction that corrected, revoked, or restricted that action.
In observed tests, this resulted in filesystem or process activity that did not reflect the complete instruction state supplied to the agent.
The security concern is not simply that output is shortened. The concern is that truncation can alter which instructions remain available at the point where Codex decides whether to perform a tool action.
Additional testing
Since the original submission, I have run further tests covering:
These tests further isolate the mechanism and distinguish logical session lineage from content loss introduced during storage, truncation, or compaction.
A later review package was also created with the following SHA-256 hash:
Why I am opening this publicly
The submission was not rejected because the attached PoC was executed and found not to reproduce. It was rejected with the claim that no PoC files had been supplied.
That claim is demonstrably incorrect.
I am not attaching the executable reproduction package or publishing the operational trigger details in this public issue. This issue is intended to:
I am not requesting another bounty evaluation through this issue. I am requesting that the technical report be reviewed on its actual contents rather than closed under the false premise that no PoC was provided.
The original archive, its exact hash, and the later supporting evidence have been preserved.