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Pass Windows metadata targets to direct exec#21032

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evawong-oai wants to merge 1 commit into
codex/windows-protected-metadata-setup-threadingfrom
codex/windows-protected-metadata-direct-exec
Open

Pass Windows metadata targets to direct exec#21032
evawong-oai wants to merge 1 commit into
codex/windows-protected-metadata-setup-threadingfrom
codex/windows-protected-metadata-direct-exec

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@evawong-oai evawong-oai commented May 4, 2026

Summary

  1. Passes Windows protected metadata targets through direct sandbox execution.
  2. Keeps the direct exec path aligned with the setup request shape.

Why

  1. Direct exec is one of the Windows sandbox entry points that must enforce protected metadata.
  2. This PR wires only that entry point so review can confirm the request field is carried without mixing in session behavior.

Stack Relation

This PR is part 6 of 21 in the Windows protected metadata stack.

  1. PR 20889 Add Windows metadata adapter target type
  2. PR 20890 Add Windows metadata setup target type
  3. PR 20891 Add Windows metadata enforcement guard
  4. PR 21030 Plan Windows metadata targets from filesystem policy
  5. PR 21031 Thread Windows metadata targets through setup request
  6. PR 21032 Pass Windows metadata targets to direct exec
  7. PR 21033 Thread Windows metadata targets through sessions
  8. PR 21035 Enforce Windows protected metadata targets
  9. PR 21036 Deny Windows protected metadata symlink targets
  10. PR 21037 Use Windows metadata targets in debug sandbox
  11. PR 21038 Allow Windows sandbox Git signal pipes
  12. PR 21039 Add Windows legacy Git read root helpers
  13. PR 21040 Grant Windows legacy Git read roots
  14. PR 21041 Inject Git safe directory for Windows legacy sandbox
  15. PR 21042 Test Windows runtime metadata target preparation
  16. PR 21043 Document Windows metadata request boundary
  17. PR 21172 Add Windows missing metadata monitor runtime
  18. PR 21173 Wire Windows metadata monitor through sandbox exits
  19. PR 21174 Add Windows missing metadata deny sentinel
  20. PR 21175 Wire missing Windows metadata to deny sentinel
  21. PR 21184 Use direct deny ACLs for Windows metadata sentinels

Validation

  1. Stack head local format and Rust tests passed on 95ef124d6194bd2126c11928cb3973214f9ac63a.
  2. Azure Windows VM 56 case validation is running on 95ef124d6194bd2126c11928cb3973214f9ac63a.

@evawong-oai evawong-oai force-pushed the codex/windows-protected-metadata-setup-threading branch from f29e31e to 230dcf4 Compare May 6, 2026 22:09
@evawong-oai evawong-oai force-pushed the codex/windows-protected-metadata-direct-exec branch from 16cc0e9 to 461f186 Compare May 6, 2026 22:09
@evawong-oai evawong-oai marked this pull request as ready for review May 7, 2026 00:45
@evawong-oai evawong-oai requested a review from a team as a code owner May 7, 2026 00:45
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💡 Codex Review

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Reviewed commit: 461f186a34

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mut env_map: HashMap<String, String>,
timeout_ms: Option<u64>,
additional_deny_write_paths: &[PathBuf],
_protected_metadata_targets: &[ProtectedMetadataTarget],
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P1 Badge Enforce metadata targets in legacy direct exec

The new direct-exec plumbing passes protected_metadata_targets to the non-elevated backend, but this callee names it _protected_metadata_targets and never applies prepare_protected_metadata_targets/deny paths or cleanup. When use_elevated is false, protected metadata remains writable/creatable despite the commit's stated enforcement goal.

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