0.104.0-alpha.5

Correct selection of candidate CRLs by Distribution Point and Issuing Distribution Point. If a certificate had more than one distributionPoint, then only the first distributionPoint would be considered against each CRL's IssuingDistributionPoint distributionPoint, and then the certificate's subsequent distributionPoints would be ignored.

The impact was that correct provided CRLs would not be consulted to check revocation. With UnknownStatusPolicy::Deny (the default) this would lead to incorrect but safe Error::UnknownRevocationStatus. With UnknownStatusPolicy::Allow this would lead to inappropriate acceptance of revoked certificates.

This vulnerability is thought to be of limited impact. This is because both the certificate and CRL are signed -- an attacker would need to compromise a trusted issuing authority to trigger this bug. An attacker with such capabilities could likely bypass revocation checking through other more impactful means (such as publishing a valid, empty CRL.)

More likely, this bug would be latent in normal use, and an attacker could leverage faulty revocation checking to continue using a revoked credential.

This vulnerability is identified by GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4. Thank you to @1seal for the report.

What's Changed

• Take semver-compatible dependency updates by @djc in #448
• fix rust 1.94 ambiguous panic macro warnings by @cpu in #449
• avoid std::prelude imports by @cpu in #450
• Take semver-compatible dependency updates by @djc in #451
• Tweak SECURITY.md to provide guidance to sloperators by @djc in #454
• Fix formatting by @ctz in #456
• Take semver-compatible updates by @ctz in #459
• Prepare 0.104.0-alpha.5 by @ctz in #457

Full Changelog: v/0.104.0-alpha.4...v/0.104.0-alpha.5