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chore(deps): update stripe/agent-toolkit digest to 84c364c - #697

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chore(deps): update stripe/agent-toolkit digest to 84c364c#697
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renovate/stripe-agent-toolkit-digest

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@renovate renovate Bot commented Jul 3, 2026

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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Update Change
stripe/agent-toolkit digest ec93d4c84c364c

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@renovate renovate Bot added the dependencies label Jul 3, 2026
@toolhive-release-app

toolhive-release-app Bot commented Jul 3, 2026

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🛡️ Skill Security Scan Results

✅ stripe-best-practices

  • Status: Passed
  • Findings: 0

❌ stripe-projects

  • Status: Failed
  • Findings: 7
  • Blocking: 3

Blocking issues:

  • [LLM_PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH) The skill instructs the agent to install and then immediately invoke a dynamically-downloaded skill from .claude/skills/stripe-projects-cli/SKILL.md (installed via stripe projects init --accept-tos --yes). The content of this externally-sourced SKILL.md is not bundled with the current skill package and is fetched/installed at runtime by the Stripe CLI plugin. The agent is then instructed to trust and execute instructions from this dynamically-installed skill without any integrity verification. This creates an indirect prompt injection vector: if the Stripe CLI plugin or its distribution channel is compromised, or if the installed SKILL.md contains malicious instructions, the agent will follow them with full trust. (SKILL.md)
  • [LLM_SKILL_DISCOVERY_ABUSE] (HIGH) The skill description contains an extremely large number of trigger phrases designed to maximize activation across a very wide range of user intents. Phrases like 'get me an API key for X', 'sign up for a service', 'I need hosting', 'add an LLM provider', 'set up monitoring', and the catch-all instruction 'Also trigger when the user asks how to get an API key or credentials for any third-party service — don't tell them to sign up manually; check the Projects catalog first' are designed to intercept user requests that might otherwise be handled by other skills or direct user action. The instruction to never tell users to sign up manually and always route through the Projects catalog is a commercial activation manipulation pattern that overrides user autonomy. (SKILL.md)
  • [ATR_2026_00010] (CRITICAL) Pattern detected: stripe projects init installs the stripe-projects-cli skill locally at .claude/skills/stripe-projects-cli. This skill contains the full post-init command referenc (SKILL.md:62)

Allowlisted (not blocking):

  • MANIFEST_MISSING_LICENSE (Allowed: stripe/agent-toolkit is licensed MIT at the repository root; upstream does not embed an SPDX license identifier in per-skill SKILL.md frontmatter.)

✅ upgrade-stripe

  • Status: Passed
  • Findings: 5
  • Allowed (not blocking): 1
    • MANIFEST_MISSING_LICENSE (Allowed: stripe/agent-toolkit is licensed MIT at the repository root; upstream does not embed an SPDX license identifier in per-skill SKILL.md frontmatter.)

Summary: Scanned 3 skill(s), found 3 blocking issue(s).

⚠️ Action Required: Review the blocking findings. Add a justified entry to the skill's security.allowed_issues[] in its spec.yaml if the finding is a false positive.

@renovate
renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/stripe-agent-toolkit-digest branch from 0de3e3d to 663ace7 Compare July 3, 2026 10:12
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title chore(deps): update stripe/agent-toolkit digest to b8d7e28 chore(deps): update stripe/agent-toolkit digest to 84c364c Jul 27, 2026
@renovate
renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/stripe-agent-toolkit-digest branch from 0230665 to df9798a Compare July 27, 2026 09:43
@renovate

renovate Bot commented Jul 27, 2026

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Edited/Blocked Notification

Renovate will not automatically rebase this PR, because it does not recognize the last commit author and assumes somebody else may have edited the PR.

You can manually request rebase by checking the rebase/retry box above.

⚠️ Warning: custom changes will be lost.

JAORMX added a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 27, 2026
…ner FPs (#808)

* fix: update skill specs for upstream restructures, removals, and scanner FPs

Path fixes for upstream repo restructures:
- mongodb/agent-skills: atlas-stream-processing renamed to
  mongodb-atlas-stream-processing
- datadog-labs/agent-skills: dd-llmo/ restructured to
  agent-observability/ (4 skills renamed)

Removed skills deleted upstream:
- firebase/agent-skills: developing-genkit-js/go/dart removed

Security scanner false positive allowlists added for:
- grilling (ATR_2026_00051 — conversational prose)
- cloudflare (BEHAVIOR_BASH_TAINT_FLOW — curl examples in docs)
- claude-api (10 new ATR_2026_* — API documentation patterns)
- agentic-actions-auditor (5 rules — security audit skill with
  intentional attack pattern docs)
- gha-security-review (BEHAVIOR_BASH_TAINT_FLOW — attack pattern
  docs)
- mongodb-schema-design (BEHAVIOR_BASH_TAINT_FLOW — mongo shell
  examples)
- firebase-firestore (BEHAVIOR_BASH_TAINT_FLOW — Firestore API
  examples)
- skill-writer (BEHAVIOR_BASH_TAINT_FLOW — meta-skill code
  patterns)

All refs updated to match renovate digest proposals (full SHAs).
Local validation passes for all modified skills.

Not addressed (left as open renovate PRs with genuine findings):
- stripe-projects (#697): prompt injection + skill discovery abuse
- gemini-api-dev/interactions-api (#688): fabricated model names +
  training-data override

* fix: add missing scanner allowlist entries for new digest content

The updated upstream digests introduced new reference file content
that triggers additional scanner rule IDs. All verified as false
positives against actual upstream content:

- agentic-actions-auditor: ATR_2026_00012/00040/00066
- claude-api: ATR_2026_00032/00113
- codeql: ATR_2026_00010/00012/00066/00111
- firebase-firestore: ATR_2026_00010/00012
- gha-security-review: ATR_2026_00040/00066/00161
- mongodb-atlas-stream-processing: ATR_2026_00010/00013
- mongodb-schema-design: ATR_2026_00012/00062
- sharp-edges: ATR_2026_00012/00161
- skill-writer: ATR_2026_00012/00088/00111
- yara-rule-authoring: ATR_2026_00004/00012/00063/00066

* chore: bump spec.version for all modified skills

Required by skillversionbump check — minor bumps for content
changes, patch bump for cloudflare (allowlist-only change).

* fix: use category-level allowlisting for ATR pattern rules

The scanner's LLM meta-analyzer produces non-deterministic results
across runs — new upstream content triggers different rule IDs each
time. Playing whack-a-mole with individual ATR_2026_* rule IDs is
unsustainable.

Switch to category-level POLICY_VIOLATION allowlisting for skills
where ALL ATR pattern matches are inherently false positives:

- Security audit/analysis skills (agentic-actions-auditor,
  gha-security-review, sharp-edges, yara-rule-authoring, codeql,
  semgrep-rule-creator, constant-time-analysis): reference files
  intentionally describe attack patterns for detection
- API/SDK documentation skills (claude-api, firebase-firestore,
  firebase-data-connect-basics, mongodb-schema-design,
  mongodb-atlas-stream-processing): pattern matches are on
  documentation prose, code examples, and API references
- Meta skills (skill-writer): pattern matches are on skill
  authoring and evaluation documentation
- Datadog observability skills (agent-observability-*): pattern
  matches are on evaluation and tracing documentation

* fix: use correct lowercase category names and add prompt_injection

The scanner assigns categories in lowercase (policy_violation,
prompt_injection, command_injection). Also adds:
- prompt_injection category allowlisting alongside policy_violation
- command_injection for semgrep-rule-creator
- LLM_SKILL_DISCOVERY_ABUSE for firebase-firestore (official Firebase
  activation directive, not commercial hijack)
- PG_PII_SSN_HARVESTING for agent-observability-eval-bootstrap

* fix: add remaining allowlist entries for trace-rca and sharp-edges

- agent-observability-trace-rca: PG_EXFIL_MARKDOWN_LINK (Datadog
  trace links to user's own tenant, same as eval-bootstrap)
- sharp-edges: command_injection (Python eval/exec examples in
  security analysis docs)
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