Story
As an XMD user, I want filesystem authorization that remains valid at the instant of access, so a concurrent path replacement cannot escape the root granted by the active filesystem provider.
Two provider contracts
xmd workflow and xmd run do not share one implementation guarantee:
- Under
xmd workflow, declarative filesystem operations resolve logical paths inside the retained DOFS Workspace. The provider authorizes every operation against that logical namespace; it does not translate a validated path into an unguarded host filesystem access.
- Under
xmd run, host filesystem providers must close the validate-then-use race for Deno, Node, Bun, and the compiled binary, or state a narrower supported guarantee explicitly.
Agent read-only materialization is owned by #302. It must not be used to claim that the ordinary host filesystem provider solved this race.
Acceptance
architecture.md and the executable-MDX threat model distinguish the retained Workspace guarantee from each host-runtime guarantee.
- Workflow filesystem operations cannot escape through host symlink replacement because their authoritative namespace is provider-owned.
- The selected host mechanism and exact guarantee are stated for Deno, Node, Bun, and the compiled binary.
- A runtime that cannot provide the strong guarantee fails or documents its narrower boundary; XMD does not overclaim portability.
- Tests race a path replacement between authorization and access for every supported host implementation.
- Contextual APIs carry the operation; shared production modules do not detect runtimes.
Out of scope
- Agent-generated XMD and Agent provider sandboxing.
- Changing File authoring forms or exact-content behavior.
- Native command containment.
Dependencies
Story
As an XMD user, I want filesystem authorization that remains valid at the instant of access, so a concurrent path replacement cannot escape the root granted by the active filesystem provider.
Two provider contracts
xmd workflowandxmd rundo not share one implementation guarantee:xmd workflow, declarative filesystem operations resolve logical paths inside the retained DOFS Workspace. The provider authorizes every operation against that logical namespace; it does not translate a validated path into an unguarded host filesystem access.xmd run, host filesystem providers must close the validate-then-use race for Deno, Node, Bun, and the compiled binary, or state a narrower supported guarantee explicitly.Agent read-only materialization is owned by #302. It must not be used to claim that the ordinary host filesystem provider solved this race.
Acceptance
architecture.mdand the executable-MDX threat model distinguish the retained Workspace guarantee from each host-runtime guarantee.Out of scope
Dependencies