feat(release): tagged GitHub Release with SHA-256 and immutable GHCR - #107
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Issue #84 first slice. A vX.Y.Z tag builds a locked binary, checksums, a GitHub Release, and ghcr.io/contextualwisdomlab/waf-ids-ai-soc:vX.Y.Z with no moving latest tag. Promotion and rollback are tag-for-tag. Do not re-implement store slices or OCC.
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| image="ghcr.io/contextualwisdomlab/waf-ids-ai-soc" | ||
| tag="${GITHUB_REF_NAME}" | ||
| docker build -t "${image}:${tag}" . | ||
| docker push "${image}:${tag}" |
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📝 Info: GHCR tag immutability is convention-only
The pushed image ghcr.io/contextualwisdomlab/waf-ids-ai-soc:vX.Y.Z is described as immutable, but GHCR does not enforce tag immutability by default. A later push to the same tag overwrites it; immutability rests only on the runbook convention, not registry protection.
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Acknowledged: GHCR tags are aliases. Promotion authority is the content digest plus signatures, not the tag. Keyless cosign-by-digest, SPDX SBOM, and SLSA attestations are on #108 (feat/issue-84-cosign-sbom). No moving latest.
| - name: Build release binary | ||
| run: cargo build --locked --release | ||
| - name: Stage checksums | ||
| run: | | ||
| mkdir -p dist | ||
| cp target/release/waf-ids-ai-soc dist/waf-ids-ai-soc-linux-x86_64 | ||
| scripts/release-checksums.sh dist/waf-ids-ai-soc-linux-x86_64 > dist/SHA256SUMS | ||
| cat dist/SHA256SUMS | ||
| - name: GitHub Release | ||
| env: | ||
| GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }} | ||
| run: | | ||
| gh release create "$GITHUB_REF_NAME" \ | ||
| dist/waf-ids-ai-soc-linux-x86_64 \ | ||
| dist/SHA256SUMS \ | ||
| --generate-notes \ | ||
| --verify-tag | ||
| - name: Publish immutable GHCR image | ||
| env: | ||
| GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }} | ||
| run: | | ||
| echo "$GH_TOKEN" | docker login ghcr.io -u "$GITHUB_ACTOR" --password-stdin | ||
| image="ghcr.io/contextualwisdomlab/waf-ids-ai-soc" | ||
| tag="${GITHUB_REF_NAME}" | ||
| docker build -t "${image}:${tag}" . | ||
| docker push "${image}:${tag}" |
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📝 Info: Release compiles the binary twice
The workflow runs cargo build --locked --release, then docker build, and the Dockerfile compiles the same release binary again in its build stage. The binary is built twice per release, roughly doubling build time.
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SHA256SUMS recorded dist/ prefixes so sha256sum -c failed next to the downloaded binary. Emit basenames. Parallel PostgresPlane connects raced HASH convert GRANT with SET ROLE GRANT (tuple concurrently updated); hold the advisory lock across both. Do not re-implement HASH layout.
Issue #84 remainder. GitHub OIDC signs the binary, checksums, SBOMs, and the GHCR image by digest. Release is created only after signatures. Syft SPDX fails closed without syft or non-SPDX JSON. NIST SP 800-218 is attached. Do not re-implement checksums or store slices.
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Rust CI |
| .execute("SELECT pg_advisory_lock($1)", &[&MIGRATION_LOCK_KEY]) | ||
| .await | ||
| .map_err(|error| format!("control plane migration lock failed: {error}"))?; | ||
| let result = apply_schema(&client).await; | ||
| // HASH convert GRANT and SET ROLE GRANT both mutate pg_class ACL | ||
| // tuples. Hold the lock across both so parallel connects cannot | ||
| // `tuple concurrently updated`. | ||
| let result = async { | ||
| apply_schema(&client).await?; | ||
| assume_runtime_role(&client).await | ||
| } | ||
| .await; | ||
| let _ = client | ||
| .execute("SELECT pg_advisory_unlock($1)", &[&MIGRATION_LOCK_KEY]) | ||
| .await; | ||
| result | ||
| } |
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📝 Info: Runtime role GRANT moved under migration lock
assume_runtime_role now runs inside migrate() while holding both MIGRATION_GATE and the advisory lock, and the standalone method was removed (no other caller referenced it). The advisory unlock at control_plane.rs now runs after SET ROLE wardnet_runtime, but pg_advisory_unlock is public and locks are session-owned, so it still succeeds.
(Refers to this code)
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| echo "$GH_TOKEN" | docker login ghcr.io -u "$GITHUB_ACTOR" --password-stdin | ||
| image="ghcr.io/contextualwisdomlab/waf-ids-ai-soc" | ||
| tag="${GITHUB_REF_NAME}" | ||
| docker build -t "${image}:${tag}" . |
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📝 Info: Release docker build omits build.rs
The workflow's docker build uses a Dockerfile that copies only Cargo.toml, Cargo.lock, src, and crates, not build.rs. The stub script's only consumer, env!("WARDNET_CORAZA_ABI_STUB") at src/coraza_inprocess.rs:415, is #[cfg(test)], so the release build compiles without it.
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Issue #84 remainder. Annotated vX.Y.Z tags only; lightweight tags fail closed before the release job builds. Kubernetes pin is the GHCR content digest; tag aliases are refused. Do not re-implement checksums or cosign/SBOM.
Issue #11 first slice. The build-script libcoraza ABI stub gains a deterministic battery covering SQLi (942100), XSS (941100), path traversal (930100), Unix RCE (932100, with first-match ordering so '; cat /etc/passwd' attributes to RCE over traversal), and Log4j JNDI (944120) in raw and percent-encoded forms across URI and POST-body phases. tests/binary.rs now starts the real gateway with the stub engine, creates a block route through the admin API, fires nine cases over HTTP, and asserts each is 403-blocked citing the expected CRS rule id while a benign request still forwards; /api/events must record one event per attempt with the forwarded client IP kept unmasked. Doctoring: docs/doctoring/ci-attack-evidence-battery.md grounds the split between detection-path evidence (CI) and detection efficacy (operator-supplied libcoraza + Core Rule Set), APA 7th.
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Pull request overview
OpenCode cannot approve yet because required coverage evidence did not pass.
Review outcome
1. HIGH .github/workflows/opencode-review.yml:1 - Coverage evidence did not prove required test/docstring evidence
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Problem: The required coverage-evidence job result was
failure, so OpenCode cannot establish approval sufficiency for this head. -
Root cause: Automated approval is only valid when the same-head coverage-evidence job proves supported repository test suites passed and configured docstring gates passed or were advisory, or reports not applicable because no supported source files or package manifests exist. Missing, failed, skipped, unavailable, or unsupported-tooling test evidence is a blocker.
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Fix: Install or configure the repository test/docstring evidence tooling when source files or package manifests exist, rerun the current-head coverage-evidence job, and approve only after it reports
successwith required evidence or explicit no-source not-applicable evidence. -
Regression test: Keep the approval branch checking
needs.coverage-evidence.result == successbefore posting APPROVE, and publish REQUEST_CHANGES when coverage-evidence blocker states such as cancelled, skipped, failed, unsupported-tooling, or below-100 evidence are present. -
Result: REQUEST_CHANGES
-
Reason: coverage-evidence result was
failure, so required test/docstring evidence was not proven for current headd810fc43ae987a0ceabc3051732a1411a72e3883. -
Head SHA:
d810fc43ae987a0ceabc3051732a1411a72e3883 -
Workflow run: 32702432576
-
Workflow attempt: 1
Coverage evidence
Coverage Decision
- Result: FAIL
- Test evidence: not proven passing
- Docstring evidence: not proven passing when configured
- Failure count: 1
Changed-File Evidence Map
flowchart LR
PR["PR changed files"] --> Evidence["OpenCode bounded evidence"]
Evidence --> S1["Workflow: release.yml"]
S1 --> I1["GitHub Actions review job"]
I1 --> R1["Review risk: Workflow: release.yml"]
R1 --> V1["actionlint plus required checks"]
Evidence --> S2["Changed file (5 files)"]
S2 --> I2["repository behavior"]
I2 --> R2["Review risk: Changed file (5 files)"]
R2 --> V2["required checks"]
Evidence --> S3["Docs (3 files)"]
S3 --> I3["operator or user guidance"]
I3 --> R3["Review risk: Docs (3 files)"]
R3 --> V3["docs review"]
Evidence --> S4["Test: binary.rs"]
S4 --> I4["regression suite"]
I4 --> R4["Review risk: Test: binary.rs"]
R4 --> V4["targeted test run"]
OpenCode Review Overview
Pull request overviewOpenCode cannot approve yet because required coverage evidence did not pass. Review outcome1. HIGH .github/workflows/opencode-review.yml:1 - Coverage evidence did not prove required test/docstring evidence
Coverage evidenceCoverage Decision
Changed-File Evidence Mapflowchart LR
PR["PR changed files"] --> Evidence["OpenCode bounded evidence"]
Evidence --> S1["Workflow: release.yml"]
S1 --> I1["GitHub Actions review job"]
I1 --> R1["Review risk: Workflow: release.yml"]
R1 --> V1["actionlint plus required checks"]
Evidence --> S2["Changed file (5 files)"]
S2 --> I2["repository behavior"]
I2 --> R2["Review risk: Changed file (5 files)"]
R2 --> V2["required checks"]
Evidence --> S3["Docs (3 files)"]
S3 --> I3["operator or user guidance"]
I3 --> R3["Review risk: Docs (3 files)"]
R3 --> V3["docs review"]
Evidence --> S4["Test: binary.rs"]
S4 --> I4["regression suite"]
I4 --> R4["Review risk: Test: binary.rs"]
R4 --> V4["targeted test run"]
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…-evidence-ci feat(waf): CI attack-evidence battery against the live binary (issue #11)
…ed-tag-admission feat(release): refuse lightweight tags and pin k8s by digest
…-sbom feat(release): keyless cosign, SPDX SBOM, and SLSA on the same tag
| tag="${GITHUB_REF_NAME}" | ||
| docker build -t "${image}:${tag}" . | ||
| push_out="$(docker push "${image}:${tag}")" | ||
| digest="$(printf '%s\n' "$push_out" | awk '/digest:/{d=$NF} END{print d}')" |
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🔴 Release digest parse grabs image size, not sha256
awk '/digest:/{d=$NF}' takes the last field of the docker push line <tag>: digest: sha256:<hex> size: <number>, which is the size number, not the digest. ref becomes ghcr.io/...@<size>, so the SBOM, cosign signing by digest, the provenance/SBOM attestations, and IMAGE-DIGEST.txt all get an invalid reference.
| digest="$(printf '%s\n' "$push_out" | awk '/digest:/{d=$NF} END{print d}')" | |
| digest="$(printf '%s\n' "$push_out" | grep -oE 'sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}' | tail -n1)" |
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| // RCE and Log4j entries precede traversal entries because command | ||
| // fixtures such as `; cat /etc/passwd` also contain traversal-looking | ||
| // substrings; first-match ordering keeps rule attribution deterministic. | ||
| BatteryEntry { | ||
| needle: "; cat ", | ||
| rule_id: 932100, | ||
| message: RCE_MESSAGE, | ||
| }, | ||
| BatteryEntry { | ||
| needle: "%3b%20cat%20", | ||
| rule_id: 932100, | ||
| message: RCE_MESSAGE, | ||
| }, | ||
| BatteryEntry { | ||
| needle: "/bin/sh", | ||
| rule_id: 932100, | ||
| message: RCE_MESSAGE, | ||
| }, | ||
| BatteryEntry { | ||
| needle: "$(whoami)", | ||
| rule_id: 932100, | ||
| message: RCE_MESSAGE, | ||
| }, | ||
| BatteryEntry { | ||
| needle: "${jndi", | ||
| rule_id: 944120, | ||
| message: LOG4J_MESSAGE, | ||
| }, | ||
| BatteryEntry { | ||
| needle: "%24%7bjndi", | ||
| rule_id: 944120, | ||
| message: LOG4J_MESSAGE, | ||
| }, | ||
| BatteryEntry { | ||
| needle: "../", | ||
| rule_id: 930100, | ||
| message: TRAVERSAL_MESSAGE, | ||
| }, | ||
| BatteryEntry { | ||
| needle: "..%2f", | ||
| rule_id: 930100, | ||
| message: TRAVERSAL_MESSAGE, | ||
| }, | ||
| BatteryEntry { | ||
| needle: "..%252f", | ||
| rule_id: 930100, | ||
| message: TRAVERSAL_MESSAGE, | ||
| }, | ||
| BatteryEntry { | ||
| needle: "etc/passwd", | ||
| rule_id: 930100, | ||
| message: TRAVERSAL_MESSAGE, | ||
| }, | ||
| BatteryEntry { | ||
| needle: "etc%2fpasswd", | ||
| rule_id: 930100, | ||
| message: TRAVERSAL_MESSAGE, | ||
| }, | ||
| ]; |
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📝 Info: Coraza stub battery relies on needle ordering
RCE/Log4j needles are placed before traversal needles so overlapping payloads like ; cat /etc/passwd attribute to RCE (932100) rather than traversal (930100). Matching lowercases input and all needles are lowercase, so percent-encoded variants line up. This is a test-only fixture, not detection logic.
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Stale review: coverage-evidence now passes on this head; all required checks green.
6a31ef0
into
feat/issue-80-optimistic-concurrency
* feat(security): fail-closed destination policy for outbound HTTP One DestinationPolicy mediates gateway upstreams, threat-intel fetches, Clearfolio, SOC LLM, and the Coraza sidecar URL. Private, loopback, link-local, CGNAT, and metadata classes are denied unless DESTINATION_ALLOWLIST (or loopback development) permits them; DESTINATION_DENYLIST wins. Clients ignore ambient HTTP proxies and do not follow redirects. Refs #79. * docs: record PR #96 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(security): harden destination policy per-IP CIDR and readiness order CIDR allowlist matches apply per resolved address, authorize non-default ports, and reject prefixes outside the address-family width. IPv6 site-local is a denied class. Hostnames that merely contain 0x are not hex IP literals. AppState constructors default to production policy; seeded fixtures opt into development. Blocking DNS runs on spawn_blocking with a timeout. Persistence and destination-list validation complete before the readiness line. * feat(security): pin outbound HTTP to evaluated destination addresses After destination policy allows a host, the reqwest client resolves only those IPs so a rebinding answer cannot reach loopback, private, or metadata classes. Host and SNI stay on the original name. Unpinned hostnames fail closed instead of falling back to OS DNS. * feat(waf): evaluate live gateway transactions with in-process libcoraza Issue #86 remainder: dlopen operator-supplied libcoraza and drive the C ABI on each /gateway request. Missing library or empty ruleset fail closed before bind. CI stays hermetic with a fixture cdylib that exports the same symbols. * docs: record PR #97 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(store): require PostgreSQL as the production control plane Non-loopback binds fail closed without CONTROL_PLANE_DATABASE_URL. Migrations create 3NF two-word tables with default-deny RLS. Snapshot persist commits policy rows and audit records in one transaction. Loopback still uses the JSON file or memory adapter. * feat(store): transactional outbox and leased workers Issue #81 first slice on the PostgreSQL control plane. Security events append with an outbox row in one transaction instead of rewriting the snapshot. Workers claim with SKIP LOCKED, retry, dead-letter, and record unique receipts. Stdout SIEM is at-least-once; the receipt is the exactly-once ack. Also deterministic ORDER BY on postgres loads (still-valid #98 finding). Do not re-implement the postgres gate. * feat(store): rustls for production PostgreSQL sslmode=require (#100) * feat(store): rustls for production PostgreSQL sslmode=require Issue #80 remainder. sslmode=require/verify-ca/verify-full connect with rustls and Mozilla roots; certificates are always verified. allow/prefer are still rejected so the process cannot silently drop to plaintext. Live test against plaintext CI postgres proves fail-closed. Do not re-implement the postgres gate or the outbox. * docs: record PR #100 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): rewrite verify-full sslmode for tokio-postgres 0.7 Still-valid #100 Devin finding. tokio-postgres 0.7 only parses disable/prefer/require. Map verify-ca/verify-full to require before connect; rustls still verifies certificates. Password query-lookalikes are left untouched. * feat(store): bound outbox listing and prune processed rows (#101) * feat(store): bound outbox listing and prune processed rows Still-valid #99 finding. GET /api/outbox returns at most EVENT_LIMIT rows (dead letters, then pending, then leased, then processed). Processed outbox_message rows prune to that cap; receipts and dead letters stay. Do not re-implement the outbox, postgres gate, or rustls. * docs: record PR #101 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): prune processed outbox to EVENT_LIMIT on save and ack Still-valid #101 Devin finding. Snapshot save and worker ack used LIST_LIMIT (1000) while append used operator EVENT_LIMIT. Store the configured cap on PostgresPlane so all three paths retain the same processed-row bound. Receipts and dead letters stay. * feat(store): logical backup and isolated restore drill (#102) * feat(store): logical backup and isolated restore drill Issue #80 remainder stacked on #101. GET /api/backup exports a hashed tenant snapshot; POST /api/backup restores after schema and payload-hash checks; POST /api/backup/drill restores into an isolated tenant, compares unmasked invariants, and drops the drill rows. Declared RPO is last successful export; declared RTO is 60s. File/memory adapters report backup=disabled. Do not re-implement rustls, outbox, or retention. * docs: record PR #102 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(store): non-owner PostgreSQL runtime role after migrate (#103) * feat(store): non-owner PostgreSQL runtime role after migrate Still-valid #98 finding. CI connects as a superuser, which bypasses FORCE RLS. Migrations stay on the login role, then SET ROLE wardnet_runtime (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS, not table owner). Missing tenant GUC yields no rows; DROP TABLE and DISABLE RLS are denied. Do not re-implement rustls, outbox, retention, or backup/restore. * docs: record PR #103 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): restore logical backups across role-only schema versions v3 only provisions wardnet_runtime and does not change table shape. verify() accepts schema 2 through the current migration version so a role-only upgrade cannot void the last pre-upgrade logical backup. * feat(store): HASH-partition security_event by tenant (#104) * feat(store): HASH-partition security_event by tenant Convert unpartitioned security_event to PARTITION BY HASH (tenant_id) with eight children under pg_advisory_lock. Rows keep unmasked client IPs and paths. /healthz.event_partitions reports the child count. Logical restore still accepts schema 2 through the current version. * docs: record PR #104 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(store): optimistic concurrency on postgres snapshots Issue #80 last remainder. tenant_account.snapshot_version must match the loaded token or persist fails closed (HTTP 409). Restores overwrite. File/memory stay single-writer. Do not re-implement rustls, outbox, runtime role, HASH, or backup/restore. * docs: record PR #105 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): keep postgres snapshot_version aligned after startup save load_postgres was saving with OCC and leaving the in-memory token one behind the database, so every later management write returned HTTP 409. Advance the loaded snapshot_version to the value save() wrote. * feat(store): outbox consumers for TAXII, Clearfolio, and orchestrator Enqueue operator-triggered TAXII polls, Clearfolio submits, and contextual-orchestrator SOC analysis on the PostgreSQL leased outbox. Request path returns 202; GET /api/outbox/{id} exposes receipt evidence. Secrets stay in the credential registry. Startup postgres save advances snapshot_version so the first management write cannot false-conflict. * docs: record PR #106 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(release): tagged GitHub Release with SHA-256 and immutable GHCR (#107) * feat(release): tagged GitHub Release with SHA-256 and immutable GHCR Issue #84 first slice. A vX.Y.Z tag builds a locked binary, checksums, a GitHub Release, and ghcr.io/contextualwisdomlab/waf-ids-ai-soc:vX.Y.Z with no moving latest tag. Promotion and rollback are tag-for-tag. Do not re-implement store slices or OCC. * docs: record PR #107 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(release): basename checksums and serialize postgres GRANTs SHA256SUMS recorded dist/ prefixes so sha256sum -c failed next to the downloaded binary. Emit basenames. Parallel PostgresPlane connects raced HASH convert GRANT with SET ROLE GRANT (tuple concurrently updated); hold the advisory lock across both. Do not re-implement HASH layout. * feat(release): keyless cosign, SPDX SBOM, and SLSA on the same tag Issue #84 remainder. GitHub OIDC signs the binary, checksums, SBOMs, and the GHCR image by digest. Release is created only after signatures. Syft SPDX fails closed without syft or non-SPDX JSON. NIST SP 800-218 is attached. Do not re-implement checksums or store slices. * feat(release): refuse lightweight tags and pin k8s by digest Issue #84 remainder. Annotated vX.Y.Z tags only; lightweight tags fail closed before the release job builds. Kubernetes pin is the GHCR content digest; tag aliases are refused. Do not re-implement checksums or cosign/SBOM. * docs: record PR #109 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(waf): detect OWASP CRS attack battery on the live binary Issue #11 first slice. The build-script libcoraza ABI stub gains a deterministic battery covering SQLi (942100), XSS (941100), path traversal (930100), Unix RCE (932100, with first-match ordering so '; cat /etc/passwd' attributes to RCE over traversal), and Log4j JNDI (944120) in raw and percent-encoded forms across URI and POST-body phases. tests/binary.rs now starts the real gateway with the stub engine, creates a block route through the admin API, fires nine cases over HTTP, and asserts each is 403-blocked citing the expected CRS rule id while a benign request still forwards; /api/events must record one event per attempt with the forwarded client IP kept unmasked. Doctoring: docs/doctoring/ci-attack-evidence-battery.md grounds the split between detection-path evidence (CI) and detection efficacy (operator-supplied libcoraza + Core Rule Set), APA 7th. * fix(control-plane): close OCC and credential race gaps * fix(release): capture pushed image digest
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Summary
Issue #84 first slice. Does not re-implement #78–#81 store slices, rustls, OCC, or outbox consumers.
A git tag
vX.Y.Zruns.github/workflows/release.yml: lockedcargo build --release,SHA256SUMSviascripts/release-checksums.sh, a GitHub Release, and an immutableghcr.io/contextualwisdomlab/waf-ids-ai-soc:vX.Y.Zimage (no movinglatest). Promotion and rollback are tag-for-tag (docs/runbooks/release.md). Buyer evidence lists the runbook and workflow.Stacked on #106 (
feat/issue-81-outbox-consumers). Merge order: #95, then #96, then #97, then #98, then #99, then #105, then #106, then this PR. Org ruleset 18156473 still requires two independent approvals; do not--adminmerge.Tests
cargo fmt --checkcargo test --locked --workspace(includesrelease_checksums_script_emits_sha256_lines)cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warningsscripts/smoke.shruns (/healthz+/admin, 2B KRW, evidence includesdocs/runbooks/release.md)Remaining on #84: keyless cosign / SBOM attestation on the same tag.