feat(waf): CI attack-evidence battery against the live binary (issue #11) - #110
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Issue #11 first slice. The build-script libcoraza ABI stub gains a deterministic battery covering SQLi (942100), XSS (941100), path traversal (930100), Unix RCE (932100, with first-match ordering so '; cat /etc/passwd' attributes to RCE over traversal), and Log4j JNDI (944120) in raw and percent-encoded forms across URI and POST-body phases. tests/binary.rs now starts the real gateway with the stub engine, creates a block route through the admin API, fires nine cases over HTTP, and asserts each is 403-blocked citing the expected CRS rule id while a benign request still forwards; /api/events must record one event per attempt with the forwarded client IP kept unmasked. Doctoring: docs/doctoring/ci-attack-evidence-battery.md grounds the split between detection-path evidence (CI) and detection efficacy (operator-supplied libcoraza + Core Rule Set), APA 7th.
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In-process transactions now receive the same forwarded-header allowlist as the sidecar path (host, user-agent, accept, content-type, referer, origin, x-requested-with, x-forwarded-for, x-real-ip, cookie — never Authorization; 32 headers / 8 KiB caps enforced by proven_engine::engine_forwarded_headers). Each header crosses the C ABI via coraza_add_request_header before process_request_headers, so CRS rules that inspect headers evaluate real client input instead of a synthetic Host only. Brings in the PR #95 sidecar hardening via merge so both engines share one allowlist implementation and one status/bound contract. Behavioral header-battery evidence lands with the issue-11 battery fixture (PR #110); this slice ships the plumbing and keeps the stub contract unchanged.
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Pull request overview
OpenCode cannot approve yet because required coverage evidence did not pass.
Review outcome
1. HIGH .github/workflows/opencode-review.yml:1 - Coverage evidence did not prove required test/docstring evidence
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Problem: The required coverage-evidence job result was
failure, so OpenCode cannot establish approval sufficiency for this head. -
Root cause: Automated approval is only valid when the same-head coverage-evidence job proves supported repository test suites passed and configured docstring gates passed or were advisory, or reports not applicable because no supported source files or package manifests exist. Missing, failed, skipped, unavailable, or unsupported-tooling test evidence is a blocker.
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Fix: Install or configure the repository test/docstring evidence tooling when source files or package manifests exist, rerun the current-head coverage-evidence job, and approve only after it reports
successwith required evidence or explicit no-source not-applicable evidence. -
Regression test: Keep the approval branch checking
needs.coverage-evidence.result == successbefore posting APPROVE, and publish REQUEST_CHANGES when coverage-evidence blocker states such as cancelled, skipped, failed, unsupported-tooling, or below-100 evidence are present. -
Result: REQUEST_CHANGES
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Reason: coverage-evidence result was
failure, so required test/docstring evidence was not proven for current headd00c78f4eb80ab701340e9b090c3e028fa059481. -
Head SHA:
d00c78f4eb80ab701340e9b090c3e028fa059481 -
Workflow run: 32702445646
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Workflow attempt: 1
Coverage evidence
Coverage Decision
- Result: FAIL
- Test evidence: not proven passing
- Docstring evidence: not proven passing when configured
- Failure count: 1
Changed-File Evidence Map
flowchart LR
PR["PR changed files"] --> Evidence["OpenCode bounded evidence"]
Evidence --> S1["Docs (2 files)"]
S1 --> I1["operator or user guidance"]
I1 --> R1["Review risk: Docs (2 files)"]
R1 --> V1["docs review"]
Evidence --> S2["Changed file (2 files)"]
S2 --> I2["repository behavior"]
I2 --> R2["Review risk: Changed file (2 files)"]
R2 --> V2["required checks"]
Evidence --> S3["Test: binary.rs"]
S3 --> I3["regression suite"]
I3 --> R3["Review risk: Test: binary.rs"]
R3 --> V3["targeted test run"]
OpenCode Review Overview
Pull request overviewOpenCode cannot approve yet because required coverage evidence did not pass. Review outcome1. HIGH .github/workflows/opencode-review.yml:1 - Coverage evidence did not prove required test/docstring evidence
Coverage evidenceCoverage Decision
Changed-File Evidence Mapflowchart LR
PR["PR changed files"] --> Evidence["OpenCode bounded evidence"]
Evidence --> S1["Docs (2 files)"]
S1 --> I1["operator or user guidance"]
I1 --> R1["Review risk: Docs (2 files)"]
R1 --> V1["docs review"]
Evidence --> S2["Changed file (2 files)"]
S2 --> I2["repository behavior"]
I2 --> R2["Review risk: Changed file (2 files)"]
R2 --> V2["required checks"]
Evidence --> S3["Test: binary.rs"]
S3 --> I3["regression suite"]
I3 --> R3["Review risk: Test: binary.rs"]
R3 --> V3["targeted test run"]
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f62e7ab
into
feat/issue-84-unsigned-tag-admission
* feat(security): fail-closed destination policy for outbound HTTP One DestinationPolicy mediates gateway upstreams, threat-intel fetches, Clearfolio, SOC LLM, and the Coraza sidecar URL. Private, loopback, link-local, CGNAT, and metadata classes are denied unless DESTINATION_ALLOWLIST (or loopback development) permits them; DESTINATION_DENYLIST wins. Clients ignore ambient HTTP proxies and do not follow redirects. Refs #79. * docs: record PR #96 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(security): harden destination policy per-IP CIDR and readiness order CIDR allowlist matches apply per resolved address, authorize non-default ports, and reject prefixes outside the address-family width. IPv6 site-local is a denied class. Hostnames that merely contain 0x are not hex IP literals. AppState constructors default to production policy; seeded fixtures opt into development. Blocking DNS runs on spawn_blocking with a timeout. Persistence and destination-list validation complete before the readiness line. * feat(security): pin outbound HTTP to evaluated destination addresses After destination policy allows a host, the reqwest client resolves only those IPs so a rebinding answer cannot reach loopback, private, or metadata classes. Host and SNI stay on the original name. Unpinned hostnames fail closed instead of falling back to OS DNS. * feat(waf): evaluate live gateway transactions with in-process libcoraza Issue #86 remainder: dlopen operator-supplied libcoraza and drive the C ABI on each /gateway request. Missing library or empty ruleset fail closed before bind. CI stays hermetic with a fixture cdylib that exports the same symbols. * docs: record PR #97 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(waf): forward bounded client headers into in-process libcoraza In-process transactions now receive the same forwarded-header allowlist as the sidecar path (host, user-agent, accept, content-type, referer, origin, x-requested-with, x-forwarded-for, x-real-ip, cookie — never Authorization; 32 headers / 8 KiB caps enforced by proven_engine::engine_forwarded_headers). Each header crosses the C ABI via coraza_add_request_header before process_request_headers, so CRS rules that inspect headers evaluate real client input instead of a synthetic Host only. Brings in the PR #95 sidecar hardening via merge so both engines share one allowlist implementation and one status/bound contract. Behavioral header-battery evidence lands with the issue-11 battery fixture (PR #110); this slice ships the plumbing and keeps the stub contract unchanged. * feat(store): require PostgreSQL as the production control plane (#98) * feat(store): require PostgreSQL as the production control plane Non-loopback binds fail closed without CONTROL_PLANE_DATABASE_URL. Migrations create 3NF two-word tables with default-deny RLS. Snapshot persist commits policy rows and audit records in one transaction. Loopback still uses the JSON file or memory adapter. * feat(store): transactional outbox and leased workers Issue #81 first slice on the PostgreSQL control plane. Security events append with an outbox row in one transaction instead of rewriting the snapshot. Workers claim with SKIP LOCKED, retry, dead-letter, and record unique receipts. Stdout SIEM is at-least-once; the receipt is the exactly-once ack. Also deterministic ORDER BY on postgres loads (still-valid #98 finding). Do not re-implement the postgres gate. * feat(store): rustls for production PostgreSQL sslmode=require (#100) * feat(store): rustls for production PostgreSQL sslmode=require Issue #80 remainder. sslmode=require/verify-ca/verify-full connect with rustls and Mozilla roots; certificates are always verified. allow/prefer are still rejected so the process cannot silently drop to plaintext. Live test against plaintext CI postgres proves fail-closed. Do not re-implement the postgres gate or the outbox. * docs: record PR #100 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): rewrite verify-full sslmode for tokio-postgres 0.7 Still-valid #100 Devin finding. tokio-postgres 0.7 only parses disable/prefer/require. Map verify-ca/verify-full to require before connect; rustls still verifies certificates. Password query-lookalikes are left untouched. * feat(store): bound outbox listing and prune processed rows (#101) * feat(store): bound outbox listing and prune processed rows Still-valid #99 finding. GET /api/outbox returns at most EVENT_LIMIT rows (dead letters, then pending, then leased, then processed). Processed outbox_message rows prune to that cap; receipts and dead letters stay. Do not re-implement the outbox, postgres gate, or rustls. * docs: record PR #101 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): prune processed outbox to EVENT_LIMIT on save and ack Still-valid #101 Devin finding. Snapshot save and worker ack used LIST_LIMIT (1000) while append used operator EVENT_LIMIT. Store the configured cap on PostgresPlane so all three paths retain the same processed-row bound. Receipts and dead letters stay. * feat(store): logical backup and isolated restore drill (#102) * feat(store): logical backup and isolated restore drill Issue #80 remainder stacked on #101. GET /api/backup exports a hashed tenant snapshot; POST /api/backup restores after schema and payload-hash checks; POST /api/backup/drill restores into an isolated tenant, compares unmasked invariants, and drops the drill rows. Declared RPO is last successful export; declared RTO is 60s. File/memory adapters report backup=disabled. Do not re-implement rustls, outbox, or retention. * docs: record PR #102 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(store): non-owner PostgreSQL runtime role after migrate (#103) * feat(store): non-owner PostgreSQL runtime role after migrate Still-valid #98 finding. CI connects as a superuser, which bypasses FORCE RLS. Migrations stay on the login role, then SET ROLE wardnet_runtime (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS, not table owner). Missing tenant GUC yields no rows; DROP TABLE and DISABLE RLS are denied. Do not re-implement rustls, outbox, retention, or backup/restore. * docs: record PR #103 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): restore logical backups across role-only schema versions v3 only provisions wardnet_runtime and does not change table shape. verify() accepts schema 2 through the current migration version so a role-only upgrade cannot void the last pre-upgrade logical backup. * feat(store): HASH-partition security_event by tenant (#104) * feat(store): HASH-partition security_event by tenant Convert unpartitioned security_event to PARTITION BY HASH (tenant_id) with eight children under pg_advisory_lock. Rows keep unmasked client IPs and paths. /healthz.event_partitions reports the child count. Logical restore still accepts schema 2 through the current version. * docs: record PR #104 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(security): add bounded outbound fetch API (#113) * feat(security): add bounded outbound fetch API * fix(security): isolate fetch DNS pins per request * feat(security): route browser DNS and HTTPS through Wardnet (#116) * feat(security): add bounded outbound fetch API * feat(security): route browser DNS and HTTPS through Wardnet * fix(security): isolate fetch DNS pins per request * fix(dns): bound concurrent UDP query handling * fix(security): close destination policy review gaps * fix(runtime): make worker shutdown durable
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Summary
; cat /etc/passwdattributes to RCE over traversal), Log4j JNDI 944120 — raw and percent-encoded needles across URI and POST-body phases.CORAZA_LIB_PATH), creates a block route via the admin API, fires nine cases over real HTTP, and asserts each is 403-blocked citing the expected CRS rule id while benign traffic still forwards;/api/eventsmust record every attempt with the forwarded client IP kept unmasked (issue 서버를 켜고 Strix가 포트를 향해 각종 공격을 할 때 감지해내야 함 (CI) #11 detection evidence).docs/doctoring/ci-attack-evidence-battery.md(APA 7th) separates detection-path evidence (CI) from detection efficacy (operator-supplied libcoraza + Core Rule Set).Stacked on #109; retarget to
mainafter the release stack lands.Test plan
cargo fmt --checkcargo test --locked --workspace(includeslive_gateway_detects_owasp_attack_battery_end_to_endand the fixture-contract test)cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings