feat(store): HASH-partition security_event by tenant - #104
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Convert unpartitioned security_event to PARTITION BY HASH (tenant_id) with eight children under pg_advisory_lock. Rows keep unmasked client IPs and paths. /healthz.event_partitions reports the child count. Logical restore still accepts schema 2 through the current version.
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* feat(store): rustls for production PostgreSQL sslmode=require Issue #80 remainder. sslmode=require/verify-ca/verify-full connect with rustls and Mozilla roots; certificates are always verified. allow/prefer are still rejected so the process cannot silently drop to plaintext. Live test against plaintext CI postgres proves fail-closed. Do not re-implement the postgres gate or the outbox. * docs: record PR #100 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): rewrite verify-full sslmode for tokio-postgres 0.7 Still-valid #100 Devin finding. tokio-postgres 0.7 only parses disable/prefer/require. Map verify-ca/verify-full to require before connect; rustls still verifies certificates. Password query-lookalikes are left untouched. * feat(store): bound outbox listing and prune processed rows (#101) * feat(store): bound outbox listing and prune processed rows Still-valid #99 finding. GET /api/outbox returns at most EVENT_LIMIT rows (dead letters, then pending, then leased, then processed). Processed outbox_message rows prune to that cap; receipts and dead letters stay. Do not re-implement the outbox, postgres gate, or rustls. * docs: record PR #101 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): prune processed outbox to EVENT_LIMIT on save and ack Still-valid #101 Devin finding. Snapshot save and worker ack used LIST_LIMIT (1000) while append used operator EVENT_LIMIT. Store the configured cap on PostgresPlane so all three paths retain the same processed-row bound. Receipts and dead letters stay. * feat(store): logical backup and isolated restore drill (#102) * feat(store): logical backup and isolated restore drill Issue #80 remainder stacked on #101. GET /api/backup exports a hashed tenant snapshot; POST /api/backup restores after schema and payload-hash checks; POST /api/backup/drill restores into an isolated tenant, compares unmasked invariants, and drops the drill rows. Declared RPO is last successful export; declared RTO is 60s. File/memory adapters report backup=disabled. Do not re-implement rustls, outbox, or retention. * docs: record PR #102 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(store): non-owner PostgreSQL runtime role after migrate (#103) * feat(store): non-owner PostgreSQL runtime role after migrate Still-valid #98 finding. CI connects as a superuser, which bypasses FORCE RLS. Migrations stay on the login role, then SET ROLE wardnet_runtime (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS, not table owner). Missing tenant GUC yields no rows; DROP TABLE and DISABLE RLS are denied. Do not re-implement rustls, outbox, retention, or backup/restore. * docs: record PR #103 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): restore logical backups across role-only schema versions v3 only provisions wardnet_runtime and does not change table shape. verify() accepts schema 2 through the current migration version so a role-only upgrade cannot void the last pre-upgrade logical backup. * feat(store): HASH-partition security_event by tenant (#104) * feat(store): HASH-partition security_event by tenant Convert unpartitioned security_event to PARTITION BY HASH (tenant_id) with eight children under pg_advisory_lock. Rows keep unmasked client IPs and paths. /healthz.event_partitions reports the child count. Logical restore still accepts schema 2 through the current version. * docs: record PR #104 in the product-technical gap baseline
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| INSERT INTO {parent} ( | ||
| tenant_id, event_id, timestamp_unix, client_address, route_id, | ||
| action_name, event_reason, event_score, request_path | ||
| ) | ||
| SELECT tenant_id, event_id, timestamp_unix, client_address, route_id, | ||
| action_name, event_reason, event_score, request_path | ||
| FROM {unpartitioned}; | ||
| DROP TABLE {unpartitioned}; |
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🔴 In-place partition conversion can silently erase all security events
The conversion copies rows with SELECT ... FROM security_event_unpartitioned, but the renamed table keeps FORCE row-level security and its default-deny policy, and migrate sets no wardnet.tenant_id. A non-superuser owner running migrations reads zero rows, so the following DROP TABLE destroys every existing event. CI migrates as a superuser and the convert test uses a non-RLS probe table, so this is never caught.
Prompt for agents
In hash_partition_sql_for (src/control_plane.rs), the 'r'-branch that converts a populated unpartitioned security_event table copies rows via INSERT INTO {parent} SELECT ... FROM {unpartitioned}. The original security_event table has ENABLE + FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY with a default-deny tenant_isolation policy keyed on current_setting('wardnet.tenant_id', true); the RENAME preserves that. During migrate() no wardnet.tenant_id GUC is set, so under FORCE RLS the SELECT returns zero rows for any migrating role that is not RLS-exempt (e.g. a non-superuser table owner with CREATEROLE — a supported hardened deployment). The subsequent DROP TABLE {unpartitioned} then permanently loses every pre-existing security event. This is masked because CI migrates as the postgres superuser (bypasses RLS) and the conversion test uses a probe table with no RLS. Fix so the copy is not RLS-filtered regardless of the migrating role's privileges — e.g. issue ALTER TABLE {unpartitioned} NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY (and/or DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY) before the INSERT ... SELECT (the owner is permitted to do this and the table is dropped immediately afterward), or otherwise ensure all tenants' rows are copied. Add a test that converts a populated, RLS-forced security_event table (not a bare probe table) and asserts the row count is preserved.
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| let hash_sql = hash_partition_sql_for("security_event")?; | ||
| client | ||
| .batch_execute(&hash_sql) | ||
| .await | ||
| .map_err(|error| format!("control plane event hash partition failed: {error:?}"))?; |
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📝 Info: Hash-partition DDL re-runs on every connect
apply_schema runs hash_partition_sql_for on every connect, even when the version already matches and the table is already partitioned. The 'p' branch is idempotent (re-checks children, re-issues GRANTs) but adds a DO-block execution to each connection setup. Correct, just slightly wasteful.
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| async function loadKpis(){const k=await getJSON('/api/kpis');const h=await getJSON('/healthz'); | ||
| const t=[['Routes',k.route_count],['Threat indicators',k.threat_indicator_count],['DNSBL entries',k.dnsbl_entry_count],['Blocked events',k.blocked_event_count],['Monitor events',k.monitor_event_count],['Gateway mode',cap(k.gateway_mode)],['Event partitions',h.event_partitions??0]]; |
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📝 Info: KPI tile now couples to a second /healthz fetch
loadKpis now awaits both /api/kpis and /healthz to render the event-partitions tile. A /healthz failure now fails the whole KPI card, where before it depended only on /api/kpis. Minor added coupling.
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| i := 0; | ||
| WHILE i < {modulus} LOOP | ||
| EXECUTE format( | ||
| 'GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON {parent}_p%s TO wardnet_runtime', | ||
| i | ||
| ); | ||
| i := i + 1; | ||
| END LOOP; |
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🟨 Child event partitions lack row-level security
The conversion forces RLS only on the parent security_event, but grants the runtime role direct DML on each child security_event_p0..p7 without enabling RLS on them. A direct query to a child by that role returns all tenants' rows, bypassing the default-deny tenant policy. Access via the parent stays isolated, so this is a defense-in-depth gap, not an active exploit given current query paths.
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* feat(store): require PostgreSQL as the production control plane Non-loopback binds fail closed without CONTROL_PLANE_DATABASE_URL. Migrations create 3NF two-word tables with default-deny RLS. Snapshot persist commits policy rows and audit records in one transaction. Loopback still uses the JSON file or memory adapter. * feat(store): transactional outbox and leased workers Issue #81 first slice on the PostgreSQL control plane. Security events append with an outbox row in one transaction instead of rewriting the snapshot. Workers claim with SKIP LOCKED, retry, dead-letter, and record unique receipts. Stdout SIEM is at-least-once; the receipt is the exactly-once ack. Also deterministic ORDER BY on postgres loads (still-valid #98 finding). Do not re-implement the postgres gate. * feat(store): rustls for production PostgreSQL sslmode=require (#100) * feat(store): rustls for production PostgreSQL sslmode=require Issue #80 remainder. sslmode=require/verify-ca/verify-full connect with rustls and Mozilla roots; certificates are always verified. allow/prefer are still rejected so the process cannot silently drop to plaintext. Live test against plaintext CI postgres proves fail-closed. Do not re-implement the postgres gate or the outbox. * docs: record PR #100 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): rewrite verify-full sslmode for tokio-postgres 0.7 Still-valid #100 Devin finding. tokio-postgres 0.7 only parses disable/prefer/require. Map verify-ca/verify-full to require before connect; rustls still verifies certificates. Password query-lookalikes are left untouched. * feat(store): bound outbox listing and prune processed rows (#101) * feat(store): bound outbox listing and prune processed rows Still-valid #99 finding. GET /api/outbox returns at most EVENT_LIMIT rows (dead letters, then pending, then leased, then processed). Processed outbox_message rows prune to that cap; receipts and dead letters stay. Do not re-implement the outbox, postgres gate, or rustls. * docs: record PR #101 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): prune processed outbox to EVENT_LIMIT on save and ack Still-valid #101 Devin finding. Snapshot save and worker ack used LIST_LIMIT (1000) while append used operator EVENT_LIMIT. Store the configured cap on PostgresPlane so all three paths retain the same processed-row bound. Receipts and dead letters stay. * feat(store): logical backup and isolated restore drill (#102) * feat(store): logical backup and isolated restore drill Issue #80 remainder stacked on #101. GET /api/backup exports a hashed tenant snapshot; POST /api/backup restores after schema and payload-hash checks; POST /api/backup/drill restores into an isolated tenant, compares unmasked invariants, and drops the drill rows. Declared RPO is last successful export; declared RTO is 60s. File/memory adapters report backup=disabled. Do not re-implement rustls, outbox, or retention. * docs: record PR #102 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(store): non-owner PostgreSQL runtime role after migrate (#103) * feat(store): non-owner PostgreSQL runtime role after migrate Still-valid #98 finding. CI connects as a superuser, which bypasses FORCE RLS. Migrations stay on the login role, then SET ROLE wardnet_runtime (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS, not table owner). Missing tenant GUC yields no rows; DROP TABLE and DISABLE RLS are denied. Do not re-implement rustls, outbox, retention, or backup/restore. * docs: record PR #103 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): restore logical backups across role-only schema versions v3 only provisions wardnet_runtime and does not change table shape. verify() accepts schema 2 through the current migration version so a role-only upgrade cannot void the last pre-upgrade logical backup. * feat(store): HASH-partition security_event by tenant (#104) * feat(store): HASH-partition security_event by tenant Convert unpartitioned security_event to PARTITION BY HASH (tenant_id) with eight children under pg_advisory_lock. Rows keep unmasked client IPs and paths. /healthz.event_partitions reports the child count. Logical restore still accepts schema 2 through the current version. * docs: record PR #104 in the product-technical gap baseline
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* feat(security): fail-closed destination policy for outbound HTTP One DestinationPolicy mediates gateway upstreams, threat-intel fetches, Clearfolio, SOC LLM, and the Coraza sidecar URL. Private, loopback, link-local, CGNAT, and metadata classes are denied unless DESTINATION_ALLOWLIST (or loopback development) permits them; DESTINATION_DENYLIST wins. Clients ignore ambient HTTP proxies and do not follow redirects. Refs #79. * docs: record PR #96 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(security): harden destination policy per-IP CIDR and readiness order CIDR allowlist matches apply per resolved address, authorize non-default ports, and reject prefixes outside the address-family width. IPv6 site-local is a denied class. Hostnames that merely contain 0x are not hex IP literals. AppState constructors default to production policy; seeded fixtures opt into development. Blocking DNS runs on spawn_blocking with a timeout. Persistence and destination-list validation complete before the readiness line. * feat(security): pin outbound HTTP to evaluated destination addresses After destination policy allows a host, the reqwest client resolves only those IPs so a rebinding answer cannot reach loopback, private, or metadata classes. Host and SNI stay on the original name. Unpinned hostnames fail closed instead of falling back to OS DNS. * feat(waf): evaluate live gateway transactions with in-process libcoraza Issue #86 remainder: dlopen operator-supplied libcoraza and drive the C ABI on each /gateway request. Missing library or empty ruleset fail closed before bind. CI stays hermetic with a fixture cdylib that exports the same symbols. * docs: record PR #97 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(waf): forward bounded client headers into in-process libcoraza In-process transactions now receive the same forwarded-header allowlist as the sidecar path (host, user-agent, accept, content-type, referer, origin, x-requested-with, x-forwarded-for, x-real-ip, cookie — never Authorization; 32 headers / 8 KiB caps enforced by proven_engine::engine_forwarded_headers). Each header crosses the C ABI via coraza_add_request_header before process_request_headers, so CRS rules that inspect headers evaluate real client input instead of a synthetic Host only. Brings in the PR #95 sidecar hardening via merge so both engines share one allowlist implementation and one status/bound contract. Behavioral header-battery evidence lands with the issue-11 battery fixture (PR #110); this slice ships the plumbing and keeps the stub contract unchanged. * feat(store): require PostgreSQL as the production control plane (#98) * feat(store): require PostgreSQL as the production control plane Non-loopback binds fail closed without CONTROL_PLANE_DATABASE_URL. Migrations create 3NF two-word tables with default-deny RLS. Snapshot persist commits policy rows and audit records in one transaction. Loopback still uses the JSON file or memory adapter. * feat(store): transactional outbox and leased workers Issue #81 first slice on the PostgreSQL control plane. Security events append with an outbox row in one transaction instead of rewriting the snapshot. Workers claim with SKIP LOCKED, retry, dead-letter, and record unique receipts. Stdout SIEM is at-least-once; the receipt is the exactly-once ack. Also deterministic ORDER BY on postgres loads (still-valid #98 finding). Do not re-implement the postgres gate. * feat(store): rustls for production PostgreSQL sslmode=require (#100) * feat(store): rustls for production PostgreSQL sslmode=require Issue #80 remainder. sslmode=require/verify-ca/verify-full connect with rustls and Mozilla roots; certificates are always verified. allow/prefer are still rejected so the process cannot silently drop to plaintext. Live test against plaintext CI postgres proves fail-closed. Do not re-implement the postgres gate or the outbox. * docs: record PR #100 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): rewrite verify-full sslmode for tokio-postgres 0.7 Still-valid #100 Devin finding. tokio-postgres 0.7 only parses disable/prefer/require. Map verify-ca/verify-full to require before connect; rustls still verifies certificates. Password query-lookalikes are left untouched. * feat(store): bound outbox listing and prune processed rows (#101) * feat(store): bound outbox listing and prune processed rows Still-valid #99 finding. GET /api/outbox returns at most EVENT_LIMIT rows (dead letters, then pending, then leased, then processed). Processed outbox_message rows prune to that cap; receipts and dead letters stay. Do not re-implement the outbox, postgres gate, or rustls. * docs: record PR #101 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): prune processed outbox to EVENT_LIMIT on save and ack Still-valid #101 Devin finding. Snapshot save and worker ack used LIST_LIMIT (1000) while append used operator EVENT_LIMIT. Store the configured cap on PostgresPlane so all three paths retain the same processed-row bound. Receipts and dead letters stay. * feat(store): logical backup and isolated restore drill (#102) * feat(store): logical backup and isolated restore drill Issue #80 remainder stacked on #101. GET /api/backup exports a hashed tenant snapshot; POST /api/backup restores after schema and payload-hash checks; POST /api/backup/drill restores into an isolated tenant, compares unmasked invariants, and drops the drill rows. Declared RPO is last successful export; declared RTO is 60s. File/memory adapters report backup=disabled. Do not re-implement rustls, outbox, or retention. * docs: record PR #102 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(store): non-owner PostgreSQL runtime role after migrate (#103) * feat(store): non-owner PostgreSQL runtime role after migrate Still-valid #98 finding. CI connects as a superuser, which bypasses FORCE RLS. Migrations stay on the login role, then SET ROLE wardnet_runtime (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS, not table owner). Missing tenant GUC yields no rows; DROP TABLE and DISABLE RLS are denied. Do not re-implement rustls, outbox, retention, or backup/restore. * docs: record PR #103 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): restore logical backups across role-only schema versions v3 only provisions wardnet_runtime and does not change table shape. verify() accepts schema 2 through the current migration version so a role-only upgrade cannot void the last pre-upgrade logical backup. * feat(store): HASH-partition security_event by tenant (#104) * feat(store): HASH-partition security_event by tenant Convert unpartitioned security_event to PARTITION BY HASH (tenant_id) with eight children under pg_advisory_lock. Rows keep unmasked client IPs and paths. /healthz.event_partitions reports the child count. Logical restore still accepts schema 2 through the current version. * docs: record PR #104 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(security): add bounded outbound fetch API (#113) * feat(security): add bounded outbound fetch API * fix(security): isolate fetch DNS pins per request * feat(security): route browser DNS and HTTPS through Wardnet (#116) * feat(security): add bounded outbound fetch API * feat(security): route browser DNS and HTTPS through Wardnet * fix(security): isolate fetch DNS pins per request * fix(dns): bound concurrent UDP query handling * fix(security): close destination policy review gaps * fix(runtime): make worker shutdown durable
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* feat(security): fail-closed destination policy for outbound HTTP One DestinationPolicy mediates gateway upstreams, threat-intel fetches, Clearfolio, SOC LLM, and the Coraza sidecar URL. Private, loopback, link-local, CGNAT, and metadata classes are denied unless DESTINATION_ALLOWLIST (or loopback development) permits them; DESTINATION_DENYLIST wins. Clients ignore ambient HTTP proxies and do not follow redirects. Refs #79. * docs: record PR #96 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(security): harden destination policy per-IP CIDR and readiness order CIDR allowlist matches apply per resolved address, authorize non-default ports, and reject prefixes outside the address-family width. IPv6 site-local is a denied class. Hostnames that merely contain 0x are not hex IP literals. AppState constructors default to production policy; seeded fixtures opt into development. Blocking DNS runs on spawn_blocking with a timeout. Persistence and destination-list validation complete before the readiness line. * feat(security): pin outbound HTTP to evaluated destination addresses After destination policy allows a host, the reqwest client resolves only those IPs so a rebinding answer cannot reach loopback, private, or metadata classes. Host and SNI stay on the original name. Unpinned hostnames fail closed instead of falling back to OS DNS. * feat(waf): evaluate live gateway transactions with in-process libcoraza Issue #86 remainder: dlopen operator-supplied libcoraza and drive the C ABI on each /gateway request. Missing library or empty ruleset fail closed before bind. CI stays hermetic with a fixture cdylib that exports the same symbols. * docs: record PR #97 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(store): require PostgreSQL as the production control plane Non-loopback binds fail closed without CONTROL_PLANE_DATABASE_URL. Migrations create 3NF two-word tables with default-deny RLS. Snapshot persist commits policy rows and audit records in one transaction. Loopback still uses the JSON file or memory adapter. * feat(store): transactional outbox and leased workers Issue #81 first slice on the PostgreSQL control plane. Security events append with an outbox row in one transaction instead of rewriting the snapshot. Workers claim with SKIP LOCKED, retry, dead-letter, and record unique receipts. Stdout SIEM is at-least-once; the receipt is the exactly-once ack. Also deterministic ORDER BY on postgres loads (still-valid #98 finding). Do not re-implement the postgres gate. * feat(store): rustls for production PostgreSQL sslmode=require (#100) * feat(store): rustls for production PostgreSQL sslmode=require Issue #80 remainder. sslmode=require/verify-ca/verify-full connect with rustls and Mozilla roots; certificates are always verified. allow/prefer are still rejected so the process cannot silently drop to plaintext. Live test against plaintext CI postgres proves fail-closed. Do not re-implement the postgres gate or the outbox. * docs: record PR #100 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): rewrite verify-full sslmode for tokio-postgres 0.7 Still-valid #100 Devin finding. tokio-postgres 0.7 only parses disable/prefer/require. Map verify-ca/verify-full to require before connect; rustls still verifies certificates. Password query-lookalikes are left untouched. * feat(store): bound outbox listing and prune processed rows (#101) * feat(store): bound outbox listing and prune processed rows Still-valid #99 finding. GET /api/outbox returns at most EVENT_LIMIT rows (dead letters, then pending, then leased, then processed). Processed outbox_message rows prune to that cap; receipts and dead letters stay. Do not re-implement the outbox, postgres gate, or rustls. * docs: record PR #101 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): prune processed outbox to EVENT_LIMIT on save and ack Still-valid #101 Devin finding. Snapshot save and worker ack used LIST_LIMIT (1000) while append used operator EVENT_LIMIT. Store the configured cap on PostgresPlane so all three paths retain the same processed-row bound. Receipts and dead letters stay. * feat(store): logical backup and isolated restore drill (#102) * feat(store): logical backup and isolated restore drill Issue #80 remainder stacked on #101. GET /api/backup exports a hashed tenant snapshot; POST /api/backup restores after schema and payload-hash checks; POST /api/backup/drill restores into an isolated tenant, compares unmasked invariants, and drops the drill rows. Declared RPO is last successful export; declared RTO is 60s. File/memory adapters report backup=disabled. Do not re-implement rustls, outbox, or retention. * docs: record PR #102 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(store): non-owner PostgreSQL runtime role after migrate (#103) * feat(store): non-owner PostgreSQL runtime role after migrate Still-valid #98 finding. CI connects as a superuser, which bypasses FORCE RLS. Migrations stay on the login role, then SET ROLE wardnet_runtime (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS, not table owner). Missing tenant GUC yields no rows; DROP TABLE and DISABLE RLS are denied. Do not re-implement rustls, outbox, retention, or backup/restore. * docs: record PR #103 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): restore logical backups across role-only schema versions v3 only provisions wardnet_runtime and does not change table shape. verify() accepts schema 2 through the current migration version so a role-only upgrade cannot void the last pre-upgrade logical backup. * feat(store): HASH-partition security_event by tenant (#104) * feat(store): HASH-partition security_event by tenant Convert unpartitioned security_event to PARTITION BY HASH (tenant_id) with eight children under pg_advisory_lock. Rows keep unmasked client IPs and paths. /healthz.event_partitions reports the child count. Logical restore still accepts schema 2 through the current version. * docs: record PR #104 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(store): optimistic concurrency on postgres snapshots Issue #80 last remainder. tenant_account.snapshot_version must match the loaded token or persist fails closed (HTTP 409). Restores overwrite. File/memory stay single-writer. Do not re-implement rustls, outbox, runtime role, HASH, or backup/restore. * docs: record PR #105 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): keep postgres snapshot_version aligned after startup save load_postgres was saving with OCC and leaving the in-memory token one behind the database, so every later management write returned HTTP 409. Advance the loaded snapshot_version to the value save() wrote. * feat(store): outbox consumers for TAXII, Clearfolio, and orchestrator Enqueue operator-triggered TAXII polls, Clearfolio submits, and contextual-orchestrator SOC analysis on the PostgreSQL leased outbox. Request path returns 202; GET /api/outbox/{id} exposes receipt evidence. Secrets stay in the credential registry. Startup postgres save advances snapshot_version so the first management write cannot false-conflict. * docs: record PR #106 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(release): tagged GitHub Release with SHA-256 and immutable GHCR (#107) * feat(release): tagged GitHub Release with SHA-256 and immutable GHCR Issue #84 first slice. A vX.Y.Z tag builds a locked binary, checksums, a GitHub Release, and ghcr.io/contextualwisdomlab/waf-ids-ai-soc:vX.Y.Z with no moving latest tag. Promotion and rollback are tag-for-tag. Do not re-implement store slices or OCC. * docs: record PR #107 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(release): basename checksums and serialize postgres GRANTs SHA256SUMS recorded dist/ prefixes so sha256sum -c failed next to the downloaded binary. Emit basenames. Parallel PostgresPlane connects raced HASH convert GRANT with SET ROLE GRANT (tuple concurrently updated); hold the advisory lock across both. Do not re-implement HASH layout. * feat(release): keyless cosign, SPDX SBOM, and SLSA on the same tag Issue #84 remainder. GitHub OIDC signs the binary, checksums, SBOMs, and the GHCR image by digest. Release is created only after signatures. Syft SPDX fails closed without syft or non-SPDX JSON. NIST SP 800-218 is attached. Do not re-implement checksums or store slices. * feat(release): refuse lightweight tags and pin k8s by digest Issue #84 remainder. Annotated vX.Y.Z tags only; lightweight tags fail closed before the release job builds. Kubernetes pin is the GHCR content digest; tag aliases are refused. Do not re-implement checksums or cosign/SBOM. * docs: record PR #109 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(waf): detect OWASP CRS attack battery on the live binary Issue #11 first slice. The build-script libcoraza ABI stub gains a deterministic battery covering SQLi (942100), XSS (941100), path traversal (930100), Unix RCE (932100, with first-match ordering so '; cat /etc/passwd' attributes to RCE over traversal), and Log4j JNDI (944120) in raw and percent-encoded forms across URI and POST-body phases. tests/binary.rs now starts the real gateway with the stub engine, creates a block route through the admin API, fires nine cases over HTTP, and asserts each is 403-blocked citing the expected CRS rule id while a benign request still forwards; /api/events must record one event per attempt with the forwarded client IP kept unmasked. Doctoring: docs/doctoring/ci-attack-evidence-battery.md grounds the split between detection-path evidence (CI) and detection efficacy (operator-supplied libcoraza + Core Rule Set), APA 7th. * fix(control-plane): close OCC and credential race gaps * fix(release): capture pushed image digest
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Summary
Issue #80 remaining after runtime role (#103). Does not re-implement #78, sidecar #95, pin #96, libcoraza #97, postgres gate #98, outbox #99/#101, rustls #100, backup/restore #102, or the runtime role.
security_eventisPARTITION BY HASH (tenant_id)with eight children. Fresh installs convert the unpartitionedCREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTStable underpg_advisory_lock. Existing unpartitioned tables convert in place and keep unmasked client IPs and paths./healthz.event_partitionsreports8on PostgreSQL and0on file/memory. The embedded/adminKPI tile shows the count.Logical restore still accepts schema 2 through the current
MIGRATION_VERSION(MIN_RESTORABLE_SCHEMA_VERSION). HASH is an on-disk layout; it does not void pre-upgrade logical backups.Stacked on #103 (
feat/issue-80-runtime-role). Merge order: #95, then #96, then #97, then #98, then #99, then #100, then #103, then this PR. Org ruleset 18156473 still requires two independent approvals; do not--adminmerge.Tests
cargo fmt --checkcargo test --locked --workspace(includes livepostgres_security_event_is_hash_partitionedandpostgres_hash_partition_convert_preserves_unmasked_probe_rows)cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warningsscripts/smoke.shruns (/healthz+/admin, 2B KRW readiness,event_partitions=0on file)/healthz.event_partitions=8,/admintile,/api/commercial/readiness2B KRWDoctoring:
docs/doctoring/postgres-control-plane.md(APA 7th, PostgreSQL table partitioning).Remaining on #80: optimistic concurrency. Remaining on #81: additional consumers (TAXII poll, Clearfolio, contextual-orchestrator).