Playbook Threat Modeling

Threat Modeling

Objective

Identify assets, trust boundaries, abuse cases, and control priorities for a system or workflow.

Inputs

• architecture notes or diagrams
• system description
• user roles and data flows
• assumptions and constraints

SMEs involved

Typically security-threat-modeling, sometimes security-architecture, and finally security-qa.

Flow

1. intake
2. system decomposition
3. asset and boundary identification
4. abuse-case generation
5. control prioritization
6. QA

Gates

• enough system context to model boundaries
• explicit assumptions
• QA pass on clarity and traceability

Outputs

• threat model
• abuse cases
• control recommendations
• assumptions and residual risk

Limitations

A threat model is only as good as the system context provided.

Sanitized example

Model trust boundaries for an internal admin workflow serving multiple tenants.