

# Protecting Cryptography Against Compelled Self-Incrimination

## Authors:

Sarah Scheffler and Mayank Varia, *Boston University*

## Abstract:

The information security community has devoted substantial effort to the design, development, and universal deployment of strong encryption schemes that withstand search and seizure by computationally-powerful nation-state adversaries. In response, governments are increasingly turning to a different tactic: issuing subpoenas that compel people to decrypt devices themselves, under the penalty of contempt of court if they do not comply. Compelled decryption subpoenas sidestep questions around government search powers that have dominated the Crypto Wars and instead touch upon a different (and still unsettled) area of the law: how encryption relates to a person's right to silence and against self-incrimination.

In this work, we provide a rigorous, composable definition of a critical piece of the law that determines whether cryptosystems are vulnerable to government compelled disclosure in the United States. We justify our definition by showing that it is consistent with prior court cases. We prove that decryption is often *not* compellable by the government under our definition. Conversely, we show that many techniques that bolster security overall can leave one more vulnerable to compelled disclosure.

As a result, we initiate the study of protecting cryptographic protocols against the threat of future compelled disclosure. We find that secure multi-party computation is particularly vulnerable to this threat, and we design and implement new schemes that are provably resilient in the face of government compelled disclosure. We believe this work should influence the design of future cryptographic primitives and contribute toward the legal debates over the constitutionality of compelled decryption.

## Open Access Media

USENIX is committed to Open Access to the research presented at our events. Papers and proceedings are freely available to everyone once the event begins. Any video, audio, and/or slides that are posted after the event are also free and open to everyone. [Support USENIX](#) and our commitment to Open Access.

BibTeX



## Presentation Video

USENIX Security '21 - Protecting Cryptography Against Compelled Self-Incrimination



### ATTEND

Registration Information  
Student Grant Application  
Diversity Grant Application  
Grants for Black Computer  
Science Students Application

### PROGRAM

Technical Sessions  
Summer Accepted Papers  
Fall Accepted Papers

### PARTICIPATE

Call for Papers  
Submission Policies and  
Instructions  
Call for Artifacts  
Artifact Evaluation Information  
Instructions for Presenters  
Hack@Sec

### SPONSORS

Sponsor Events  
Sponsor and Exhibitor Info

### ABOUT

Symposium Organizers  
Past Symposia  
Conference Policies  
Code of Conduct  
Questions

