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Credits and Revenue Clearing

mister-mayflower edited this page Nov 14, 2026 · 5 revisions

Mayflower credits are the clearing asset used in Mayflower's revenue-clearing auction. Participants commit credits during an epoch to claim shares of a pot funded with a reward asset. The reward asset can differ from credits.

In the intended AVM integration, market actions synchronously fund these pots with their protocol-fee allocations in the base reserve asset. Each pot keeps that asset denomination. Credits provide a common bidding unit across pots with different reward assets. Bidders decide what those assets are worth to them. Settlement uses the token amounts in each pot and their weighted shares.

The referral specification defines separate family-escrow and admission uses for issued credits. The clearing specification defines the auction; using credits for one purpose does not give them weight in another.

Committing and spending credits

A deposit earns shares according to when it is made; an earlier deposit can receive more shares per credit. Before the deadline, a participant can withdraw from its newest surviving deposit lots, consuming them in newest-first order. It gives up the corresponding shares and receives the refund computed once for the total withdrawn amount. The remaining withdrawn principal is the penalty and is burned during that withdrawal.

At the deadline, deposits, withdrawals, and funding stop. Finalization burns all remaining committed credits and fixes the reward pot and surviving shares. Each position can then claim its proportional share of the pot, rounded down to whole reward base units. The burn happens even if the funded pot is zero.

Claims use the same frozen totals, so claim order does not change entitlement. Unclaimed rewards and rounding residuals remain in the epoch vault. If no shares survive, no position is eligible to claim through this algorithm. The current lifecycle has no recovery or remainder-sweep operation; it does not automatically transfer those funds to protocol custody.

A participant that withdraws all of its deposits has no surviving shares, though its withdrawals may have incurred penalties. The exact entry and exit formulas are described in Time Weight.

How clearing relates to emission

Clearing consumes already-issued credits. It does not set the emitter's planned continuously decreasing rate $E(t)$. The referral allocation model divides the scheduled budget, and newly accrued emission does not itself fund a clearing pot. Uncollected referral rewards must first be collected into issued credits before those credits can be committed to clearing.

The reference integration uses exclusive custody across channel pledges, family escrow, clearing commitments, and auction bids. A credit in family escrow must first be withdrawn with its prior family earnings settled; a channel pledge must first be reduced. An auction bid must be released under that auction's rules before its principal can be used elsewhere.

Family escrow is different from clearing: its principal remains withdrawable without a mandatory penalty or forfeiture. Ordinary referral admission transfers a credit fee to the parent, while a scarce top-level seat's winning auction payment burns credits. Neither payment creates clearing shares or funds the clearing pot.

Collections add issued supply. Transfers and refundable custody movements do not change it. Clearing burns reduce supply during withdrawal or finalization; root-auction payment burns also reduce supply. Neither burn authorizes replacement emission. Burning credits does not itself create the reward asset or fund a revenue pot.

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