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Revenue Clearing Rationale
On a public blockchain, accepted commitments and funding reveal the current pot and outstanding shares. With a fixed deadline, a bidder who waits gets to see more of that activity and gives others less time to react. Future bids, funding, and transaction inclusion remain uncertain.
Sniping exploits the fixed close. If a token buys the same number of shares throughout the auction, a bidder can watch the pot and competing shares grow and decide at the last moment whether to participate. An early bidder commits while those values are still changing and exposes their bid for others to react to.
A stink bid is a large apparent commitment that makes the reward per share look unattractive to other bidders. If it is free to cancel near the deadline, the bidder can recover the principal after others have decided to sit out or commit less. The bid influenced their choices despite carrying little cost for the bidder who posted it.
In revenue clearing, a deposit puts actual clearing tokens in escrow. The deposit increases visible competition and creates a claim on the pot if its shares survive. A withdrawal gives up the shares backed by the withdrawn principal and burns a fraction of that principal. Any clearing tokens still committed at finalization are burned in full.
Burning the principal keeps the payment for shares separate from the funded reward asset. Bidders supply their own valuations when bidding, and the pot pays out in the asset it received. Revenue Clearing
Let
Entering early earns extra shares in exchange for committing before the final
pot and competition are known. Waiting lets a bidder observe more data or
avoid committing entirely if the auction turns out to be unattractive.
The linear curve gives up the same amount of potential weight for each second
of waiting. This makes the tradeoff predictable even when bids and funding
arrive in bursts. With
The slope
Early in the epoch, other bidders have time to react when new funding or competition prompts someone to revise a bid. Later, a bidder has had longer to observe how others responded to their displayed commitment. Canceling close to the deadline can leave others little time to revise decisions made under that apparent demand.
The ideal penalty on the withdrawn principal is
With
An exponent of one gives a constant rate of increase. Larger exponents lower
the penalty between the endpoints and concentrate more of the rise near the
deadline. A channel can reward early entry strongly and still give bidders
room to revise. At
- Late bids can still earn more shares by committing more tokens. Inclusion and ordering still determine which actions land before the deadline.
- A sole bidder with positive shares receives the whole funded pot. Economic competition depends on other bidders showing up and committing tokens.
- The funded reward and surviving shares determine the payout. Promised funding carries no claimable balance, and remaining principal burns even when the funded pot is empty.
Every claim uses the same final pot and share total. Bidders can calculate the effect of an accepted action from public state, while the eventual payout depends on the rest of the auction. Formal Specification
AVM
AVM features
Linear AVM
Referral network
- Overview
- Rationale
- Specification
- Parameters and authority
- Family marketing
- Choosing a parent
- Diagrams
Credits
- Mayflower Credits
- Earning credits
- Channel weighting
- Credits and revenue clearing
- Long-term economics
Credit emissions
- Overview
- Emission rate and cumulative budget
- Lane allocation
- Participation and referral rewards
- Accrual, collection, and conservation
Revenue clearing