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Revenue Clearing Formal Specification
Participants commit clearing tokens for shares of a funded reward pot. Entry time determines the shares created. Withdrawal time determines the forfeiture of principal. Finalization fixes the reward pot and surviving shares for proportional claims. Revenue Clearing Rationale · Time Weight
An epoch begins at
Each auction fixes two parameters.
-
Entry bonus slope
$b$ , with$0\le b\le2$ . The ideal entry weight starts at$1+b$ and declines linearly toward 1. The reference value is$b=1$ . -
Exit penalty exponent
$k\in\{1,2,3,4\}$ . It determines the shape of the withdrawal penalty. The reference$k=2$ gives a quadratic penalty, and$k=1$ gives a linear penalty.
The duration
For a repeating schedule with master start
The group's recorded epoch advances one counter at a time after the current epoch ends. A live action must refer to that recorded current epoch and execute in its live interval. Creating a channel also opens its first auction in the group's current live epoch. A channel may skip later epochs and opens at most one auction per epoch. An auction opened partway through an epoch uses the group epoch's start for both curves. Each auction has its own pot, positions, and shares. Earlier auctions can be finalized and claimed independently of later ones. Timestamp additions and counter increments must fit their storage ranges.
During a live epoch, let
Principal and rewards are accounted in whole base units of their respective
assets. Shares, weights, and fractions use a fixed-point grid of quantum
Rounding is directed consistently: entry weight and shares round down; the withdrawal penalty and partial-lot share removal round up; returned principal and claims round down to whole units. These choices prevent fractional accounting from creating additional whole-unit claims. Amounts and timestamps are unsigned 64-bit integers; epoch counters are unsigned 32-bit integers. Shares and intermediate results must fit the selected fixed-point range. A failed range or relationship check rejects the transition. An integration must commit accounting and token settlement atomically.
A funder adds a whole amount
Exactly
For
A positive whole deposit
Add
The deposit action evaluates entry weight at execution time. It has no minimum-share argument.
Withdrawals are accepted only in the live interval and consume the newest
surviving lots first. For a requested whole amount
The shares removed are
The ideal penalty fraction is
Remove each lot's
In ideal arithmetic, the newest lot has the lowest or tied entry weight, so consuming it preserves the most shares for a given withdrawal. Whole-unit rounding occurs per withdrawal, so dividing withdrawals or deposits among positions can change the amount returned and shares sacrificed.
At or after the deadline, finalization burns the recorded committed principal and freezes the surviving shares and tracked net reward. Anyone may submit the Solana finalization instruction.
If
The multiplication and division are performed together with downward rounding,
without first rounding
The current Solana claim closes the bidder position after transferring its reward, with authorization from the position's owner. It also closes a positive-share position whose whole-unit payout is zero. An empty position cannot use this claim action. No epoch-closure or reward-remainder sweep is provided. Unclaimed rewards, final rounding remainder, and the whole pot of a zero-share epoch remain in escrow. No participant receives another participant's fractional remainder, and no entitlement carries into a later epoch.
For a reachable active epoch, lots add up to the epoch totals and
The lower bound survives upward rounding of partial share removal. For a lot
with
Principal accepted equals principal returned plus withdrawal burns plus principal burned at finalization. Before finalization, replace its burn term with the still-committed principal. Principal and reward can be different assets and are accounted separately.
For a positive-share epoch after all claims, let
For
Splitting a fixed share entitlement across claimants cannot increase its total payout: the sum of individually rounded-down payouts cannot exceed the payout obtained by rounding their combined entitlement down once. All positions use the same frozen ratio, and no last claimant receives the rounding remainder of an earlier claim.
AVM
AVM features
Linear AVM
Referral network
- Overview
- Rationale
- Specification
- Parameters and authority
- Family marketing
- Choosing a parent
- Diagrams
Credits
- Mayflower Credits
- Earning credits
- Channel weighting
- Credits and revenue clearing
- Long-term economics
Credit emissions
- Overview
- Emission rate and cumulative budget
- Lane allocation
- Participation and referral rewards
- Accrual, collection, and conservation
Revenue clearing