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Referral Network Rationale

mister-mayflower edited this page Nov 9, 2026 · 5 revisions

The Referral Network combines two choices: fixed commissions based on descendant asset balances, and discretionary marketing for competing over children. Neither enlarges the global emission budget. Admission prices and marketing policies are participant choices within those rules.

Reward capital participation throughout the downline

Every earning ancestor receives the same fraction $q$ of a descendant source's gross attribution. When Bob recruits Carol, Carol's eligible balance attributes part of the scheduled credits to Alice even if Bob has no assets of his own. The asset principal is not spent on commissions. Alice earns more credits than if the same incoming capital joined outside her subtree; this does not guarantee more income than before that capital entered. Commissions depend on eligible assets and their ancestry, not a reward for each account merely existing.

Each commission is calculated from the source's original attribution. With $q=10\%$, a depth-2 source retains 80% and assigns 10% to each ancestor. There is no compounded sequence of percentage deductions.

A shared emission budget still creates dilution. Suppose Alice is the only asset holder, with 100 eligible units, and initially receives the entire lane's allocation. Another 100 units joining directly under her gives her 110 core units out of 200, or 55%. If that capital instead joined a different top-level branch, she would have 100 out of 200, or 50%. Recruiting improves her outcome relative to that alternative; it does not preserve her original 100% share.

These are fractions of the lane's available budget. The global emission rate also decreases continuously, so an unchanged percentage does not promise an unchanged credit income per unit of time.

Depth has an economic cost

A deeper node has both a lower own-asset retention fraction and less recruiting room. The finite bound $H$ limits the total commission burden and keeps the maximum number of paid ancestors explicit. $Hq\lt 1$ preserves a positive own-asset share at the bottom.

Finite depth alone does not create scarce top positions. That scarcity comes from protocol-authorized auctions of depth-zero seats under a non-earning root. Winning payments burn credits. Ordinary parents separately price admission to their branches and may offer free entry to attract future participation.

Auctions limit the number of seats, not the number one beneficial owner may control. Seat scarcity does not itself prevent concentrated ownership or a monopoly over top-level positions.

What splitting neutrality actually means

Consider one owner's connected region, whose highest owned member has $d$ outside earning ancestors. Look only at the attribution generated by that owner's fixed assets in a lane. Each asset unit pays those same outside ancestors $dq$, wherever it sits within the owned region. All commissions to owned intermediaries remain inside the group.

Consequently, the group retains $(1-dq)$ of its own assets' gross attribution. Splitting those assets among owned descendants does not increase that combined core amount. Existing outside assets may also fund commissions to the group; hold those assets and their existing connections fixed for this comparison.

This is a limited property, not proof of human identity or resistance to every coalition strategy. For example, with $q=10\%$ and $H=7$, a seat owner can create six empty accounts beneath it before admitting an outside depositor at depth 7. With marketing turned off, the owner's seven ancestor accounts together receive 70% of that depositor's gross attribution; admitting the depositor directly under the seat would pay the owner 10%. The depositor retains 30% or 90%, respectively. Scarce seats and permanent edges do not prevent this arrangement.

The example earns more from outside capital, so it does not contradict own-capital splitting neutrality. It does rule out a stronger claim that extra owned accounts can never improve an owner's referral income. Pooling capital above an outside intermediary or acquiring a different family's offer is also a different arrangement. Permanent edges prevent inserting an intermediary above an existing member; they do not identify which new accounts share an owner.

Movable capital can bypass an intermediary

Permanent edges do not make the economic position of an intermediary permanent. Suppose A is a top-level seat, B is A's child, C is B's child, and only C has assets. At $q=10\%$ with marketing off, 100 gross credits divide as 10 to A, 10 to B, and 80 to C. If A and C instead pool those assets in A's eligible position, it earns 100. An arrangement returning 89 to C and keeping 11 for A benefits both while B receives nothing. C's original node simply becomes empty.

This requires custody and redistribution that participants find acceptable; it does not require duplicated balances or a changed parent edge. Efficient pools at top-level seats could therefore undercut deeper positions. The model allows this competition, but cannot promise that multilevel intermediaries remain economically necessary or continue receiving capital from old recruits.

Why use credit escrow for family marketing?

Equal rewards per child would reward manufacturing accounts. Weighting children by escrowed credits instead requires a real, exclusively held resource. Splitting 100 credits among ten sibling accounts gives the same combined share as staking 100 through one account. An empty account receives no family allocation.

Credits also provide one unit across asset lanes. The parent first earns its overrides in credits under the asset and allocation rules. It then divides its chosen marketing budget by immediate-child credit escrow, without comparing raw BTC, ETH, or SOL quantities again.

This budget gives siblings exposure to each other's recruiting. A nephew's assets can increase the grandparent's gross overrides without increasing the uncle's competing escrow denominator. That makes expected family growth relevant when shopping for a link.

Credit escrow does not itself generate additional commissions or emission. It competes for a fraction of someone else's already allocated income. Borrowing credits over real elapsed time is capital rental, not evidence of independent people or unleveraged wealth. Correct historical settlement prevents a temporary new stake from collecting an earlier pool.

Why let parents change the offer?

Mutualization is a marketing budget. A parent may raise it to attract children, lower it when expected participation changes, or stop it. The payment rule determines how each elapsed interval is allocated; it does not guarantee a future percentage or a profitable campaign.

A parent can stake credits through child accounts it controls. That can recapture some of its offered pool, just as reducing $\mu$ retains more commissions directly. The design permits this behavior. It does not require identifying the parent's beneficial ownership, or treating a fee paid to oneself as a real external cost.

Future admission revenue and reputation can make a generous offer worthwhile. They do not automatically make it permanent or prove that every parent will honor today's rate indefinitely. Children choose how much credit principal to commit and can withdraw it; their existing parent connections remain fixed.

Keep the financial flows separate

An ordinary join fee is a price paid to a parent. A winning top-seat payment is burned. Escrow remains the child's withdrawable property. Core credits are earned from eligible assets, and family allocations reallocate gross overrides. These roles must not be counted twice.

This separation supports a simple market without account-count bonuses, permanent family shares, or mandatory marketing promises. It also makes the limits visible: global dilution, competing escrow, changing gauge allocations, and discretionary offers all affect what a member earns. See Mutualization for the mechanics and Emission Accounting for the chronology required to implement them.

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