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WebRTC has no ICE candidates behind a proxy

The short version: a residential proxy tunnels TCP and drops UDP, STUN needs UDP, so the gathering that should produce a public candidate produces nothing. A real Firefox behind a home router never comes back empty. So "empty" does not read as "private", it reads as "manipulated".

You route the browser through a residential proxy, open a detection page, and the WebRTC section comes back empty. No local candidate, no server reflexive candidate, nothing. It feels like a win, because nothing leaked. It is not a win. An empty candidate list is one of the loudest signals a fingerprinting page can read, and this page is about why the emptiness happens and why it is the tell.

The empty list is the tell, not the leak

Most WebRTC advice is written around the opposite failure: the browser exposing your real local address next to the proxy's. That is a real problem and it has its own page. But the failure people hit behind a working proxy is the mirror image, and it is worse because it looks like success.

A browser that has gathered ICE candidates emits at least two kinds. A host candidate, which is the machine's own address (or a masked .local form of it), and a server reflexive candidate, the srflx, which is the public address a STUN server saw the traffic arrive from. Behind NAT, which is every home connection, a real Firefox always produces a srflx, because that is the entire point of STUN: to discover the public side of the NAT.

So a detector does not need to inspect the candidates to be suspicious. It counts them. Zero candidates under a desktop user agent, on a page that just asked for them, is a state a normal browser on a normal network does not reach. A model does not have to know why the list is empty to score the emptiness. This is the general rule that shows up across every surface: a suppressed signal is itself a signal, and asserting the absence of a leak is not the same as asserting the presence of a real value.

Why a residential proxy makes STUN return nothing

STUN, the Session Traversal Utilities for NAT protocol, works over UDP. It sends a small datagram to a STUN server and reads back the public address and port the server observed. That round trip is how the srflx candidate gets its value.

A SOCKS5 residential proxy, of the kind sold as a pool of home IP addresses, almost always carries TCP and refuses UDP. Even the SOCKS5 UDP ASSOCIATE command, which the protocol defines precisely for this, is typically unimplemented at the exit. So when the browser tries to send its STUN datagram through the tunnel, the datagram has nowhere to go. The STUN transaction times out. No public address comes back, so no srflx candidate is formed.

This is not a browser bug and it is not something a JavaScript patch can fix, because the packet genuinely cannot traverse the tunnel. It is a property of the transport you chose. If you want to understand why UDP and TCP behave so differently through these tunnels, SOCKS5 versus HTTP proxying covers what each one actually forwards.

The consequence for stealth is direct. Do nothing, and the proxy silently strips your one guaranteed public candidate, and the list that remains is either short or empty in a way a real network never produces.

The second cause, which is subtler: the default-route probe

There is a second way to reach zero candidates, and it fires even before STUN is attempted. It is worth knowing because it explains an empty list on pages that never prompted for any device.

A page that has not been granted camera or microphone permission does not get the full candidate set. To limit what an untrusted page can learn about your interfaces, the browser switches into a reduced mode, one of the WebRTC IP address handling modes, in which it only offers the address of the default route: the single interface your traffic would leave by. Deciding which interface that is requires a quick internal probe. The browser opens a UDP socket and "connects" it to the remote address of the document, not to send anything, but to ask the operating system which local address that route would use.

Behind a SOCKS proxy, that remote is not reachable directly. The probe is UDP, it is aimed at an address the proxy has interposed itself in front of, and it fails. In the reduced mode, a failed default-route probe is fatal to gathering: it returns a failure, and the whole candidate list comes back empty. So on an ordinary page, one with no media prompt at all, the very step that is supposed to pick a safe address to advertise collapses into advertising nothing.

That is the part that makes the emptiness so easy to ship by accident. It is not the exotic case of a page requesting your webcam. It is the default case, and it is exactly the case a detection page exercises.

What a real Firefox emits, and what the fix guarantees

The reference is a stock Firefox behind a home router. Open a WebRTC probe in one, on a normal connection, and you get a host candidate and a server reflexive candidate whose address is your public IP. Non-empty, with a srflx present. That is the shape a detector expects, and matching it is the goal.

The three states a detector can observe, side by side:

WebRTC state Candidate count Server reflexive (srflx) Reads as
Stock Firefox behind a home NAT Non-empty Present, carries the public IP Normal
Untouched engine via a SOCKS5 proxy Short or empty Missing (UDP dropped) Manipulated
This project's fix via the same proxy Non-empty Present, carries the proxy egress IP Normal

The fix in this project targets both failure paths so the observed shape matches that reference through a proxy:

  • When the default-route probe fails, gathering does not abort. It falls back to the local addresses that were already collected and filtered, so the reduced mode still has something valid to work from instead of returning empty.
  • The host addresses are masked into the .local form, so the local network is not exposed even though the list is non-empty.
  • A server reflexive candidate is synthesized from the proxy's own egress address, the address the browser is genuinely reaching the internet from, so the srflx a real NAT would have produced is present and correct rather than missing. The realness of that candidate, its priority and foundation matching what a genuine gather produces, is covered in ICE candidate spoofing.

The measured result, through a SOCKS5 residential exit: the host candidate reads as .local, the server reflexive candidate carries the proxy egress IP, the public IP the page reports equals that egress, and CreepJS shows the WebRTC panel complete and unblocked rather than recording a suppressed probe. Zero of the "empty list" and "blocked" states that the untouched paths produce. None of this changes the behaviour without a proxy, where the real gather runs normally.

Reproduce it and read the candidates yourself

The only way to trust any of this is to read the candidate list on the path you deploy on, through the proxy you deploy with, not on localhost. Here is the probe. It creates a peer connection, waits for gathering to complete, and returns the raw candidate lines so you can count them and inspect the addresses.

from invisible_playwright import InvisiblePlaywright

GATHER_ICE = """
() => new Promise((resolve) => {
    const pc = new RTCPeerConnection();
    const lines = [];
    pc.onicecandidate = (e) => {
        if (e.candidate) {
            lines.push(e.candidate.candidate);
        } else {
            resolve(lines);   // null candidate marks gathering complete
        }
    };
    pc.createDataChannel("probe");
    pc.createOffer().then((offer) => pc.setLocalDescription(offer));
    setTimeout(() => resolve(lines), 5000);  // do not hang if it stalls
});
"""

proxy = {
    "server": "socks5://gate.example.com:1080",
    "username": "user",
    "password": "pass",
}

with InvisiblePlaywright(seed=42, proxy=proxy) as browser:
    page = browser.new_page()
    page.goto("https://example.com")
    candidates = page.evaluate(GATHER_ICE)

    print("candidate count:", len(candidates))
    has_srflx = any(" typ srflx " in c for c in candidates)
    print("has server reflexive:", has_srflx)
    for line in candidates:
        print(" ", line)

    assert candidates, "empty candidate list: the proxy dropped STUN and nothing filled the gap"
    assert has_srflx, "no srflx: a real browser behind NAT always emits one"

Note that the assertions are written in the positive form. They fail on an empty list and on a missing srflx, because those are the states a detector reads as manipulation. A test that only checked "my real IP did not appear" would pass on a completely empty list, which is the false green that started this whole investigation.

Run it more than once, and compare against the same probe in a stock Firefox on the same machine, since the interesting differences are the ones between the two reports rather than the raw numbers in either. If you need to confirm the exit address the proxy is actually giving you before trusting the srflx value, and to get authentication right for a SOCKS5 pool, see SOCKS5 proxy authentication.

A minimal install to run the snippet:

pip install invisible-playwright

Conclusion

An empty WebRTC candidate list is not the safe outcome it looks like. It is a state a real browser on a real network does not reach, and a detection page can score the emptiness without ever inspecting a single candidate. The root cause is the transport: a residential proxy carries TCP and drops the UDP that STUN depends on, so the one public candidate a NAT would guarantee never forms, and on ordinary pages the default-route probe fails the same way before STUN is even tried.

The fix is not to hide WebRTC but to make it produce the shape a genuine browser produces through the same proxy: a masked host candidate, and a server reflexive candidate carrying the true egress address. Look real, which means non-empty and consistent, rather than merely quiet. And whichever tool you use, read the candidate list on the deployed path instead of trusting that no leak means all is well.

Short answers to the questions that lead here

Why does WebRTC return no ICE candidates behind my proxy? Because a residential SOCKS5 proxy carries TCP and drops UDP, STUN needs UDP to discover your public address, so the server reflexive candidate never forms and the list comes back short or empty.

Is an empty candidate list safe because nothing leaked? No. It is a tell. A real Firefox behind NAT always emits at least one server reflexive candidate, so zero candidates is a state normal browsers do not reach, and detectors read it as manipulation.

Why is the list empty even on a page that never asked for my camera? Pages without media permission use a reduced mode that only advertises the default-route address, and the probe that finds that route is itself UDP. Behind SOCKS it fails and gathering returns empty.

Can I fix this from JavaScript? No. The STUN datagram genuinely cannot traverse a UDP-blocking tunnel, and the default-route probe genuinely fails. It has to be handled below the page, in the engine, by falling back and synthesizing the candidate the proxy prevented.

What should the candidates look like through a working proxy? A host candidate in the masked .local form and a server reflexive candidate whose address equals the proxy egress IP, with the public IP the page reports matching that same egress.

How do I test it without fooling myself? Assert the list is non-empty and that a srflx is present, run it through the real proxy rather than localhost, repeat it, and diff against a stock Firefox on the same machine.

Sources

See also: WebRTC leaks through a proxy for the opposite failure of exposing your real address, ICE candidate spoofing for how the synthetic candidate is made to look real, and testing whether your browser is detected for the compare-against-stock method used throughout.

Written while maintaining invisible_playwright, a Firefox patched at the C++ level driven by stock Playwright. The empty-list false green on this page cost us a release gate that looked green for weeks.

Browser fingerprinting and bot detection, from the source

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