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Reporting a safety concern
Three routes, depending on what you found. If you are unsure which one applies, report anyway and say so; the safety manager will route it.
| What you found | Where it goes | Why |
|---|---|---|
| A security vulnerability | Privately, through GitHub private vulnerability reporting. Never a public issue, pull request or discussion. | Security issues can affect vehicle safety, and public disclosure before a fix puts drivers at risk. SECURITY.md has the full policy. |
| A field incident, a near miss, or a suspected hazard | A GitHub issue with the field-issue label, or a copy of the field issue report template
|
It enters the field monitoring process and the register. |
| A bug, a question, or a doubt about an analysis | An ordinary issue | Everything else. |
- Source links, if the signal comes from a regulator, upstream, a fork, the press or the community.
- Vehicle, software version or fork, and the device.
- The scenario and the outcome. Keep facts separate from claims; the template has a column for each.
- Driver-monitoring state and any alerts, if known.
If you are unsure, report anyway. A near miss in a scenario that can kill is a Class A issue even when nothing happened this time.
The signal follows one path whether it comes from a regulator, upstream openpilot, a fork, the community or the project's own test drives:
flowchart LR
A[1 Intake] --> B[2 Triage and classify]
B --> C{Safety anomaly?}
C -- no --> N[Close with rationale]
C -- yes --> D[3 Applicability]
D --> E[4 Containment]
E --> F[5 Root cause analysis]
F --> G[6 Hazard log, HARA, SOTIF, TARA update]
G --> H[7 Corrective and preventive actions]
H --> I[8 Verification and effectiveness]
I --> J[9 Closure and safety case update]
J -. SPI trend .-> A
The flowchart of LD-SAF-PRC-001 §5, written here as Mermaid so it is reviewed as text.
Triage happens within two business days. The severity class is based on the worst credible outcome, not the outcome observed:
| Class | Criteria, any one | Containment decision due | Root cause analysis starts |
|---|---|---|---|
| A, critical | Fatality or life-threatening injury credible; regulatory defect investigation or recall; loss of a safety mechanism; cyber exploit with physical effect | 24 hours | 3 days |
| B, major | Severe or moderate injury credible; unexpected actuation; safety goal violated with no harm; driver-monitoring or driver-alert failure | 5 days | 10 days |
| C, minor | No credible injury; degraded comfort or availability; warning without hazard; documentation error | Next planning cycle | |
| D, not a safety anomaly | Feature request; not reproducible and not plausible; out of scope with evidence | Closed with a rationale |
Each issue also gets a root cause category: systematic fault, random hardware fault, performance limitation, ML insufficiency, foreseeable misuse, configuration fault, cybersecurity event, or process escape. Class A and B issues cannot close without a review by someone other than the analyst. The process is LD-SAF-PRC-001; every issue and every monitoring sweep is in the register, and the hazards found go to the hazard log.
In September 2026 NHTSA opened a preliminary evaluation, PE26007, into comma devices and openpilot after five crashes in which equipped vehicles struck stopped or slow vehicles in their own lane. The project recorded it as FI-2026-001, Class A, applicable to LionDriver because it runs the same stack. The root cause analysis is complete at the code level and waits on field logs and a reproduction. Two lessons already feed the analyses:
- A limitation that is only documented is not a control. Stationary in-lane vehicles were a known upstream limitation handled solely by user information. Every Class A limitation needs an engineered control or an operating-domain restriction.
- An "alpha" toggle can remove an independent OEM safety barrier. Configuration options need safety impact analysis just like code changes.
Test only on equipment you own. Never test on public roads or in a moving vehicle outside a closed course. Do not access other people's devices, data or accounts, and do not attack comma.ai or other third-party infrastructure. These rules are from SECURITY.md and apply to safety testing too.
Mirrored from wiki/ on liondriver-dev at 7a1aec4, 2026-11-04. Pages are reviewed by pull request; the wiki is not edited in place. This wiki explains and links; safety claims and evidence live in the assurance record.
LionDriver wiki
- Home
- Roadmap and status
- How LionDriver works
- How the repository is organized
- How decisions are made
- Glossary
- What is a safety case?
- Reading the Living Safety Case
- Standards at a glance
- From hazard to test
- Deriving and writing safety requirements
- ASIL decomposition
- Building a fault tree
- Hardware safety and interference
- After release (ISO 26262 Part 7)
- SOTIF and ISO 26262
- Cybersecurity and ISO/SAE 21434
- AI safety and ISO/PAS 8800
- ASPICE: is the process capable?
- Integrated standards: one system, not five
- For the assessor
- Reference vehicle
- CAN, CAN FD and end-to-end protection
- Contributor guide
- Reporting a safety concern
- Session log
- FAQ
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