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plat 209
PLAT-209 — a "35-minute hung LLM call" was host machine sleep, not a workflow or platform timeout defect
| Coordination | Value |
|---|---|
| Assigned agent | unassigned |
| Ticket state |
resolved — informational closure record, no code change |
| Last synchronized | 2026-08-29 |
- Priority: P4 — external/informational. The finding's own conclusion is that no bounded-timeout or workflow-side change is warranted for the incident it investigated.
- Owner: N/A — host power-state interruption, not a platform code boundary.
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Related:
host:machine-sleep:llm-session-continuity(confida-login, low), the finding this closes.PUL-048B1B72(an abort-timeqa_cyclesRUNNING-state terminalization gap the finding names as "IS fixable") is a separate, workflow-local (not platform) concern per this register's own scoping rule — not tracked inplatform_harness_issuesunder any key, out of scope for this ticket and this register.
"Informational/external, and it corrects the premise: the 2026-08-18 abort was NOT a 35-minute hung LLM call. The LLM call took 5.4 minutes; the other 30.2 minutes are untracked wall-clock while the host machine was asleep. No bounded-timeout plan change is warranted."
The finding's own evidence is precise and self-sufficient: the failing
step's execution-attempt record shows llm_duration_ms=323792 (5.4
minutes, tracked) against untracked_duration_ms=1810532 (30.2 minutes,
untracked) — 85% of the apparent step duration is suspended wall-clock
while the host was asleep, not execution time. The provider's own error
text ("Your computer went to sleep mid-response") and a prior commit
(872edfb, "Transient host-sleep failure, not a workflow defect")
corroborate the same conclusion independently.
This is a diagnosis that disproves its own premise, not an open question. The finding explicitly recommends no timeout-dimension change: "No workflow-side defect in the timeout dimension, so no plan change should be forced for it." It separately notes (without claiming as part of this finding's own scope) two real residues, both explicitly filed or identifiable elsewhere:
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qa_cyclesstayingRUNNINGafter an abort with no terminalization path — the finding names thisPUL-048B1B72and calls it fixable, but it is not present inplatform_harness_issuesunder any target key. Per this register's own scoping rule ("a finding belongs here only when the failed boundary is owned by the workflow runtime... not by the workflow plan or its data"), an abort-timeqa_cyclestable terminalization gap reads as workflow-local data-lifecycle ownership, not a platform boundary — left for the workflow's own Pulse system to track, not migrated into this register speculatively. - No fallback model configured on any role — a genuine single point of failure, but the finding itself notes it would not have helped in this specific incident ("host suspension affects every provider on that host equally"), and configuring fallback models is a workflow-authoring choice, not a platform defect.
- No code change — the finding's own conclusion is that none is warranted for the timeout/hang question it investigated.
- Did not chase
PUL-048B1B72into this register — confirmed it is not tracked as a platform-level harness issue under any key, and its shape (a workflow's own DB table lifecycle) reads as workflow-owned per this register's scoping rule, not platform-owned.
- Confirmed via the finding's own cited execution-attempt record and provider error text; no independent re-verification needed beyond reading the evidence it already presents.
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